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IT IS A GREAT pleasure to offer this compilation for the public’s con-
sideration. It consists of the speeches delivered by outstanding intel-
lectuals, politicians and critics of the dominant thinking and of the
horrors of neo-liberal globalization at the Third Latin American and
Caribbean Conference on Social Sciences entitled “New Worldwide
Hegemony”. Options for Change and Social Movements”, held in
Havana, Cuba, on October 27-31, 2003, within the framework of the
21st General Assembly of the Latin American Council of Social
Sciences (CLACSO). To Francisco de Oliveira, Samir Amin, Noam
Chomsky, Robert Dahl, Perry Anderson and Armando Hart Dávalos go
our most sincere thanks for their committed participation in this
undertaking and for having allowed us to publish their conferences.
It goes without saying that these wonderful sessions, their intense
debates and discussions, their enlightening examination of the situation
in Latin America, would not have been possible without the extraordi-
nary backing we received from the Cuban people and government, who
decided to sponsor these events, the Conference and the General
A s s e m b l y. Hence the debt of gratitude contracted by CLACSO toward
the President of the Councils of State and of Ministers of the Republic
of Cuba, Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, and through him toward the entire Cuban
PREFACE
ATILIO A. BORON
12
NEW WORLDWIDE HEGEMONY. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE ANDSOCIAL MOVEMENTS
people, who, overcoming all manner of obstacles, never stinted in their
support for this undertaking to be successfully carried out.
We must also underline our thanks to a team, as large as it was
outstanding, of Cuban colleagues of the very top rank with whom we
not only drew up the academic program but also decided each of the
practical matters demanded by the simultaneous unfolding of the
Conference and the General Assembly. It must be pointed out that this
involved not only work of a bureaucratic character but a permanent
dialogue with our hosts until the achievement of the final structure of
a program which, in our view, will be remembered as one of the most
important events held by the social sciences in Latin America in many
years. For this reason I owe very special thanks to Ricardo Alarcón,
President of the Cuban National Assembly; to the Minister of Science,
Technology and the Environment, Dr. Rosa Elena Simeón, whose
Ministry was CLACSO’s counterpart in the preparation of all events; to
Abel Prieto, Culture Minister, and, in the framework of the Ministry of
Science, Technology and the Environment (CITMA), to Dr. Daniel
Codorniú, Deputy Prime Minister of that Ministry; to Lina Domínguez
Acosta, Deputy Minister of CITMA; to Miguel Lima David, on whose
shoulders fell the enormous task of organizing the operative part that
enabled events such as these to unfold over the course of a week with-
out any kind of organizational or logistical hindrances or problems.
Through Miguel we also express our thanks to all members of the
Cuban Organizing Committee. I also wish to state my gratitude to Dr.
Daisy Rivero, president of the Cuban Scientific Committee and in her
name to all colleagues and friends at the Academy of Sciences and
other Cuban educational institutions that cooperated in this effort.
Our sincerest admiration and gratitude are elicited by the cooperation
of personalities such as Roberto Fernández Retamar, Armando Hart
Dávalos, Yolanda Ricardo and Roberto Verrier, and many other col-
leagues, so many that we cannot name them all but who are those
who, from the Cuban side, made it possible to achieve this aspiration
of having a very good Assembly that would combine CLACSO’s insti-
tutional and administrative matters with issues of a substantive nature
having extraordinary practical importance for the peoples of Latin
America and the Caribbean.
Naturally, all the above also enjoyed inestimable support and
cooperation originating in other sources. I therefore wish to thank
UNESCO in the person of the Director of UNESCO’s Office for the
Social Sciences in Latin America, with headquarters in Mexico, Dr.
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Gonzalo Abad, and in that of its representative of the general office for
Culture with headquarters in Havana, Francisco Lacayo Parajón, who
from the initial moments of this entire process offered us inestimable
help. In addition to this cooperation offered by UNESCO –which is
somewhat like CLACSO’s mother institution since, although we won’t
formally belong to the United Nations system, we hold the status of
“permanent consultative agency” of that organization– other institu-
tions must be mentioned here since their cooperation was fundamen-
tal for ensuring that this event could be carried out.
In the first place, we must thank the Swedish International
Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), which for a long time has
been supporting the work in the field of social sciences not only of
CLACSO but also of other sister institutions in Latin America. At a
time when military dictatorships seemed on the verge of putting an
end to social sciences in this region, when those régimes persecuted,
caused the disappearance of, or murdered our social scientists, a spe-
cialized department of SIDA –we refer to SAREC– performed an
essential role not only for avoiding the collapse of social sciences in
the region but also for saving the lives of our colleagues. Suffice it to
recall that the number of social scientists who in the 1970s were
forced to leave their countries is calculated at 2,000, and the coopera-
tion of SIDA was absolutely decisive to make viable a rescue operation
of this magnitude. SIDA has continued to support the social sciences
in Latin America and the Caribbean in the new, democratic stage, in
which the threats come mainly from the angle of the financial asphyx-
iation that affects research and higher learning institutions in our
countries. For this reason we wish to express the most sincere grati-
tude of the community of social scientists to its representatives at this
meeting, Ms. Berit Olson and Mr. Anders Gerdin, for their unshakable
support over the course of so many years.
I wish to state the same with regard to the contribution of new
friends who have sponsored the development of critical thinking in
this region. In this case we are referring to NORAD, the Norwegian
Agency for Development Cooperation, here represented in the person
of Lill Ann Medina, which at a recent date has begun a program of
cooperation with CLACSO to develop a series of projects aimed at
improving the quality of the research into poverty in Latin America. It
is indeed insufficient to identify the existence of a problem; overcom-
ing it also requires developing the most appropriate methodologies
that enable a precise analysis of the complex, manifold and very vari-
14
NEW WORLDWIDE HEGEMONY. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
able situation presented by poverty in our countries. For this reason I
thank NORAD for its help and also, in this sense, very especially, a
dear friend of socials scientists in Latin America, because the cooper-
ation program with NORAD has a fundamental academic component
and this component is offered by CROP, the Comparative Research
Program on Poverty headquartered in Bergen, Norway, whose direc-
tor, founder and inspiring genius is Prof. Else Oyen. Else has been
cooperating with CLACSO for several years, giving material form to
this assistance with the help of NORAD. We shall continue to work
along these lines for a long time given the success of this program and
its importance for the social sciences in the region.
Lastly, allow me to say that this special mention directed at
these friendly institutions, UNESCO as well as the diverse cooperation
agencies of the Scandinavian countries, fundamentally in Sweden and
Norway (SIDA and NORAD), would be incomplete if I didn’t thank the
staff of CLACSO’s Executive Secretariat that has worked side by side
with its Cuban counterpart and that thanks to its huge and unflagging
enthusiasm and total identification with CLACSO’s institutional proj-
ect gave its all to cause this event to happen. I thus wish to express my
gratitude to its members for this exemplary dedication, not only in my
own name, as Executive Secretary, but in the name of all the social sci-
entists gathered in this convention.
Buenos Aires, April 2004
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I WOULD LIKE TO EXPRESS my appreciation for the opportunity to
take part in the conference and also to visit Cuba for the first time,
much too long delayed, but I am very pleased to be here and pleased
that you are all here as well.
A new doctrine
A year ago, in September 2002, several events took place of consider-
able significance, which cast a long shadow over world affairs. The
first was the declaration of the national security strategy of the Bush
administration. This announced in effect that the United States
intends to dominate the world permanently by force if necessary
–force is the one dimension in which the United States reigns com-
pletely supreme– and also announced the pretension to eliminate any
potential challenge to its rule. This caused quite a reaction in the
world. Not because it was new. In fact it is not new; there are many
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precedents as back as the early stages of World War II even before the
United States entered the war. In those early days it was understood
by US leaders that the war would end with the United States in a world
dominant position and there were high-level meetings of State
Department planners and experts on the Council on Foreign
Relations, the main non-governmental foreign relations institution.
And they issued some very important studies the basic theme of which
was announced in 1941, concluding that the long term goal, I am quot-
ing it now, was for the United States to hold unquestioned power in
the post-war world and to act to ensure the limitation of sovereignty
by any state that might interfere with the policy of achieving military
and economic supremacy for the United States, and then followed
elaborate plans so as to implement those ideas. And in subsequent
years similar materials appeared in internal documents and some-
times even in public documents, but what was different last
September was that the declaration was so brazen and so extreme and
that it was so defiant of world opinion and was a warning to the world
that you’d better watch out. And that is the difference. The predeces-
sors were intended for elite discussion or general plans, nothing like
this. That is the first of the major events that took place and should be
taken into account. 
The declaration was followed at once by a series of actions to
implement the Bush doctrine. That included the announcement of
quite remarkable military plans and immediate steps that were taken
to undermine any international agreements that might impede the
realization of the plans that were announced. I don’t have enough
time, but they are quite interesting, and also unknown –almost
unknown– because although they were public they were not reported
so the population doesn’t know about them, except for people that pay
special attention to these things. One of the steps that were taken to
implement the national security doctrine, however, was very publicly
announced, loud and clear; and that was the intention to invade Iraq.
It was understood at once that the invasion of Iraq was to be what is
sometimes called an exemplary action to demonstrate that the
doctrine, the security doctrine, was intended very seriously, wasn’t just
words; it was going to be acted upon and it would be implemented at
will, without any credible pretext and without the intervention of any
international authority –that’s crucial. The national security strategy
itself barely mentions international law, or international institutions.
Washington made it very clear to the Security Council right away that
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it could be relevant –that’s the term that was used– it could be relevant
if it gave its stamp of approval to actions that the US was going to
carry out, whether it approved them or not; and if it refused to “be
relevant” then it would be a “debating society”, merely an organ in
which subjects are discussed without any influence on operational
decisions. That’s what Colin Powell, the Bush administration’s
“moderate,” explained. A few months later, at the World Economic
Forum in Davos, Switzerland, Powell said that the main issue at the
World Economic Forum was Iraq, which generated a very grim and
gloomy mood. Colin Powell was sent as the administration’s emissary
and he informed at the World Economic Forum that, in his words,
“the United States has the sovereign right to use military force and
when we feel strongly about something we will lead and we will lead
even if no one is following, as in this case”. That elicited very hostile
reactions from the “masters of the universe” as the business press calls
the people gathered in Davos, with only a slight touch of irony. These
reactions are important facts to remember and think of when thinking
of the evolving world system.
The electoral strategy and the art of “taming the
beast”
Another crucial event of September 2002 was the opening of the mid-
term election campaign, which is closely related. The Bush
administration has a very fragile hold on political power; the
population is generally opposed to its domestic policies, which is not
very surprising –the policies are harmful to the general population and
they also transfer enormous costs to future generations. The
Republican campaign managers are well aware of this. The leading
figure, maybe the most important person in Washington, is Karl Rove
who heads the campaign committee, and he informed Republican
Party activists that for the coming election, the November 2002
election, they would have to emphasize national security issues and
suppress social and economic policies. And for the election it just
barely worked. They manage to win the election by an extremely small
margin of a few tens of thousands of votes; polls showed that voter
preferences remained unchanged but their priorities shifted.
Enough people to win the election huddled under the umbrella
of power in fear of the demonic enemy that was constructed by a
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remarkable government media propaganda campaign that began in
September and within a few weeks polls revealed that American opin-
ion had been driven far off the international spectrum. Later studies
and in greater depth showed the extraordinary misperceptions among
the public, and the misperceptions are strongly coordinated with sup-
port for the invasion, which is not very surprising. I would’ve sup-
ported the invasion myself if I thought that Iraq was an imminent
threat to the survival of the United States and that it was responsible
for September 11’s atrocities, that it was closely linked to Al-Qaeda
which is surely planning new terrorists attacks. And that’s why the
invasion had considerable global support. All of these beliefs are real-
ly widely held in the United States and of course all are completely
outlandish and held nowhere else.
Well, all of this illustrates one of the dilemmas of dominance,
how do you control the population, how do you tame the great beast,
as Alexander Hamilton described the people –that’s the problem,
always. And it’s particularly difficult when leaders are committed to
policies that are harmful, that harm and endanger the beast. There is
only one effective way that’s known to carry this task ahead and that
is to inspire fear, and it often works. That in fact is second nature to
the people who are now running Washington; most of them are recy-
cled from the Reagan and first Bush administration, from their most
reactionary sectors, and that’s the way they managed the hold power
for 12 years.
The instructive nature of “exemplary actions”
Well, let’s go back to another of the major events of September 2002.
We have mentioned the national security strategy announcement and
the invasion of Iraq. As I said, it was understood at once that the
invasion was to be an “exemplary action”, that it was intended to
instruct the world that they would have to put aside considerations of
national interests and international law and they would have to act in
support of America’s goals. I happen to be quoting the noted Middle
East historian Roger Owen of Harvard University but this was widely
understood. Opposition to the war in the world –and in fact in the
United States as well– was unprecedented, and a large part of the
opposition I am sure was based on recognition that Iraq was, quoting
The New York Times, was the first test case of the national security
strategy, and certainly not the last. It was the Petri dish for an
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experiment in pre-emptive policy –that’s the Times’ report after the war
was over. It’s not quite accurate, the term pre-emptive which is
commonly used is incorrect; pre-emptive action means something in
international law, it’s applied to situations on the verge of illegality in
accordance with the UN Charter, which does grant the right of self-
defense against imminent, overwhelming attack when there’s no time
for deliberation and diplomacy. Countries are permitted to react in
self-defense until the Security Council has the chance to intervene.
That’s pre-emptive war; this policy has absolutely nothing to do with
pre-emptive war, and the term should not be used. Sometimes in more
technical literature in international relations or international legal
literature it is called preventive war or anticipatory self-defense, those
terms are not so obviously false but they are also incorrect. Nothing
was prevented by the invasion of Iraq and there was no self-defense
anticipated. The presidential declaration permits the use of force
against constructed threats, or invented threats, or imagined ones. In
fact all of these terms are just euphemisms for what was called the
Supreme Crime at Nuremberg, the crime of aggression. And that is
also understood. 
As the bombing of Iraq began the well-known historian and for-
mer Kennedy adviser Arthur Schlesinger wrote an article in which he
recalled Franklin Roosevelt’s description of the bombing of Pearl
Harbor as a date that will live in infamy; and “president Roosevelt was
correct”, Schlesinger wrote, “but today it is we Americans who live in
infamy as the government follows the policies of imperial Japan”. This
kind of commentary is also unprecedented and right in the main-
stream, in important parts of the mainstream. In fact the national
security strategy and its implementation aroused much concern
around the world including among the foreign policy elite at home as
this quote illustrates, and these too are important facts, like the reac-
tion of the World Economic Forum. In the major establishment jour-
nal, Foreign Affairs, the issue after the declaration of the security strat-
egy featured an article by a well-known international relations spe-
cialist, John Ikenberry, in which he discussed what he called the “New
Imperial Grand Strategy”, and he was quite critical of it and conclud-
ed that it poses a great danger to the world and to the United States,
including the likelihood of proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and of terror as a deterrent to US aggression. Another leading spe-
cialist made the same point and it’s pretty obvious: “if you announce
to someone you’re going to attack them, they don’t say please attack
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me, they try to work out some way to defend themselves”. The Iraq
war also was accompanied by the same warnings. US and British
intelligence agencies, others in the world and independent analysts
warned that the likely consequences of the Iraq war were proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction and terror. And after the invasion the
same sources reported that those predictions were apparently verified.
Intelligence reported that the Iraq invasion was causing a huge set-
back for the war on terror; it led to a sharp peak in recruitment for ter-
rorist groups and in fact Iraq became a terrorist haven for the first
time as was pointed out by Harvard University’s leading specialist
Jessica Stern. With regard to proliferation, specialists on Iran and
North Korea pointed out right away that the invasion probably stimu-
lated their more active efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction,
and if true that’s not unprecedented either. In 1981 Israel bombed the
Iraqi nuclear facilities, Iraq’s reactors, under the pretext that they were
developing nuclear weapons; in fact it turned out, according to inspec-
tion by US physicists, including the head of Harvard’s physics depart-
ment, that there were no facilities for developing nuclear weapons but
the bombing did have the consequence of leading Iraq to institute and
accelerate a program to try to develop nuclear weapons. Again the
logic is pretty obvious, the consequences one expect.
The dispersal of the monopoly of violence 
Well, that poses another one of the dilemmas of dominance. Vi o l e n c e
may intimidate some but is likely to incite others either to revenge or to
deterrence. And since no one can hope to compete with the United States
in military force –the United States already spends about as much as the
rest of the world combined in military expenditures and is far more
advanced technologically in military terms, so that kind of reaction is
impossible– potential victims will turn to the “weapons of the weak”,
which are weapons of mass destruction and terror. Those are available to
the less powerful, much less powerful. And sooner or later weapons of
mass destruction and terror will become united, very few people doubt
that and the prospects are quite horrendous, there are high-level US gov-
ernment-sponsored studies that go into in some detail as to the likely
consequences, most of them not preventable. This was internally known
long before September 11 through the 1990s. There’re technical studies
and others warning that the powerful have lost their monopoly of vio-
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lence. They still have an enormous preponderance but no longer monop-
oly and that difference is significant, that’s one of the reasons why
September 11 was so shattering to the United States and Europe. And the
reaction in much of the rest of the world was, “this is horrible but wel-
come to the club; this is what you’ve been doing to us for hundreds of
years. We are sorry about the attacked on you, but it is not particularly
novel”. That’s the meaning of the loss of a monopoly of violence to which
the powerful have been accustomed. This was certainly known in, since
1993. In 1993, there was an attempt to blow up the World Trade Center
with much more ambition and came very close to succeeding. Wi t h
somewhat better planning it would have killed tens of thousands of peo-
ple according to the building engineers. That was carried out by people
who were apprehended and they were closely related to Al-Qaeda-type
organizations, trained by the US and its associates in Afghanistan in the
1980s. And the leader of it was apparently brought to the United States
by the CIA and was kept there under CIA protection. For sure, at the
same time that they were trying to blow up the World Trade Center
Clinton was sending Al-Qaeda activists and Hezbollah activists to the
Balkans to fight on the US side of the Balkans war, which happened to
be at the same time. But since 1993 it’s been obvious to anyone who
reads the newspaper that horrendous terrorist atrocities of these kinds
are possible and it’s just a matter of time before they happen.
Terrible as the September 11 attacks were they don’t actually
change the risk analysis; the risk analysis remains the same. It was already
there, and the fact that it was realized basically doesn’t change anything,
except, you know, for the atrocities itself. Well all of this is perfectly well
known to administration planners, it’s not a secret to anybody. They know
all of this just as well as the establishment’s critics and they are now keep-
ing their debates within the establishment, within very narrow circles.
The administration understands surely that the actions that they are
announcing and taking increase the threat to the security of the American
people and the world, and they don’t want that consequence, but it’s just
not a high priority, there are other priorities that are much higher, such as
global dominance and the domestic programs of rolling back the pro-
gressive legislation of the past century and beating back what business
leaders call the rising political power of the masses. Business literature
happens often to be rather like “vulgar Marxism” in its terminology, as do
internal documents; different values but the same ideas.
The current leadership is extremist in pursuing these goals but
the spectrum of ideas is narrow, and that’s important to understand.
The elite criticism is unprecedented in its intensity, but much of it is
based on a recognition that the policies may prove very harmful to the
interests of power and privilege. The people who own the world don’t
want to lose it and these policies may destroy it. The criticism is also
based on the belief that there are safer and more effective means to
achieve pretty much the same goals.
A good illustration of it was discussed last night1 and you all know
about it; it is Brazil. Forty years ago Brazil had a slightly populist pres-
ident with some degree of popular support and that was enough of a
danger for the Kennedy administration to instigate a military coup
which established the first of the “national security states”, the neo-Nazi
states that then swept through the hemisphere. Well, today Brazil has a
far more impressive and far more radical president who was elected
with enormous support from mass organizations that have developed in
the past 20 years, but there is no talk of a military coup. The reasons
could be several, but one reason is that it’s simply not needed.
Neoliberalism2 and the corrosion of democracy
As regards the economic consequences of the neoliberal measures of
the past 30 years, the economic effects are debatable, but is clearly
understood that these measures undermine democracy; they essential-
ly make it impossible. That was understood 70 years ago by John
Maynard Keynes, who pointed out that the experiment in democratic
self-government is endangered by the global international financial
markets. And therefore the post-war economic system, post Second
World War economic system, which was designed by Keynes and the
US representative Harry Dexter White, was based on the principle that
if you have free flow of capitals and free speculation against currencies
22
NEW WORLDWIDE HEGEMONY. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
1 See Francisco de Oliveira’s article in this book.
2 Since the word neoliberalism does not appear in many conventional English language dictionaries a
little explanatory note is in order. Throughout this book neoliberalism refers to this new term introdu-
ced in the public discourse in the last ten or fifteen years. It refers to a unique blend of “neoclassical”
economics -with its exaltation of unfettered free-markets and its reciprocal condemnation of any form
of state intervention aimed at reducing the damages produced by social Darwinism- and neoconserva-
tive politics, with its emphasis on strong authority, religion, traditional values, and political restraint.
The economic policies of neoliberalism are properly condensed in the Decalogue of the Washington
Consensus and the “official line” of the IMF, the WB and the WTO. Despite some minor differences, its
politics are exemplaryly synthesized in the whole array of domestic and international initiatives of
governments such as Bush Jr.’s in the US, Aznar’s in Spain, and Blair’s in the United Kingdom.
Therefore, the term should not be confused with the word “liberal” in its American meaning.
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states can’t do anything because the economy can be destroyed, and
also the principle that currencies must be pretty closely regulated; they
stay within narrow bands so there won’t be speculation against cur-
rencies. The first of the major steps that dismantled this system 30
years ago freed financial capital flows, and thus comes the predicted
danger than may have destroyed the experiment in democratic self gov-
ernment. As these measures intensified and increased, they narrowed
the possibilities for governments to undertake policies because policies
are really determined by what is sometimes call the virtual parliament
of investors and lenders who decide what policies they accept and if
they don’t like them they destroy the currency, undermine the economy
and so on. Now, that’s all been well understood for years and other ele-
ments of the neoliberal program also have this consequence; take pri-
vatization, which is a mantra of neoliberalism. There was no econom-
ic justification for privatization, but here’s a very good political moti-
vation: privatization reduces the public arena by definition, it transfers
decisions from the public arena into the hands of unaccountable pri-
vate tyrannies, which is what corporations are. And that by definition
again undermines democracy. The privatization of services is now
under negotiation; that, essentially, if carried out, reduces the public
arena to virtually nothing. It reduces it so drastically that formal
democracy can be tolerated, in fact introduced without undue concern
that it might have any effects. Well, it’s been widely observed that the
extension of formal democracy in Latin America in recent years has
been accompanied by a steady lack of faith in democracy. The reasons
for that were pointed out by Atilio Boron. Years ago, namely, the exten-
sion of formal democracy coincided with the extension of neoliberal
policies which undermined functioning democracy; and indeed were
designed for that purpose. I mean, nobody says it, but it cannot be that
people who apply them don’t understand these simple points which
were obvious to Keynes and otherwise true virtually by definition. 
Well, many of the establishment critics of the Bush administra-
t i o n ’s extremism much prefer the softer measures for taming the beast,
less dangerous ones. At home as well; there is a domestic analogue. It
is also worth keeping very much in mind that the grim forecasts that
are expressed here are largely shared by government planners across
the spectrum. Samir Amin3 spoke yesterday of what he called “the
trend toward apartheid on a global scale”. And the US intelligence and
3 See Samir Amin’s article in this book.
US military planners have similar expectations; they use a different ter-
minology and they apply the policies that they expect to have these
consequences instead of opposing them, but the analysis is approxi-
mately the same, so US intelligence and military planners –I am quot-
ing– predict that globalization, meaning the neo-liberal style of global-
ization, will lead to a widening economic divide between the haves and
the have-nots and that deepening economic stagnation, political insta-
bility and cultural alienation will lead to unrest and violence among the
have-nots, much of it directed against the United States, perceived as
the source of what they are suffering. This analysis happened to be
from the Clinton administration, not the Bush administration; which
again illustrates that the conceptions are widely shared. And military
planning is in fact geared to this eventuality, quite explicitly. There is a
domestic analogue; probably this view lies at the heart of the sharp
increase in criminalization. In fact, throughout the neoliberal period
the increase in jailings centered on the people who in Latin America are
sometimes call disposable, the targets of “social cleansing”. The United
States is more civilized; instead of murdering them you put them in
jail, and this goes on right along with the neoliberal period. Clinton
increased the numbers by about 50%. Well, all of this leads us back to
the first dilemma: how do you control the population, the ones who are
bearing the costs and the risks?
How to win the presidential elections of 2004?
A specific problem right now is how to win the coming election, the
2004 election. Well, if you want to know that’s done, go back to May 1st.,
2003: recall the carefully staged performance in which President Bush
landed on an aircraft carrier, placed in such a way that you get the right
television pictures, wearing combat gear, helmet and so on; he was an
object of ridicule and fear around the world but it was taken quite seri-
ously in the United States. On its front page –I don’t know if it was
meant seriously– the front page report in the New York Ti m e s d e s c r i b e d
his victory speech as a powerful Reagan-like finale. Coming back to the
meaning of this, the more astute observers described the event as the
opening of the 2004 presidential campaign which will be built on
national security themes. That was the Wall Street Journal report. 
And Karl Rove, the campaign manager, made that clear; he said
the theme of the coming election will be the battle of Iraq, emphasiz-
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ing “battle”, and not the war. The war will go on, the war is the war on
t e r r o r, and that must continue because there is no other way to fright-
en the population into obedience, and if it happens to have negative
consequences like the destruction of the country, that’s one of the costs
you have to face. President Bush and his victory speech declared victo-
ry in a war on terror by removing an ally of Al-Qaeda; it’s immaterial
that no competent observer including the CIA believes a single word of
this. It’s a higher truth and therefore facts are irrelevant, including the
fact that the only known connection between Iraq and terror is that the
invasion apparently increased the threat of terror exactly as had been
predicted, but it makes no difference and it continues. So a few weeks
ago and in his regular weekly radio address the president announced
that the world is safer today because their coalition ended the regime
that cultivated ties to terror while it built weapons of mass destruction.
That was a few weeks ago. Bush’s speechwriters and minders know
very well that all of these are complete fabrications but they also know
that if you repeat them often and often loudly enough they just become
truth. They didn’t invent that but they know it, and it works. It works
at least temporarily; it worked last September, September 2002. Wi t h i n
a few weeks about 60% of the population believed that Iraq was a
threat to the security of the United States. No one in the world believed
that, including Kuwait which had every reason to fear Saddam
Hussein. He invaded them; they would’ve liked to tear him to shreds,
but they didn’t regard Iraq as a threat –they knew that Iraq was the
weakest country in the region, that it had been devastated by criminal
sanctions. It was essentially disarmed, otherwise the United States
would not have been willing to attack it. There was a horrible monster
running it but not a threat to anyone, and in fact Kuwait had joined
other countries in the region in trying to integrate Iraq back into their
own regional system over strong US objections. But in the United
States it was believed. Congress a few weeks later passed a resolution
authorizing the president to use force because of the threat to the secu-
rity of the United States posed by the government of Iraq. The press
and intellectuals were kind enough not to remind us that Congress was
repeating a script that is familiar. In 1985, President Reagan already
declared the national emergency in the United States –pretty serious–
because of what he called the unusual and extraordinary threat to the
security of the United States posed by the government of Nicaragua,
which was only two days’ driving time from Texas, so Americans had to
tremble and fear before the Nicaraguan hordes who posed an unusual
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and extraordinary threat, much worse than Saddam Hussein. And in
fact all of this helps explain Karl Rove’s confidence that they can carry
it off in the coming election. Let’s go back now to the powerful Reagan-
like triumphalism reflected in Bush’s victory speech.
Well, that’s referring to Ronald Reagan’s victory speech when he
informed the country that “we are again standing tall” having con-
quered Grenada, overcoming the resistance of a few dozen construc-
tion workers with six thousand special forces who got eight thousand
medals of gold during the invasion. So we were standing tall and the
powerful Reaganian finale on the first of May, on the aircraft carrier,
was a recollection of that grand moment of modern history.
Well, that went on right through the 1980s. Every year there was
some new scare. Libyan hitmen were wandering the streets of
Washington to assassinate our leader, part of Libya’s campaign to expel
America from the world. Reagan said Grenadan and Nicaraguan crime
in the streets were a threat to our existence. The first president Bush
won the 1988 election basically by playing the race card, by appealing
to the threat of the black criminal, who’s going to rape your sister
unless you elect me. The drug scare works about the same; drugs and
crime in the United States are about the same as in other industrial
societies, but fear of crime and drugs, which is manipulated, is much
h i g h e r, and it has its effects. The method worked for about 12 years,
exactly 12 years that the administration was able to stay in office, even
though the population was quite strongly opposed to its policies which
again did harm most people. In fact, by 1992 Reagan was considered
the most unpopular living ex president, right next to Nixon, and far
more so than Carter and Ford. Well, so they want to replay the same
script, not surprisingly –it worked well before, let’s try it again.
The stake on world domination
All the above is fundamental for the dominant group in the United
States. And a lot is at stake in the current situation. Internationally
one stake is world domination, which is not a small minor goal. And
also control over Middle East oil. The expectation I presume is that the
United States will end up with military bases in Iraq, stable bases right
at the heart of the oil producing region for the first time, in a client
state, a state which will be called free and independent and even dem-
ocratic, but in secret will be described the way the British in secret
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described their colonial domains. It will be run by what the British
called an Arab façade, behind which Britain effectively ruled. That’s
pretty much the way the United States has run its own backyard,
Central America and Caribbean, for a hundred years, and it’s familiar
in the history of imperialism. It’s particularly important in the Middle
East. Back in 1945 the State Department recognized that particularly
the oil of the Gulf region is a stupendous source of strategic power and
one of the greatest “material” prizes in world history. That’s not a small
thing and the US must of course control it; that has been a leading
theme of post-war history. The same intelligence predictions that I
have mentioned before had anticipated that the Gulf region will pro-
vide about two thirds of the energy resources of the world in the next
generation. And therefore the US must control them. Notice that con-
trol doesn’t mean access –it doesn’t matter whether the US uses the oil,
in fact if the US shifted to solar energy it will still have to control the
oil. In fact they predict and anticipate that the US itself will rely on
more stable Atlantic basin resources, West Africa and the Western
hemisphere, fundamentally Canada, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia
–and that is part of the reason for the great concern about the conflicts
in the Andean region. But even though the US won’t particularly
access Middle East oil itself, it wants to control it. This stupendous
source of strategic power remains and as US planners pointed out 50
years ago, controlling it gives what they call veto power over what
other governments may do. So there’s a very powerful international
interest at stake and there are also powerful domestic interests.
The Bush administration people are not conservatives, they are
radical statist reactionaries, which is something quite different. Their
policies right away included a huge increase in federal spending, in
fact the biggest increase since the Reagan administration came in,
that is since they came in the first time, combined with a massive tax
cut for the rich, and the consequences of that are perfectly obvious. It
leads to what economists call a fiscal derailment. In fact, the govern-
ment own economists now estimate unpayable bills of approximate-
ly 45 trillion dollars, which is about six times the total gross domes-
tic product. The presidential spokesman was asked about that in a
press conference and he responded that yes, it is correct, and there-
fore Congress will have to be responsible in dealing with Medicare,
the health programs (limited but that do exist), Social Security and
other programs for the population, and when he said they have to be
responsible he didn’t mean fund them with progressive taxation, he
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meant destroy them. And that’s the point. The point is this phrase,
which comes from the budget director of the first Reagan adminis-
tration: we have to starve the beast, we have to starve those parts of
the government that serve the general public. You can’t run for off i c e
by saying I want to eliminate health care, security, schools, roads and
so on, but you can run for office saying, well, I’m sorry but we have a
huge unpayable debt of 45 trillion dollars so we just can’t fund any of
those things but of course we can still continue to fund and in fact
expand those parts of the government that serve the powerful and the
privileged. That’s essentially the program and it’s not very secret. The
heart of that is military spending but you have to remember about
military spending that its purpose and its function, to a substantial
extent, is domestic: it provides a cover for the development of the
technology of the future. If you use a computer and the internet and
telecommunications and so on you are enjoying the results of decades
of transfer of cost and risk to the public under the pretext of nation-
al defense, so that then the results can be turned over to private cor-
porations for profit and that has been true –that’s true for almost the
entire so-called “new economy” and it’s also planned for the economy
of the future. That’s also one of the many respects in which the rich
and powerful wouldn’t dream of participating in market systems.
“Markets are for the poor and defenseless, not for the rich”. That’s
essentially the script followed, in its most extreme form, in the past
but familiar now too. And there is only one method to get the public
to pay the costs, take the risks, suffer the consequences; and that is to
press the panic bottom.
The Old and the New Europe
Well, there are other dilemmas of dominance. One of them, a crucial
one, is controlling other major power centers. The most spectacular
achievement of the propaganda campaign of the past year has not, in
my opinion, been in creating fantastic images of Iraq, not that that
wasn’t spectacular enough, but there was something more dramatic,
namely the admiration for the president’ inspiring vision of bringing
democracy to the Middle East, tribute to a “yearning for democracy”
as some press commentators described it. This noble presidential
vision proceeded right alongside the most remarkable display of
hatred and contempt for democracy that I have ever seen. I can’t recall
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any counterpart. And the two went side by side with, as far as I can
see, no comment. An illustration of what I mean is for example the dis-
tinction between the Old and the New Europe that was the main
theme of the early part of the year. Old Europe: Germany and France
are the bad guys, the ones we hate and rival. New Europe: Berlusconi
and Aznar and the former Russian satellites so we admire for their
marvelous achievements. What’s the criterion that distinguishes New
Europe from Old Europe? Well, it’s absolutely clear and definitive. Old
Europe, the bad Europe, were the countries where the governments
took the same position as the overwhelming majority of their popula-
tion. New Europe were the countries where the governments over-
ruled an even larger proportion of their population. The criterion was
absolutely explicit –you couldn’t say more dramatically “I hate and
despise democracy”. Maybe the most extreme, most dramatic example
was Turkey. Everyone was surprised the Turkish government took the
same position as 95% of the population, and they were bitterly con-
demned for lacking democratic credentials –this is actually the word
it was used. Paul Wolfowitz, who was supposed to be the great vision-
ary, even condemned the Turkish military because they didn’t inter-
vene to prevent the government from taking the same position as 95%
of the population and he urged them, meaning ordered them, to apol-
ogize to the United States for this departure from democratic creden-
tials, and to agree to help the United States. All of this went on almost
without comment. Although some of the commentaries were absolute-
ly amazing. Such prominent intellectuals as Robert Kagan condemned
what he called the paranoid conspiratorial anti-Americanism of Old
Europe and its feverish intensity –meaning how can Europeans fail to
comprehend that we are noble and that their task is to serve us.
Fortunately there were enlightened figures like Berlusconi and Aznar
who understood that and the same was true in the former Russian
satellites, where they have experience in the matter.
The highest achiever among them is Latvia. The former foreign
minister was asked why the Latvian government supported the United
States even though the population was overwhelmingly opposed, and
he gave the right answer. He said: “We have to salute and shout, ‘Yes,
sir!,’ we have to please America, that will demonstrate our democratic
credentials”. All of this went on without comment by the press that
witnessed this vision of democracy. That’s quite an achievement. I
don’t think many totalitarian states could achieve that kind of propa-
ganda effect. Well, the hatred and fear of Old Europe, France and
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Germany particularly, that had much deeper reasons than the visceral
fear and contempt for democracy. Ever since World War II there has
been a considerable concern that Europe might go on an independent
course. During the Cold War this was called the “fear of a third force”.
There’s no time to talk about it but there’s quite an interesting history
that is coming out of the US and Russian archive records, about this
interplay through the 50s and the 60s. The appearance of a third force
has been a major concern all along.
The year 1973, 30 years ago, was the year of what should be
called and in Latin America is often called the other 9/11. That’s the
September 11 coup that overthrew Allende, killing several thousand
people, the equivalent of maybe 60 thousand in the United States by
conservative estimate. That 9/11 as you know was strongly supported
and partly instigated by the United States and Kissinger expressed its
reasons. The reasons were that Allende’s victory could be a virus that
would spread contagion, not just through Latin America but through
Southern Europe –it would send the message that there can be a
peaceful road to some form of social democracy and independence
and that is unacceptable. In fact at the very same time in Southern
Europe the United States was carrying out extensive subversion sim-
ilar to Chile’s particularly in Italy. Major CIA operations had been
going on; in fact they’d been going out since 1947, and they were
going on in the early 70s, to prevent Italian democracy from func-
tioning. They even included supporting fascist elements, as in fact
happened in Greece right next door. It was happening at the same
time. United States is a global power; what’s happening in one place
is usually happening somewhere else. And the fear there too was the
spreading of contagion.
Incidentally, the Kremlin agreed on this; they too hated and
feared the rise of what was called Eurocommunism, and a little later
any form of social democracy. In Europe they feared it just as much as
Kissinger did; they had the same perception. Well, this fear of suc-
cessful independent development is, I think, the primary theme of the
Cold War, masked under security pretexts by both sides.
Cuba is a very striking case, the declassified records are
extremely illuminating about this, but I am sure you know about it
–this is not new, nothing new about it. The Tsar and Metternich
warned of the contagion of republican principles from the liberated
American colonies which they said might undermined the marvelous
order of Europe and Kissinger was probably just quoting the tsar and
31
NOAM CHOMSKY
Metternich when he warned of the contagion of Allende in Chile and
of social democracy in Italy. Let us not forget that he is an expert on
that period of history.
The same year, 1973, was designated “the year of Europe” –that
was the year of celebration of Europe’s definitive recovery from the
war, and Kissinger gave an important address called “The Year of
Europe Address” in which he warned Europe to keep to its regional
interests, within the overall framework of order that would be man-
aged by the United States– “don’t go on an independent course”. And
of course France and Germany are the industrial and commercial and
financial heartland of Europe so if they go on an independent course
it’s very frightening. The moves to expand NATO and the European
Union and the deep concern right now about an independent
European military force all fall within this framework of very long
standing concerns.
There’s another concern: Northeast Asia. Northeast Asia is the
most dynamic economic area in the world, the fastest growing. Its
joint gross domestic product is much higher than that of the United
States, it has about half of the foreign exchange in the world, it’s great-
ly involved in world trade and growing beyond the US and Europe and
it is a region that is potentially integrated and self sufficient. It has
plenty of energy resources in Eastern Siberia; there is now big conflict
over pipeline construction –you now, who’s going to get the advantages
from them. It has some of the leading industrial powers in the world,
Japan and South Korea, China coming along. The US is quite con-
cerned that it too might achieve some form of independence including
energy independence, which means freeing itself from the veto power
that comes from the control of the sources of energy and the transit
routes. That lies at the background of US military interests in the
Middle East and central Asia. The big question is about which way the
pipelines will go from central Asia and also concerns about North
Korea and many other issues. Again there’s too much to talk about at
this time as I would like to.
The new faces of the arms race
Let us again take up the initial idea: the bellicose strategy of National
Security is dangerous, even, and especially, for the United States.
Current technological resources make it possible to attack anywhere,
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without prior notice, and with such detailed monitoring that it makes
it possible to see cars crossing the streets in some city located in the
antipodes. This reduces the need for military bases abroad and for
allies and –in principle and perhaps in practice– offers an incredible
way of controlling the world through violence. It also, in all likelihood,
offers a method to destroy the world because it is known that these
systems are extremely dangerous. And of course, in the face of this,
other international actors don’t remain indifferent, and react.
Russia, for example, has already responded with a marked
increase in its military capability. Military expenditure has been
increasing by around a third in the last year, reacting to the United
States’ plans exactly as it was expected to. Nowadays it is concentrat-
ing on the manufacture of missiles of greater sophistication and vari-
ety, including more advanced submarines that are equipped with
improved intercontinental missiles. After the United States dismantled
the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Russia apparently reposi-
tioned itself by setting up its missiles in what is called “Launch and
Warning” mode, or, what amounts to the same thing, automatic
response, and this is virtually a recipe for destroying the world. Its
deteriorated command and control system potentially guarantees an
accident, and the likelihood of this happening will increase as these
military systems are expanded. All of this is well known, and it can all
be read about in the technical magazines. Only two weeks ago, the
Russian defense minister, Sergei Ivanov, informed NATO that Russia
is adopting the Bush doctrine of first attack, which includes nuclear
attack against a perceived threat. Well, that is Bush’s National Security
strategy. Now the world is a more insecure place, Russia having decid-
ed to follow the United States’ initiative in the strategic field. One can-
not expect to reserve this right exclusively for oneself; the Russians are
following the example and presumably others will react in a similar
way. This is the well-known logic of escalation.
The same is true in relation to the so-called Missile Defense.
This has been perfectly well understood by military specialists in
China and the United States. In fact, both employ the same terms and
know equally well that Missile Defense is an offensive weapon. What
these analysts say is that defense with missiles is not only a shield but
also a source that supplies the necessary means for a first nuclear
strike in the hope of surviving a retaliation, with the expectable con-
sequences. China is responding exactly as expected through an
increase in its offensive nuclear military capacity, which forces India
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to respond in the same manner, which in turn forces Pakistan to
respond, and afterwards all this has its effects on the Middle East and
in a large part of the rest of the world.
Again, all this is known, only that these threats, including
threats of mass destruction, aren’t paid sufficient and due attention.
More evidence on the ranking of the threats was generated in
September and October 2002. On September 19, two days after the
announcement of the new National Security strategy, the Bush admin-
istration destroyed international efforts to strengthen the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) which envisioned the supply of monitor-
ing and control mechanisms that would prevent their development.
Soon after, on October 23, the United States blocked the efforts made
at the United Nations to prevent the militarization of outer space
–which the UN correctly described as a serious danger to internation-
al peace and security– and also blocked efforts aimed at reaffirming a
protocol of 1925 forbidding bacteriological warfare, a very serious
threat for the United States, probably impossible to forestall. A good
example are the anthrax attacks: even although the tracking of this ele-
ment led to a federal laboratory, where these actions came from still
hasn’t been discovered, which illustrates the difficulties that exist to
prevent such attempts. The efforts to forbid it were blocked by the
Bush administration last October. Since 1999, the United States has
blocked efforts to reaffirm and strengthen the Outer Space Treaty of
1967 that forbids the militarization of space. This too has been
blocked since the year 2000, and Washington also blocked negotia-
tions at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament and
Militarization of Outer Space.
Recently, the Bush administration announced that it is no
longer limited by Article 6 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
This article is the only one that establishes obligations on the nuclear
powers, since it imposes a commitment to make efforts in good faith
to eliminate nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, all powers have violated
it. In fact, the Bush administration is, openly and brazenly, developing
new nuclear weapons that will naturally lead others to respond in the
same manner.
All these initiatives increase the risks to survival. The same is
true with regard to the protection of the environment: the refusal to
accept the Kyoto Protocols and other, similar measures is well known,
and there is absolutely nothing new in this. Anyone who knows some-
thing of history, including the most recent events, knows that the his-
torical record is replete with examples of leaders willing to run the
risks of destruction in order to promote their interests with regard to
power, dominance and enrichment. The difference now is above all a
difference of scale. Now the stakes are much higher. In fact the stakes
are really the survival of mankind.
The overall conclusion, I think –and part of this is the reason
why there is a sector of the elite that is opposed to the particular forms
of dominance promoted by the Bush administration– is that violence
is indeed a powerful instrument of control. History demonstrates it,
but the dilemmas of violence are not insignificant and we should
understand them in all their complexity.
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MY SUBJECT tonight is centrally the role of ideas in the construction
of alternatives. Well, if Marx was right, saying that the dominant ideas
in the world are always the ideas of the dominant classes, it is very
clear that these classes –in themselves– haven’t changed at all over the
last hundred years. In other words, the owners of the world continue
to be the owners of the materials means of production, at a national
and international level.
Nevertheless, it is equally obvious that the forms of their ideo-
logical dominance have indeed changed, and significantly so. I wish to
begin my paper, then, with some observations regarding this point.
If we hark back to the world situation after the defeat of fascism
in 1945, the international setting was polarized between capitalism
and communism. The distinction may be made, however, that while in
the East the Soviets employed the terms in the above-mentioned pair,
in the Western counterpart, instead, the official concepts in the face-
off were completely different. In the West, the Cold War was present-
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ed as a battle between democracy and totalitarianism. The Western
bloc did not employ the term “capitalism” for self-reference, since this
was considered basically as a term of the enemy’s, a weapon against
the system rather than a description of it. The West expressed itself in
the name of the “Free World,” not of the “Capitalist World.”
In this sense, the end of the Cold War led capitalism, for the first
time in history, to begin to proclaim itself as what it was, an ideology
that announced the arrival of an endpoint in social development, con-
structed on the assumptions of the free market, beyond which it was
impossible to conceive substantial improvements. Francis Fukuyama
gave the broadest and most ambitious theoretical expression to this
view of the world in his book The End of History. But in other, more
vague and popular expressions, the same message was also spread:
capitalism is the universal and permanent fate of humanity. There is
no longer anything outside this fulfilled destiny.
This is the nucleus of neoliberalism as an economic doctrine
that is still massively dominant at government level all over the world.
This swaggering boastfulness of a deregulated capitalism, as the best
of all possible worlds, is a novelty of the current hegemonic system.
Not even in Victorian times were the virtues and needs of the reign of
capital so clamorously proclaimed. The roots of this historical change
are clear: it is a product of the West’s clear victory in the Cold War. Let
it be fully understood: not only the defeat but rather the complete dis-
appearance of its Soviet adversary, and the consequent inebriation of
the owning classes, who now no longer needed euphemisms or cir-
cumlocutions to disguise the nature of their domination.
That contradiction between capitalism and communism in the
Cold War period had always been overdetermined by another global
contradiction; I refer to the struggle between the Third World’s nation-
al liberation movements and the First World’s colonial and imperialist
powers. On occasion both struggles fused or crisscrossed each other,
as here in Cuba, or in China and Vietnam.
The result of a long history of anti-imperialist combat was the
emergence around the world of national states that were formally
emancipated from the colonial yoke and endowed with juridical inde-
pendence, even enjoying a seat at the United Nations. The principle of
national sovereignty many times violated in practice by the great pow-
ers, but never questioned, or, in other words, always affirmed by inter-
national law and solemnly inscribed in the United Nations Charter,
has been the major conquest of this wave of Third World struggles.
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But in their struggles against imperialism, the national liberation
movements found themselves benefiting –objectively– from the exis-
tence and strength of the Soviet camp. Even when they lacked materi-
al or direct support from the Soviet Union, the mere existence of the
communist camp kept the West, and especially the United States, from
crushing those struggles with all the means at their disposal and with-
out fear of resistance or reprisal. The correlation of global forces, after
the Second World War, did not allow the extermination campaigns
freely practiced (by France in Morocco, or Britain in Iraq) after the
First World War. In fact the United States always tried to present itself
before the countries of the Third World as an anti-colonialist country,
being the product of the first anti-colonialist revolution on the
American continent. The diplomatic and political competition
between West and East in the Third World favored the national liber-
ation movements.
With the disappearance of the communist camp there also van-
ished the traditional inhibitions that conditioned the North in its rela-
tions with the South, and this is the second great change in recent
decades. Its expression in the field of the confrontation of ideas has
been an increasing assault against the principle of national sovereign-
ty. Here the decisive moment was constituted by the Balkan war
(1999). The military aggression against Yugoslavia launched by NATO
was openly justified as a historical transcending of the fetish of nation-
al sovereignty, in the name of higher values, that is to say, in favor of
human rights. Since then, an army of jurists, philosophers and ideo-
logues has built up a new doctrine of “military humanism,” seeking to
demonstrate that national sovereignty is a dangerous anachronism in
this period of globalization, and that it can and should be trampled on
to universalize human rights, as these are understood by the more
advanced and, of course, enlightened countries. Today, in Iraq, we see
the fruit of this “apotheosis” of human rights.
Ideological innovations: “military humanism”
Thus, it can be said that in the field of ideas the new worldwide hege-
mony is based on two fundamental transformations with regard to the
dominant discourse during the Cold War: (a) the self-affirmation of
capitalism, declared as such, and not simply as a mere socio-econom-
ic system preferable to socialism but as the “sole” form of organizing
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modern life conceivable for humanity from here to eternity; (b) the
open annulment of national sovereignty as a key to international rela-
tions among states, in the name of human rights.
Let us briefly give an account of a structural connection
between these two changes. The unlimited reign of capital presuppos-
es the de facto cancellation of many of the classical prerogatives of a
national state which, in consequences, loses faculties which used to
pertain to it, such as controlling the exchange rate, the interest rate,
its fiscal policy and lastly the very structure of its national budget. In
this sense, the juridical annulment of national sovereignty –to the ben-
efit of military humanism– completes and formalizes an already quite
advanced process of erosion of the structure of the nation-state.
Now then, are these two ideological transformations enough
for setting up a new worldwide hegemony? No, because a hegemony
demands something more, demands the existence of a particular
power that will organize and enforce compliance with the general
rules of the system. In a word, there is no worldwide hegemony with-
out a hegemonic state. A hegemonic power has to be a particular state
–with a series of features that, by definition, cannot be shared by
other states, since it is these peculiarities, precisely, that make it a
superpower above the other states. A particular state capable, there-
fore, of performing a universal role as guarantor of the “proper oper-
ation” of the system.
We thus still need to mention the third and most unexpected of
the changes underway. While neoliberalism offers a universal social
and economic framework, “military humanism” proposes a universal
political framework. With the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the radius of
action of United States hegemony has extended enormously, for the
first time turning truly global.
One may then ask oneself, how is this new U.S. high-handedness
articulated with the ideological innovations of neoliberalism and of
military humanism? Unfortunately, in a manner totally unthinkable
only a few years ago. With a steady tread, imperialism has been fully
and candidly rehabilitated as a highly valuable, modernizing and civi-
lizing political system. It was Anthony (Tony) Blair’s advisor on
national security affairs, Robert Cooper, who initiated this contempo-
rary transvaluation of imperialism, giving as a touching example
NATO’s assault on Yugoslavia. Afterwards, Lyndon Johnson’s grand-
son, the constitutional jurist and nuclear strategist Philip Bobbit, pre-
dicted in his –certainly enormous– book The Shield of Achilles the most
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radical and ambitious theorization of the new United States hegemo-
ny. Today, articles, essays and books that celebrate the rebirth of the
“American Empire,” typically embellished with lengthy comparisons
with the Roman Empire and its civilizing role, cascade from the print-
ing presses in the United States.
It must be stressed that this neo-imperialist euphoria isn’t an
ephemeral excess of the United States right; there are both Democrats
and Republicans in its array of heroes. For every Robert Kagan or Max
Boot, there is a counterpart like Philip Bobbit or Michael Ignatieff. It
would be a serious mistake to believe that this is the work of one man
alone. That Ronald Reagan or the Bushes –father and son– have been
capable by themselves to give life and growth to these ideas. It is not so.
James Carter and Bill Clinton, too, with their Zbigniew Brzezinskis and
Samuel Bergers, have made their contributions, playing equally funda-
mental roles in the development of this political scene.
We could state it in the following manner: both neoliberalism and
neo-imperialism have been politically bipartisan in the United States, as
also in its closest ally, the United Kingdom. It is not that the role of the
c e n t e r-right and the performance of the center-left have been identical in
their emergence and consolidation. Nevertheless, in both cases there was
a brief but significant intervention in the path taken by this phenome-
non. Thus, neoconservative monetarism began in the North under the
governments of James Carter and Callaghan in the late 1970s; was enor-
mously powered and expanded under Ronald Reagan and Margaret
Thatcher; and finally consolidated by Bill Clinton and Tony Blair.
A n a l o g o u s l y, the first boldly neo-imperialist initiatives were shaped in
Afghanistan by Brzezinski; extended to Nicaragua, Grenada, Libya and
other places by Casey and Weinberger; and normalized as part of the sys-
tem in the Middle East and in the Balkans by Albright and Berger.
N o w, if these are nowadays the main features of the new world-
wide hegemony in the battlefield of ideas, where are the main clusters of
resistance localized, and what specific forms do they take? If we look at
the global political scene, we may identify three different geographical
areas where adverse reactions to U.S. hegemony appear.
Foci of global resistance
At the beginning of 2003 Europe saw the biggest street demonstrations
in its entire history against the war that was being readied in the
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Middle East. In Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Britain, millions of peo-
ple came out into the streets to express their opposition to the invasion
of Iraq –even many United States citizens chose to demonstrate
against this war. The center of gravity of the international pacifist
movement has undeniably been European. How much hope may be
placed on the reach of this major reaction by European public opin-
ion? Could it have been a merely immediate and ephemeral impulse?
What was undoubtedly influential was the undisguisable hostility vis-
à-vis the policy of the White House, which continues to be reflected in
all surveys following the war, as well as in a torrent of articles, mani-
festos and outpourings in the mass media of the main countries on the
continent. A concrete aspect of this recent wave of anti-U.S. sentiment
is the affirmation of a historical identity, pertaining to European soci-
eties and absolutely different from that of the United States. The
philosopher J. Habermas and many other European intellectuals and
politicians theorize these differences as a contrast in values. Europe
continues to be more humane, more tolerant, more pacific and social-
ly more responsible with regard to the people governed than its United
States counterpart.
It is clear that the European capitalist model has, since the
Second World War, been more regulatory and interventionist than that
of the U.S., and that no European state, and the European Union even
less so, enjoys a remotely comparable military power to that at
Washington’s disposal. But nowadays neoliberalism reigns in all
European societies with the same watchwords as in the rest of the
world in terms of reduction of government expenditure, reduction of
social benefits, deregulation of markets, privatization of industries
and public services. In this regard the structural differences between
the European Union and the United States are ever smaller. What
appears is a vague notion that alludes to the existence of a cultural dif-
ference between those political units, although, obviously, with every
passing year European societies find themselves more subordinated to
the products of Hollywood and of Silicon Valley. Nevertheless, this
European distance or cultural reaction which we referred to consti-
tutes a very weak basis in terms of a lasting political resistance to the
United States. This is very clearly seen in the fact that the overwhelm-
ing majority of the demonstrators against the Iraq war should have
fervently supported the war against Yugoslavia, whose justification
and modus operandi were more or less identical. The main difference
appears to center on the fact that at that time the president was Bill
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Clinton, a sumptuous and effusive Democrat with whom so many
Europeans identified themselves, and not the Republican George
Bush, who reminds them of an unacceptably sullen and rustic cowboy.
In other words, there is no opposition to neo-imperialism in principle;
there only exists a “label aversion” against the figure of its current
ruler. For this reason, it is no coincidence that after the conquest of
Iraq the European pacifist movement finds itself in a situation of
reflux, accepting the fait accompli, and without making any type of sig-
nificant manifestation of solidarity with the national resistance to the
occupation. To this is added the fact that the European governments
that have initially opposed the invasion of Iraq (like Germany, France
and Belgium) have quickly adapted to the conquest, seeking timidly to
repair their relations with the White House.
Let us now position ourselves in the Middle East. Here, the set-
ting is a totally different one, since combat is being offered, arms in
hand, against the new worldwide hegemony. Both in Afghanistan and
in Iraq, the lightning United States conquest was followed by a tena-
cious guerrilla resistance in the territorial space that still causes the
U.S. serious difficulties. Additionally, there isn’t the slightest doubt
about the massive support of Arab public opinion in the entire region
to these national liberation struggles against the occupiers and their
puppets. It would be surprising if the Arab world did not react in this
manner in the face of the U.S. aggressions, since these take place in a
formerly colonial area that each day, with Washington’s blessing, expe-
riences the expansion of Israeli colonialism in the Palestinian territo-
ries. From the outset, this historical background separates the form in
which the Arab opposition is carried out from that of the European
opposition with regard to the new worldwide hegemony, and to this
end it must be taken into account that some of the above-mentioned
European powers were themselves the original colonizers of the
region. But there are two further factors that differentiate the Arab
from the European resistance. Here, too, a cultural contrast with the
superpower comes into play –a much deeper contrast than the one
examined above– because it is sustained by a millennial religion:
Islam. Contemporary Islam is, with all its nuances, infinitely less per-
meable to the penetration of United States culture and ideology than
the vague welfare-state identity which the Europeans boast. As we
have repeatedly seen, the former is capable of inspiring acts of coun-
terattack of unparalleled ferocity.
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Additionally, this ancient religious faith melds with a modern nation-
alist feeling, rebelling against the miseries and humiliations of a
region governed for decades by corrupt and brutal feudal or puppet
régimes. The combination of the cultural and religious with the
national endows the Islamic-Arab resistance with a strength that will
not be easily exhausted. But at the same time, it has its limitations. It
lacks the social aspect, a credible alternative vision of a modern soci-
ety to that which the hegemonic power seeks to impose in the Middle
East. Meanwhile, the diverse tyrannical and backward régimes of the
region continue to oppress their peoples, all of them, without excep-
tion, being ready to collaborate with the United States, as has been
demonstrated ad libitum by the Arab League and by the experience of
the First Gulf War.
We have already mentioned two of the existing centers of resist-
ance: Europe and the Middle East. Let us turn now to developing the
third focus of resistance, located in Latin America.
Singularities of the Latin American resistance 
In Latin America we find a much stronger and promising combination
of factors than in Europe or in the Middle East. Here and only here,
the resistance to neoliberalism and to neo-imperialism melds the cul-
tural with the social and national. That is to say, it implies the emerg-
ing vision of another type of organization of society, and another
model of relations among states on the basis of these three different
dimensions. Of the three decisive features that distinguish this region
from the previous ones, this is the first one to underline.
In the second place, Latin America is –and this is fact that is fre-
quently forgotten– the only region of the world with a continuous his-
tory of revolutionary upsets and radical political struggles that extend
for somewhat more than the last century. Neither in Asia, nor in
Africa, nor in Europe do we find the equivalent of the succession of
revolts and revolutions that have marked the specific Latin American
experience. The twentieth century began with the Mexican Revolution
that took place before the First World War. It was a victorious revolu-
tion, but also one that was “purified” as regards many of its popular
aspirations. Between the two wars there was a series of heroic upris-
ings and political experiments that were defeated but deserve to be
remembered: Sandinism in Nicaragua, the Aprist revolt in Peru, the
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insurrection in El Salvador, the revolution of 1933 in Cuba, the rising
in Brazil, the brief socialist republic and the popular front in Chile.
With the Second World War, however, a new cycle began: first
Peronism in its Jacobin phase in Argentina, the Bogotazo in Colombia
and the Bolivian revolution of 1952. At the end of the decade the
Cuban Revolution burst out. There followed a new wave of guerrilla
struggles all across the continent, and lastly we cannot fail to mention
the election of the government of Salvador Allende in Chile.
All these experiments were crushed with the cycle of military
dictatorships that began in Brazil in 1964 and then cleared the way for
Bolivia, Uruguay, Chile, Argentina in the leaden 1970s. By the middle
of the decade, the reaction appeared to be victorious almost every-
where. Again, however, the fire of the resistance was lit with the tri-
umph of the Sandinist revolution, the struggle of the Salvadoran guer-
rillas, and the massive campaign for direct elections in Brazil. This
onslaught of popular insurgency, too, was mercilessly disarticulated.
In the mid-1990s there reigned in almost all Latin American countries
native versions of U.S. neoliberalism, installed or backed by
Washington: the governments of Carlos S. Menem in Argentina,
Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Fernando Henrique Cardoso in Brazil,
Salinas de Gortari in Mexico, Sánchez de Losada in Bolivia, etc.
Finally, with a restored, stable democracy, and excellent economic
policies, the Department of State believed that Latin America had
become a safe and quiet backyard of the global empire. However, soon
the political landscape was to become radicalized once more. The
most recent popular cycle, which began with the Zapatist revolt in
Chiapas, has already witnessed the arrival of Chávez in power in
Venezuela, the victories of Ignacio Lula da Silva and Néstor Kirchner
in Brazil and Argentina respectively, the collapse of Sánchez de
Losada in Bolivia, and repeated social outbreaks in Peru and Ecuador.
We still have to mention a third distinctive feature of the Latin
American scene: here, and only here, do we find coalitions of govern-
ments and movements in a broad front of resistance to the new world-
wide hegemony. In Europe, the pacifist and alterglobalist movement
has been much more extensive than the diplomatic opposition by
some governments to the war in Iraq. This asymmetry between the
street and the palace has been one of the most significant features of
the European situation, where the majority of governments –Great
Britain, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Denmark and all of
Washington’s new satellites in Eastern Europe– not only backed the
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aggression against Iraq, but participated in the occupation, while the
majority of their populations opposed the war. In the Middle East, this
asymmetry between the virtually unanimous opposition of the street
to the conquest of Iraq and the virtually unanimous complicity of the
régimes with the aggressor is even more dramatic, or indeed total. In
Latin America, in contrast, one sees a series of governments that to
diverse degrees and in different fields try to resist the will of the hege-
monic power, and a set of typically more radical social movements
that fight for a different world, without diplomatic or ideological inhi-
bitions; there one finds from the Zapatists in Mexico and the members
of the Landless Movement (MST) in Brazil, to the coca growers and
miners of Bolivia, the picketers in Argentina, the strikers in Peru, the
indigenist block in Ecuador, and so many others. This constellation
endows the resistance front with a repertory of tactics and actions,
and with a strategic potential, superior to those of any other part of
the world. In Asia, for example, there may be governments that are
firmer in their opposition to United States economic and ideological
commands –Mahathir’s Malaysia is an obvious case– but powerful
social movements are lacking; and where such movements exists, the
governments typically show themselves to be to a greater or lesser
extent servile, as in South Korea, whose president now promises
troops to help the occupation of Iraq.
Limits of the government-social movements
articulation
Taking into account all that has been said up to this point, it is logical
that the two most important initiatives for international resistance to
the new worldwide hegemony should have been conceived and
launched in Latin America. The first, of course, has been the emer-
gence of the World Social Forum, with its symbolic roots in Porto
Alegre; and the second, the creation of the G-22, in Cancún. In both
cases, the notable aspect is a true intercontinental resistance front,
which in very different ways encompassed movements in one case and
governments in the other. Now then, both the Social Forums and the
G-22 have concentrated their resistance efforts on the neoliberal sec-
tor of the enemy front, i.e. essentially on the economic agenda of the
hegemonic power and its allies in the wealthy countries. Here, cor-
rectly, the central targets have been the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In this battle of ideas
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the notion of free markets, in other words, pure and autonomous sys-
tems of exchange of commodities, of labor and of capital, without
political or other interference, have been ever more clearly exposed as
mysthification. All markets, at all times, are erected and regulated
politically: the only pertinent question is what type of politics shapes
and determines them. Neoliberalism seeks to impose its “Great
Neoliberalism Transformation” (to employ the formula coined by Karl
Polanyi). Like its predecessor, the Victorian state, this project on a
global scale implies the imposition of trading rules that favor the inter-
ests of the metropolitan states and corporations to the detriment of
the interests of the peripheral countries. Protectionism turns into a
privilege reserved to the North, while in the South it is seen as an
infraction of the fundamental laws of any healthy economy. Compared
to this hypocrisy, the medieval idea of a fair price might seem like a
model of enlightenment. The attack that was carried out in Cancún
against the ideological arrogance and practical abuses of the hege-
monic power and its allies hit the mark.
Nevertheless, and here the discrepancies between governments
and movements stand out, resisting hegemonic pretensions in the
trade area –for example, defending MERCOSUR against the FTAA–
cannot lead to very encouraging results, if at the same time the IMF
and the financial markets are docilely obeyed in matters as crucial as
interest rates, the fiscal standards, the pension system, the so-called
primary surplus, not to mention responses to the popular demand for
an egalitarian redistribution of land. Here the role of social move-
ments becomes decisive. Only their ability to mobilize the masses the
peasants, workers, informal and precarious workers and employees
who combat wavering and opportunistic governments –if necessary,
without truce– can ensure more egalitarian and fair social policies.
The democracy which the neoliberal governments of the last decade
boasted of has always been a restricted and elitist affair, with low elec-
toral participation and major interference by the power of money. A
democracy that practices an effective resistance against the new
worldwide hegemony is something different: it requires an exercise of
power from below, the embryonic forms of which are being outlined
in the “participative budget” of Porto Alegre, the Bolivian insurgency
committees, the self-organization of the Venezuelan shanty towns, the
MST’s land takeovers.
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Who fights against neo-imperialism, and how?
We take due note of the existence of promising outbreaks of regional
international resistance against neoliberalism. What is necessary now
is to ask oneself about the current situation as regards the challenging
of neo-imperialism. Here the setting becomes somber. The first Social
Forums have carefully avoided the apparently too burning issue of the
new United States bellicosity. In Europe there have been not a few
people who, swallowing the idea of a military humanism in defense of
human rights, backed the bombing of Belgrade. Among governments,
naturally, one sees even less appetite for facing the hegemonic power
in its strongest terrain, the military field. The reaction of the diverse
Latin American governments to the invasion of Iraq could be encap-
sulated by the immediate repudiation to which the unfortunate
Chilean ambassador to the United Nations was subjected by the
social-democratic President Lagos, when in an unguarded moment
during an informal chat he condemned the Anglo-U.S. aggression, and
for this reason received a furious telegram from La Moneda in which
he was ordered to rectify his lapsus. Chile didn’t condemn the aggres-
sion; it regretted it. The other Latin American governments haven’t
demonstrated any greater courage: the only two exceptions were Cuba
and Venezuela.
Now then, this resistance front against the new worldwide hege-
mony demands a consistent criticism of its key concepts. Here the bat-
tle of ideas for the construction of an alternative must concentrate its
aim on two decisive points: human rights and the United Nations,
which have currently turned into instruments of the global strategy of
the hegemonic power. Let us first examine human rights. Historically,
the declaration that introduced them to the world, in 1789, has been
one of the great political feats of the French Revolution. But, as was to
be expected, this notion, the fruit of the ideology of a great bourgeois
revolution, lacked a philosophical basis to underpin it. A right is not
an anthropological phenomenon; it is a juridical concept, which has
no meaning outside a legal framework that institutes this or that right
in a code of law. There cannot be any human rights in the abstract,
which is to say, transcending any concrete state, in the absence of a
code of law. To speak of human rights as if they could pre-exist beyond
the laws that would bring them to life is mysthification.
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It was because of this that a classic utilitarian thinker, Jeremy
Bentham, called them “follies” and Marx, whose opinion of the former
was never high, did not hesitate to quote him on this regard.
The obvious fact is that there cannot be any human rights as if
they were dictated by a universal anthropology, not only because their
idea is a relatively recent phenomenon, but also because there is no
universal consensus on the list of such rights. According to the domi-
nant ideology, private property, naturally including that which con-
cerns the means of production, is considered a fundamental human
right, proclaimed as such, for example, in the war against Yugoslavia,
when the U.S. ultimatum to Rambouillet that set off the NATO attack
demanded not only freedom and security for the population of
Kosovo, and the free movement of NATO troops through Yugoslav ter-
ritory, but also blithely stipulated –I quote– that Kosovo must have a
market economy. In fact, within the parameters of the dominant ide-
ology in the United States, the right to decide is daily opposed to the
right to life with regard to the issue of abortion. There is no rational
criterion for discriminating among such constructions, since rights
are by their constitution malleable and arbitrary, like any political
notion: anybody can invent one according to his own whim. What they
normally represent is interests, and it is the relative power of these
interests that determines which of the rival constructions is predomi-
nant. The right to employment, for example, has no status in the con-
stitutional doctrines of the countries of the North; the right to inheri-
tance does. To grasp this does not imply any nihilistic position.
Although human rights (but not legal rights) are a philosophical con-
fusion, there exist human needs that indeed do without any juridical
framework, and correspond in part to universal anthropological phe-
nomena –such as the need for nourishment, for shelter, for protection
against torture or abuse– and partly correspond to demands that are,
in a Hegelian manner, the product of historical development, such as
the freedoms of expression, entertainment, organization, and others.
In this sense, rather than of rights, it is always preferable to speak of
needs: a more materialist and less equivocal notion.
Let us now turn to our military humanism, the illustrated
shield of human rights under the new worldwide hegemony. I have
noticed that the Social Forum and more generally the alterglobaliza-
tion movements have paid little attention to neo-imperialism, prefer-
ring to concentrate their fire on neoliberalism. Nevertheless, there is
a very simple international mobilizing watchword that they might
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adopt. This consists in demanding the closure of all foreign military
bases around the world. Currently, the United States maintains such
bases in over a hundred countries throughout the planet. We must
demand that each of these bases be closed and evacuated, from the
oldest and most infamous of all, here in Guantánamo, to the newest,
in Kabul, Bishkek and Baghdad. The same for the British, French,
Russian and other bases. What justification is there for these innu-
merable tumors on the flanks of national sovereignty, other than sim-
ply la raison d’être of the empire and its allies?
The United States military bases constitute the fundamental
strategic infrastructure of the hegemonic power. The United Nations
provide an essential superstructure for its new forms of domination.
From the first Gulf War onwards, the UN has operated as a docile
instrument of its successive aggressions, maintaining, for a decade,
the criminal blockade of Iraq, which has caused between 300,000 and
500,000 deaths, most of them of children; consecrating the NATO
attack on Yugoslavia, where it propitiated and continues to propitiate
post-sale services to the aggressors in Kosovo; and now, cooperating
with the occupiers of Iraq to set up a government of U.S. puppets in
Baghdad, and collecting funds from other countries to finance the
costs of the conquest of the country. Since the disappearance of the
Soviet Union, Washington’s command over the UN has become almost
limitless. The White House directly, and without any shame, chose the
current Secretary-General as its administrative butler in Manhattan,
casting his predecessor aside as insufficiently servile to the United
States. The FBI openly eavesdrops on all foreign delegations to the
General Assembly. The CIA, without even denying its activities, which
are public knowledge, penetrated the corps of the so-called inspectors
in Iraq, from head to toe. There is no measure of bribery or blackmail
that the Department of State does not employ daily to twist nations’
representatives to its will. There are occasions, though they are ever
rarer, when the UN doesn’t explicitly approve the projects and deci-
sions of the United States on which Washington unilaterally takes the
initiative, and then the UN authorizes them post-facto, as a fait accom -
pli. What never happens now is that the UN rejects or condemns a
United States action.
The root of this situation is very simple. The UN was built up in
the days of F.D. Roosevelt and Truman as a machine for the domi-
nance of the big powers over of the other countries of the world, with
a façade of equality and democracy in the General Assembly, and an
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iron-fisted concentration of power in the hands of the five permanent
members of the Security Council, arbitrarily chosen among the victors
of a war that has no relevance today. This deeply oligarchic structure
lends itself to any kind of diplomatic command and manipulation.
This is what has led the organization –which in principle ought to be
a bulwark of the national sovereignty of the poor countries of the
world– to its current prostitution, converted into a mere mask for the
demolition of that sovereignty in the name of human rights, naturally
transformed in turn into the right of the hegemonic power to block-
ade, bomb, invade and occupy lesser countries, according to its whim.
What conceivable remedy is there to this situation? All projects
for the reform of the Security Council have sunk on the grounds of the
rejection by the monopolists of the veto to give up their privileges,
which they also have the power to protect. All demands by the General
Assembly for a democratization of the organization have been, and will
be, in vain. The only plausible solution to this impasse would appear to
be the withdrawal from the organization of one or several large coun-
tries of the Third World, which could de-legitimize it until the Security
Council were forced to accept its expansion and a redistribution of real
powers within the General Assembly. In the same way, additionally, the
only hope for serious nuclear disarmament is the withdrawal of one or
several countries of the Third World from the infamous Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty –which ought to be called Treaty for the
Preservation of the Nuclear Oligopoly– to force the true, arrogant hold-
ers of weapons of mass destruction to renounce their privileges.
It is necessary to restore and promote any serious resistance to
the new worldwide hegemony, Samir Amin has said here1. I agree. I
will only add that the principles of equality that are demanded and
applied should be inclusive, that is to say, that they not be restricted to
the economic and social fields within nations, but also be applied to
political and military aspects among nations.
As I see it, we are still far from having achieved this order of
things. How far, can be seen in the latest resolution of the Security
Council, voted in this very month of October, and in which the
supreme organ of the United Nations solemnly welcomes the puppet
council of the occupation forces in Iraq, calling it the incarnation of
Iraqi sovereignty, condemning the acts of resistance to the occupation,
calling on all countries to assist in the reconstruction of Iraq under the
1 See Samir Amin’s article in this book.
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designs of these same puppet forces, and naming the United States as
recognized leader of a multinational force of occupation of the coun-
try. This resolution, which is nothing else than the UN’s act of blessing
for the conquest of Iraq, was unanimously approved. It was signed by
France, Russia, China, Germany, Spain, Bulgaria, Mexico, Chile,
Guinea, Cameroon, Angola, Syria, Pakistan, the United Kingdom and
the United States. The supposedly Gaullist France, the supposedly
popular China, the supposedly social democratic Germany and Chile,
the supposedly Baathist Syria, the Angola once rescued by Cuba from
its own invasion, not to speak of the other, more familiar clients of the
United States, all of them accomplices in the recolonization of Iraq.
This is the new worldwide hegemony. Let us combat it.
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I HAVE BEEN INVITED to address you “on the current situation and
prospects for democratic polities in advanced nations”1.
Because an adequate examination of that topic would far
exceed our time, I am going to focus on just one major challenge for
democratic polities in advanced countries. This is the fundamental
problem of attaining and sustaining a satisfactory level of political
equality among the citizens of a democratic country. Though the
problem of political equality is also too vast in its ramifications and
complexities to deal with adequately here, I would like to explore
three questions. Is political equality a desirable goal? If so, why does
the goal of political equality pose a profound challenge for democra-
cy in the advanced countries? Are there feasible innovations in the
standard political institutions of large scale democracy that might
help to meet the challenge?
DEMOCRATIC POLITIES IN
ADVANCED COUNTRIES:
SUCCESS AND CHALLENGE
ROBERT A. DAHL*
1 I have drawn freely here on my previous work.
* Professor emeritus, Yale University, US.
Democracies: older, newer, newest
Before I turn to these questions, let me begin with this observation. One
of the most extraordinary changes in all recorded history is the amaz-
ingly rapid increase in the number of democratic systems throughout
the world during the twentieth century (Table 1). In 1900, democratic
political systems existed in only six countries –and in all but one, New
Zealand, the suffrage was restricted to male citizens. What is more, in
the southern United States, most African-Americans were, in practice,
excluded from voting, and would remain so until the mid-1960s. By
1930, the number of democratic countries had increased to twenty one,
although in three –Belgium, France, and Switzerland–women were still
excluded. By mid-century the democratic countries numbered twenty
five– several of which would collapse into dictatorship. By the end of the
c e n t u r y, out of 191 countries in the world, more than seventy were
democracies and they included almost half the world’s population2.
I find it helpful to classify democratic countries into three groups:
the older democracies, the newer democracies, and the newest democ-
racies. Democratic political institutions have existed continuously since
1950 or earlier in twenty-one countries. I’ll call these the older democ-
racies (Table 2). In another fourteen countries democratized after 1950,
the institutions have existed continuously since 1980 (Lijphart, 1999,
Table 4.1: 50). These I’ll call the newer democracies. Finally, in thirty-
seven countries, the newest democracies, the institutions have existed
only since 1981 or later. Indeed, in many, democratic institutions are
very recent (Diamond, 2003).
52
NEW WORLDWIDE HEGEMONY. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
2 Larry Diamond (2003: 8-9) has recently listed 72 countries as “liberal democracies”, i.e., countries
that fully possess the basic institutions. He identifies an additional thirty-one countries as “electoral
democracies.” In these, “the principal positions of political power are filled through regular, free, fair,
and competitive (and therefore multiparty) elections. Electoral democracy can exist in countries with
significant violations of human rights, massive corruption, and a weak rule of law... Normatively I do
not argue that we should rest content with such an illiberal and hollowed-out democracy as our goal.
The goal for every country should be a political system that combines democracy on the one hand with
freedom, the rule of law, and good government on the other. As Guillermo O’Donnell has incisively
argued, a truly accountable political system requires three components. One is democratic, enabling
citizens to choose their rulers in free and fair elections and to participate and express themselves in
other political processes. The second is liberal, limiting the power of the state to encroach on the basic
rights of the person, and thus affirming civil liberties and minority rights. The third is republican,
providing a rule of law and good government through institutions of horizontal accountability that check
and balance executive (and other forms of) power, while holding all actors, public and private, equal
before the law. When these three normative goals are combined, we have the second, higher threshold
of democracy, what I call liberal democracy.
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The o l d e r democratic countries share much in common. For one thing,
their predominantly market economies produce very high levels of
income. These range from a GDP of over $19,000 per capita in New
Zealand to around $30,000 or more in Norway, Iceland, Ireland, and the
United States (Table 3). The older democratic countries also rank high
on the quality of life, as measured by the “Human Development Index.”
This index, which is prepared annually by the United Nations
Development Program, includes GDP per capita, life expectancy at
birth, adult literacy, school enrollment, general life expectancy, and edu-
cation (UNDP, 2003).
The fourteen newer d e m o c r a c i e s are far more mixed. Thus Spain’s
GDP per capita of $20,000 is slightly larger than that of New Zealand,
an older democracy. On the Human Development Index, Spain ranks
slightly higher than two other older democracies, Italy and New
Zealand, while Portugal and Greece are close behind. At the bottom are
Jamaica, with a GDP per capita of $3,720, India with $2,840, and Papua
New Guinea with $2,570. 
The newest democratic countries are perhaps even more diverse.
In most of them, democratic institutions have never previously existed.
Yet Chile and Uruguay are exceptions, because both countries experi-
enced many years of democracy before an interval of dictatorship set in.
Some of the newer democracies –Israel, South Korea, Taiwan– have
advanced economies and high levels of personal income, whereas in
some, most people are desperately poor and lack the basic essentials for
a decent life.
As a group, then, the older democracies possess some exception-
al advantages. Yet even in these affluent countries where democratic
political institutions have been well established, political equality, con-
sidered as an ideal, continues to pose a serious challenge, and I believe
will continue to do so. 
Is political equality desirable?3
Before we turn to that challenge, we might first ask whether move-
ment toward greater political equality is necessarily a good thing. Is
political equality really a desirable goal?
3 In the following I draw freely from my “The Future of Political Equality,” (2001 [a]).
Although some among us may have reservations, I believe that if we are
prepared to make two assumptions, the case for political equality and
democracy becomes extraordinarily powerful. Each assumption is, in
my view, difficult to reject in reasonable and open public discourse. 
The first is the moral judgment that all human beings are of
equal intrinsic worth, that no person is intrinsically superior in worth
to another, and that the good or interests of each person must be given
equal consideration4. Let me call this the assumption of intrinsic
equality. The alternative –that some human beings are of intrinsically
greater worth than others and therefore their interests ought to be
given special consideration beyond that of their inferiors– seems to me
so morally opprobrious that it cannot be reasonably defended in open
public discourse. 
Yet even if we accept this moral judgment, the troublesome
question immediately arises, who or what group is best qualified to
decide what the good or interests of a person really are? Pretty clearly
the answer will vary, depending on the situation, the kinds of deci-
sions, and the persons involved. To justify political equality as an end,
then, we need to make a second assumption. If we restrict our focus
to the government of a state, then it seems to me that the safest and
most prudent assumption would run something like this: among
adults, no persons are so definitely better qualified than others to gov-
ern that they should be entrusted with complete and final authority
over the government of the state(Dahl, 1989; 1998: 74 ss).
Although we might reasonably add refinements and qualifica-
tions to this prudential judgment, it is difficult for me to see how any
substantially different proposition could be supported, particularly if
we draw on crucial historical cases in which substantial numbers of
persons have been denied full citizenship. Does anyone really believe
today that when the working classes, women, and racial and ethnic
minorities were excluded from political participation, their interests
were adequately considered and protected by those who were privi-
leged to govern over them? 
Yet even if political equality is a desirable goal, you might won-
der whether, like most desirable goals, it may sometimes conflict with
other important values, indeed might actually harm them? And if so,
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4 I provide a fuller account in my Democracy and Its Critics, (1989)and On Democracy (1998). In these
works and elsewhere I have drawn on Stanley I. Benn (1967: 61-78).
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shouldn’t our justifiable desire to attain other goals temper our pursuit
of political equality?
Consider, for example, the conflict that is often said to exist
between equality and liberty. In the second volume of Democracy in
America, Alexis de Tocqueville seems to offer a scenario in which
excessive equality in a democratic society will lead to the impairment
of freedom of thought, expression, and other fundamental rights.
Since his time this view has often been voiced by critics fearful of the
possible “excesses” of democracy. Indeed, Tocqueville is sometimes
interpreted as foreseeing the possibility, or even the likelihood, that
majorities may employ their rights to destroy democracy by support-
ing authoritarian rulers.
What does a century and a half of experience since Tocqueville’s
time reveal?
Before turning to my response, I cannot resist commenting that
I am frequently amazed by assertions about the supposed conflict
between liberty and equality that make no mention of what would
seem to me to be an absolutely essential requirement of any reason-
able discussion about the relation between the two. Whenever we talk
about liberty, freedom or rights, are we not obliged to answer the ques-
tion: liberty or rights for whom?5
As to historical experience: when we examine the course of
democratic development over the past two centuries, and particular-
ly over the century just ended, what we see is a pattern of democrat-
ic development that seems to me to contradict the pessimistic
Tocquevillian scenario.
As democratic institutions become more deeply rooted in a
country, so do fundamental political rights, liberties and opportuni-
ties. As democratic institutions mature in a country, the likelihood that
they will give way to an authoritarian regime approaches zero. As we
all know, democracy can collapse into dictatorship. But breakdowns
are extraordinarily rare in mature democracies. Instead, breakdowns
are likely to occur in countries that encounter times of great crisis and
stress when their democratic institutions are relatively new and frag-
5 Amartya Sen (1992: 17-22) seems to me entirely correct when he says: “It is, I believe, arguable that
to have any kind of plausibility, ethical reasoning on social matters must involve elementary equal con-
sideration for all at some level that is seen as critical. The absence of such equality would make a the-
ory arbitrarily discriminating and hard to defend... Libertarians,” he goes on to say, “must think it impor-
tant that people should have liberty. Given this, questions would immediately arise regarding: who, how
much, how distributed, how equal?”.
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ile. Occasional crisis appears to be an inevitable occurrence in the life
of every country. Even mature democratic countries face severe crises:
wars, economic depressions, large- scale unemployment, terrorism,
and other challenges. But they have never, or almost never, collapsed
into authoritarian regimes.
In the twentieth century, on something like 70 occasions,
democracies have given way to nondemocratic regimes. Yet with very
few exceptions, these breakdowns have occurred in countries where
democratic institutions were very new –less than a generation old.
Indeed, the only instances in which a democratic breakdown occurred
in a country where democratic institutions had existed for 20 years
seem to be Uruguay and Chile in 1973, though even here the case of
Chile is a somewhat less clear-cut case because of restrictions on the
suffrage that had only recently been lifted. As to the famous case of the
Weimar Republic, we need to remember that it had existed less than
14 years before the Nazi takeover and the stresses on the German peo-
ple –defeat in World War I, followed by inflation that inflicted enor-
mous damage on the middle class, and then by extensive and contin-
uing unemployment– were enormous.
Nor is the pessimistic scenario of declining liberties confirmed
by the 21 countries in which democratic institutions have now existed
continuously for the past half century or more, the older democracies.
Have the fundamental rights and liberties of citizens steadily nar-
rowed or become less secure over the past half century in these coun-
tries –in, to name a few, Iceland, Britain, Norway, France, Switzerland,
Australia, New Zealand, the United States? I do not see how an affir-
mative answer to this question could be seriously maintained.
Although we must not ignore the occasional harms and failures, what
is striking is the extent to which fundamental rights, including politi-
cal rights, have been broadened in democratic countries over the past
century, not contracted. In changes that broke with ancient and deeply
established practices, fundamental political rights have been extended
to groups hitherto excluded –notably women and racial minorities–
and deepened to include wholly new social and economic rights. 
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Ideal vs. actual
I now want to advance a proposition that runs directly counter to the
view that political equality conflicts with liberty. My proposition is
this: insofar as the goal of political equality is expressed through dem-
ocratic institutions, it actually requires fundamental rights and liber-
ties. To see why this is so, I want to introduce a distinction that has
been familiar at least since Aristotle’s time: between ideal and actual
political systems. For the same reasons that Aristotle found it useful to
describe his three ideal constitutions in order to classify actual sys-
tems, a description of an ideal democracy provides a model against
which to compare various actual systems. Although ideal democracy
is probably unachievable, setting out its ideal requirements is highly
useful, I believe, for classifying and appraising actual political sys-
tems. A conception of the ideal –the kind of system we would like to
emulate– is also useful, I think, for designing appropriate political
institutions, for fashioning strategies of democratization, and so on. 
In classifying actual political systems, we commonly judge some
to be “democracies,” even though they fall short, probably far short, of
the ideal, as when we say that the United States, France, and Sweden,
for example, are democracies. In effect, we conclude that however dis-
tant their political institutions are from the ideal, they meet its
requirements at an acceptable level, a minimal threshold, if you will. 
How then should we describe the ideal? Although no model of
democracy can claim universal acceptability, it is useful, I find, to
think of an ideal democracy as a political system that might be
designed for members of an association who were willing to treat one
another, for political purposes at least, as political equals. The mem-
bers of the association –let me call them collectively the demos– might,
and indeed almost certainly would, view one another as unequal in
other important respects. But if they were to assume that, despite
these inequalities, all of them ought to possess equal rights to partici-
pate fully in making the policies, rules, laws, or other decisions that all
citizens are expected (or required) to obey, then the government of
their state would, ideally, have to satisfy several criteria. Let me list
these criteria without amplification.
- Before a policy is adopted by the association, all the members
of the demos would have equal and effective opportunities for
making known to other members their views about what the
policy should be.
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- When the moment arrives at which the decision will finally be
made, every member would have an equal and effective oppor-
tunity to vote, and all votes would be counted as equal.
- Within a reasonable amount of time, each member would have
equal and effective opportunities for learning about the relevant
alternative policies and their likely consequences.
- The demos would have the exclusive opportunity to decide
how, and if its members chose, what matters are to be placed on
the agenda. Thus the democratic process required by the three
preceding characteristics would never be closed. The policies of
the association would always be open to change by the demos,
if its members chose to do so.
- All of the members of the demos would have the full rights that
are implied by the first four criteria: a right to effective partici-
pation, a right to equality in voting, a right to opportunities for
gaining an enlightened understanding of the issues, and a right
to participate in exercising final control over the agenda.
Actual democracy
As we all know, the democratic ideal I have just described is too
demanding to be fully achieved in the actual world of human society.
Although I have described that ideal as applying to any association,
the particular association to which democracy is most important is, of
course, the state. To achieve political equality in a state, so far as may
be possible under the imperfect conditions of the real world, then, cer-
tain political institutions for governing the state –actual if by no means
ideal institutions– would be required. Amid the imperfections of the
real world, these actual institutions would be necessary, but they
would no doubt be far from sufficient to achieve the ideal. Moreover,
democratic institutions in the modern world, unlike the assembly gov-
ernments of the Greek city-states and the medieval republics of Italy,
would have to be suitable for governing a state that encompasses a
large territory, such as a country, and perhaps a very large country, like
the United States. That is, they would need to provide for representa -
tive democracy rather than direct (or assembly or town meeting)
democracy.
There is no need for me to describe in detail the basic political
institutions of representative government in a modern democratic
country, but by now it should be obvious that just as in the ideal so too
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in actual practice, the existence of a representative democracy pre-
supposes that all its adult citizens possess a body of fundamental
rights, liberties, and opportunities. These include: 
- the right to vote in the election of officials in free and fair
e l e c t i o n s ;
- the right to run for elective office;
- the right to free expression; 
- the right to form and participate in independent political
organizations, including political parties; 
- the right to gain access to independent sources of information; 
- rights to any other freedoms and opportunities that may be
necessary for the effective operation of the political institutions
of large-scale democracy.
Finally, to be fully democratic as we now understand the ideal,
all or at any rate most adult permanent residents under its jurisdiction
and bound by its laws would possess these rights. I need hardly add
that although most democrats today would consider the full inclusion
specified by this criterion to be a necessary requirement if a state is to
be governed democratically, before the twentieth century most advo-
cates of democracy would have rejected it (Dahl, 1989; 1998 and table
4 in this article). 
It is obvious, then, that both as an ideal and as an actual set of
political institutions, democracy is necessarily a system of rights, lib-
erties, and opportunities. These are required not merely by definition.
They are required in order for a democratic system of government to
exist in the real world. If we consider these political rights, liberties,
and opportunities as in some sense fundamental, then in theory and
practice, democracy does not conflict with liberty. On the contrary,
democratic institutions are necessary for the existence of some of our
most fundamental rights and opportunities. If these political institu-
tions, including the rights, liberties, and opportunities they embody,
do not exist in a country, then to that extent the country is not demo-
cratic. When they disappear, as they did in Weimar Germany, Uruguay,
and Chile, then democracy disappears; and when democracy disap-
pears, as it did in these countries, then so do these fundamental right,
liberties, and opportunities. Likewise, when democracy reappeared in
these countries, so, necessarily, did these fundamental rights, liberties,
and opportunities. The connection, then, is not in any sense acciden-
tal. It is inherent.
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The links between political equality, democracy, and fundamental
rights, liberties and opportunities run even deeper. If a country is to
maintain its democratic institutions through its inevitable crises, it
will need a body of norms, beliefs, and habits that provide support for
the institutions in good times and bad –a democratic culture that is
transmitted from one generation to the next. But a democratic culture
is unlikely to be sharply bounded. A democratic culture will not only
support the fundamental rights, liberties, and opportunities that dem-
ocratic institutions require. People who share a democratic culture
will, I think inevitably, also endorse and support an even larger sphere
of rights, liberties, and opportunities. Surely the history of recent cen-
turies demonstrates that it is precisely in democratic countries that
liberties thrive.
Let me repeat: We need always to keep in mind that certain
political institutions may be necessary for approximating ideal democ-
racy to an important extent, but they may not be sufficient for fully
closing the gap between ideal democracy and real democracy. Indeed,
as is almost always the case with highly demanding ideals, we have
every reason to suppose that even under the most favorable circum-
stances the gap will remain quite large. In short, judged against the
exacting standards set by democratic ideals, real democracy as we
know it is almost sure to be quite far from fully democratic.
Challenges
Will a belief in the desirability of democracy, which so many citizens
in the older democratic countries seem to possess, withstand future
challenges?
It is easy to dream up possible scenarios, but impossible, I think,
to gauge with much accuracy their probability or consequences.
Among many possible challenges, a number appear to me to be par-
ticularly important. But since an adequate exploration of any one of
these would require an entire conference, and much more, I shall sim-
ply describe each of them briefly.
a) One is the perennial challenge of achieving a desirable bal-
ance between the needs of the two basic systems, political and
economic. During the last half of the twentieth century, central-
ized, state controlled, predominantly nonmarket economies
revealed themselves not only to be inefficient but, because they
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necessarily grant excessive power to political leaders, also
incompatible with democratic institutions. As a result, their
appeal and even their existence have all but disappeared
throughout the world. In all the older democracies –indeed in all
democratic countries and even in most nondemocratic coun-
tries, like China today– goods and services are predominantly
produced and distributed by nonstate enterprises in more or
less competitive market economies. But even though a demo-
cratic political system and a market economy are in many
important ways mutually supportive, they do not make an
entirely happy couple6. If we believe that in a democratic politi-
cal order, citizens ought to be relatively equal in their political
resources and thus in their capacities for influencing government
policies and decisions, the source of tension between political
equality and a market economy is virtually self-evident. For,
among other problems, a market economy automatically gener-
ates significant inequalities in the distribution of resources of all
kinds; and these resources are all readily convertible into politi -
cal resources that may be used for acquiring influence over gov-
ernment. Consequently, the two systems, economic and politi-
cal, remain in perpetual tension, with constant adjustment and
readjustment of the boundaries between the two. Nineteenth
century visions of an economic order that would eliminate that
tension have collapsed throughout most of the world, and no
feasible “Grand Alternative” is in sight (Dahl, 1976).
b) Although international organizations have become the locus
of important decisions and will doubtless be even more so in the
future, they are not now and probably will not be governed dem-
ocratically. Instead they will continue to be governed, I believe,
mainly by bargaining among bureaucratic and political elites,
6 I leave this problem and the three that follow undeveloped here because I have described them more
fully elsewhere. On the tension between a market economy and democracy see On Democracy,
Chapters 13 & 14. This is one of my many efforts over many years to discuss the problem of a market-
economy in the context of democratic theory and practice, beginning in 1940 with an article “On The
Theory of Democratic Socialism,” Plan Age , Vol. 6 (November-December 1940), which was recently
rescued from total oblivion by its republication in Toward Democracy: A Journey, Reflections:
1940–1997 (1997: Vol. II, 553-583). I discuss the problem of democracy and international organiza-
tions in “Can International Organizations be Democratic? A Skeptic’s View,” in Ian Shapiro and Casiano
Hacker-Gordon (1999: 19-36). On the challenge of complexity, see “The Problem of Civic Competence,”
in Toward Democracy (1997: Vol. 1, 211-228). On diversity, see “From Immigrants to Citizens: A New
Yet Old Challenge to Democracies,” (1994) in Toward Democracy (1997: 229-250).
operating within extremely wide limits set by treaties and inter-
national agreements. Thus they pose a crucial double-edged
question: Can they be made democratic, or at least more demo-
cratic, and to the extent that they cannot be made democratic,
how can they be made sufficiently accountable so that their
processes of making decisions are consistent with basic demo-
cratic values –notably, political equality? 7
c) As a result of legal and illegal immigration and a sharp rise in
what is sometimes called the politics of identity, cultural diver-
sity and cleavages are increasing in almost all of the older dem-
ocratic countries. Distasteful as the thought may be, we know
that cultural diversity tends to stimulate conflicts that are
extremely difficult to resolve peacefully by means of civil dis-
course and compromise and therefore threaten to inspire
actions that might impair basic democratic rights and opportu-
nities. Yet in many of the older democratic countries in Europe
–and in Japan– assimilation over several generations, in the pat-
tern that has been fairly successful in the United States8, may be
much more difficult to achieve. Because declining birthrates in
almost all of the older democratic countries will require immi-
gration in order to maintain an adequate labor force, the prob-
lem will probably continue for much of the twenty-first century.
d) A high likelihood remains that terrorists employing small and
easily transported weapons will attack major metropolitan
areas. It is by no means unlikely that some may employ nuclear,
biological, or chemical weapons and cause enormous devasta-
tion, death, and disease. As the American experience shows, the
human costs of terrorist attacks could stimulate strong
demands for severe restrictions on civil rights, to the detriment
of the democratic process. 
e) Finally, let me mention what I have called the problem of civic
competence (Dahl, 1997 [a]: Vol. I, 211-228). Although it would
be easy to suggest standards of information and understanding
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7 The question has stimulated a great deal of debate. For one view, see my “Can international organi-
zations be democratic? A skeptic’s view,” (1999: 19-36)and “Is Post-national Democracy Possible?”
(2001 [b]pp. 35-46). For more optimistic views, see D. Archibugi and D. Held, Cosmopolitican
Democracy (1995).
8 One must always keep two major exceptions in mind: African Americans and Native Americans (i.e.,
indigenous peoples). 
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among citizens so high that they would be humanly impossible
to achieve, we might reasonably lower our sights somewhat and
aim for the “good-enough” or adequate citizen. Let us say that
good-enough or adequate citizens would possess sufficiently
strong incentives to gain a modicum of knowledge of their own
interests and of the political choices most likely to advance
them, as well as sufficiently strong incentives to act on behalf of
these choices.
H o w e v e r, as public policies have become more and more com-
plex, and, as with foreign affairs, remote from the direct experiences
and immediate concerns of many citizens, to achieve even this more
realistic level of adequate competence among citizens presents a for-
midable challenge. A large and growing body of evidence reveals that
in all democratic countries, including the older democracies, many cit-
izens are deficient in their understanding of policies that will have
direct and important consequences for their basic interests. This is true
not only in the most obvious case, foreign affairs, but many other mat-
ters as well. And public policies may continue to increase in complexi-
t y, and thus impose even greater obstacles to public understanding.
The institutions for facilitating public understanding that have
developed in democratic countries over the past century and earlier
include widespread literacy, universal education, a free press, freedom
of discussion, political leaders actively competing for office in politi-
cal campaigns by presenting policies, challenging the policies of the
incumbent leaders, and many others. Essential as these are to an
informed citizenry, they no longer seem fully up to the task of public
enlightenment. In a moment I shall suggest a new and highly feasible
innovation that would help to raise the level of citizen competence and
engagement.
In the older democratic countries, many scholars, public intel-
lectuals, research institutions, and others –including, no doubt, some
in my audience– are engaged in creating proposals for meeting the
challenges I described earlier. Although I have neither the time nor the
competence to describe them here, I want to offer one example by
describing a proposal designed to help meet the challenge posed by
the problem of civic competence that I described a moment ago.
This is the Deliberative Poll, created by the American political
scientist and political philosopher, James Fishkin9. Here is a recent
description of its essential features: 
“A Deliberative Poll is a survey of a random sample of citizens
before and after the group has had a chance to deliberate seri-
ously on an issue. The process begins by selecting a representa-
tive sample from the population and asking each person a set of
questions on the issue to be considered at the Deliberative Poll.
This initial survey is the standard sort conducted by social sci-
entists doing public opinion research. The respondents are then
invited to a single place for a weekend of discussion. A small
honorarium and travel expenses are paid to recruit a represen-
tative sample”.
“In preparation for the event, the participants are sent carefully
balanced briefing materials to lay the groundwork for the dis-
cussion. These materials are typically supervised for balance
and accuracy by an advisory board of relevant experts and stake-
holders. On arrival, the participants are randomly assigned to
small groups with trained moderators. When they meet in small
groups, participants not only discuss the general issue that pro-
vides the focus for deliberation. They also try to identify key
questions that merit further exploration, and they then bring
these questions to balanced panels of competing experts or pol-
icymakers in larger plenary sessions. The small groups and ple-
nary sessions alternate throughout the weekend. At the end of
the process, the respondents take the same questionnaire they
were given on first contact”.
“These typically reveal big changes in the distribution of citizen
opinion. When ordinary people have the chance seriously to
consider competing sides of an issue, they take the opportunity
to become far more informed. Their considered judgments at
the end of the process demonstrate higher levels of knowledge
and greater consistency with their basic values and assump-
tions. These experiments demonstrate that the public has the
capacity to deal with complex public issues. The difficulty is that
it normally lacks an institutional context that will effectively
motivate it to do so” (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2003).
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9 An early view of the problem is my “From Immigrants to Citizens: A New Yet Old Challenge to
Democracies,” in Dahl (1997 [a]).
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A Deliberative Poll along these lines is more than an abstract idea. It
is a highly practical and well tested means that has already been
employed on many occasions in many countries –the United States,
Britain, Sweden, Denmark, and elsewhere. 
In a bold new proposal Fishkin and Professor Bruce Ackerman
of the Yale University Law School now want to extend Deliberative
Polls to an even larger sphere. They would assemble 500 citizens for
two days before a presidential election to “consider the ‘major nation-
al issues’ designated by the contenders” (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2003).
I shall not attempt to present the details of their design, which they
have described as “an essay in realistic utopianism.” I mention it only
to show that the challenges I described earlier will engender searches
for creative solutions. While many of the proposed solutions, perhaps
most, will probably not be adopted, as the example of Deliberative
Polling shows, feasible and realistic reforms are well within our reach.
Can the older democracies meet the challenges I have just
described –and no doubt others I have not? Is it possible that under
the impact of these challenges, confidence in the value of democracy
might erode badly in democratic countries, where citizens are already
seriously discontented with their key political institutions?
We must never forget that the democratic systems in the older
democratic countries have proved to be extraordinarily sturdy and
adaptable. Indeed, it is because of their capacity to survive that we can
now count them as the older democracies. The older democracies
have managed to weather through major economic depression, mass
unemployment, inflation, war, and inept or scandalous leadership.
That a democracy is able to survive challenges like these
requires, among other things, a body of citizens who are reasonably
confident that the essential qualities of a democratic order render it
clearly superior to any feasible nondemocratic alternative, and so they
remain largely immune to the temptations of authoritarianism. The
evidence we have, imperfect though it may be, appears to indicate that
a great many people in democratic countries not only understand
what these basic qualities are but also value them highly.
Yet it would be wrong, I believe, to ignore the challenges to
democratic governments like those I have mentioned. To borrow a
term widely used to describe the European Union, we confront a
democratic deficit in the political institutions of the older democra-
cies, as well as in the newer and the newest. This democratic deficit
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presents a challenge to political scientists, constitutional lawyers, and
political leaders.
If this challenge were to occupy a significant place in the work of
social scientists, it would keep many of us fruitfully occupied for a long
time to come. What is more important, our contributions might even
help to keep democracy alive and healthy through the coming century.
Table 1
Democratic Countries: 1900-1995
Source: Dahl (1989) Table 17.2 (240).
Table 2
Countries steadily democratic since 1950
Decade Democratic Countries Non Democratic countries Percentage democracies
1900-09 8 40 17%
1920-29 22 42 34%
1940-49 25 50 33%
1960-69 40 79 34%
1994-97 86 106 45%
1 Australia
2 Austria
3 Belgium
4 Canada
5 Denmark
6 Finland
7 France
8 Germany
9 Iceland
10 Ireland
11 Israel
11 Israel
12 Italy
13 Japan
14 Luxembourg
15 Netherlands
16 New Zealand
17 Norway
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Table 2 (Continued)
Costa Rica might reasonably be added since it made the transition to democracy a few
years later.
Table 3
The Older Democracies: GDP Per Capita 
(Purchasing Power Parity, US $) 2001
Source: UNDP, 2003
18 Sweden
19 Switzerland
20 United Kingdom
21 United States
GDP per Capita
GDP rank US$
1 Luxembourg 53.780
2 United States 34.320
3 Ireland 32.410
4 Iceland 29.990
5 Norway 29.620
6 Denmark 29.000
7 Switzerland 28.100
8 Netherlands 27.190
9 Canada 27.130
10 Austria 26.730
11 Belgium 25.520
12 Australia 25.370
13 Germany 25.350
14 Japan 25.130
15 Italy 24.670
16 Israel 19.790
17 Finland 24.430
18 Sweden 24.180
19 United Kingdom 24.160
20 France 23.990
21 New Zealand 19.160
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Table 4
The relation between the institutions of actual (large-scale)
democracy and the requirements of an ideal democracy 
Source: Dahl (1998) Fig. 7, 92.
In a unit as large as a country, ...are necessary to satisfy these
these political institutions criteria of ideal democracy
1. Elected representatives Effective participation
Control of the agenda
2. Free, fair, and frequent elections Voting equality
Effective participation
3. Freedom of expression Effective participation 
Enlightened understanding
Control of the agenda
4. Alternative sources of information Effective participation
Enlightened understanding
Control of the agenda
5. Associational autonomy Effective participation
Enlightened understanding
Control of the agenda
6. Full inclusion of all members Effective participation
of the demos Voting equality
Enlightened understanding
Control of the agenda
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THE ANALYSIS I propose is inscribed within an overall historical
view of the expansion of capitalism, which I can not develop here1.
In this view, capitalism has always, since its origins, been a polariz-
ing system by nature, that is, imperialistic. This polarization –in
other words, the concomitant construction of dominant centers and
dominated peripheries and their ever deeper reproduction at each
stage– is inherent in the process of accumulation of capital operat-
ing on a worldwide scale, founded on what I have called “the global-
ized law of value.”
In this theory of the worldwide expansion of capitalism, the
qualitative transformations of the systems of accumulation between
one phase and another in its history construct the successive forms of
the asymmetrical, centers/peripheries polarization, that is, of concrete
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1 I suggest consulting Amin (1981, 2001) and Amin & Anderson (1992).
imperialism. The contemporary world system will, consequently, con-
tinue to be imperialistic (polarizing) in any possible future, so long as
the fundamental logic of its deployment continues to be dominated by
capitalist relations of production. This theory associates imperialism
with the process of capital accumulation on a worldwide scale, an
event that I regard as one sole reality with different dimensions, which
are, in fact, inseparable. It differs from the vulgarized version of the
Leninist theory of “imperialism as the higher phase of capitalism” (as
if the previous phases of the worldwide expansion of capitalism had-
n’t been polarizing) and from contemporary post-modernist theories
that term the new globalization “post-imperialistic2.”
From the permanent conflict among imperialisms to
collective imperialism
In its worldwide deployment, imperialism was always conjugated in
plural form, from its origins in the nineteenth century until 1945. The
conflict among imperialisms played a decisive role in the transforma-
tion of the world through the class struggle, by which the fundamen-
tal contradictions of capitalism are expressed. Social struggles and
conflicts among imperialisms were closely articulated and this articu-
lation is what has ruled the history of really existing capitalism. I point
out in this regard that the proposed analysis differs markedly from
that of the “succession of hegemonies.”
The Second World War triggered a greater transformation as
regards the form of imperialism: the substitution of a collective impe-
rialism, associating the group of centers of the capitalist world system
(for simplicity’s sake, the “triad”: the United States and its Canadian
outside province, Western and central Europe and Japan) for the mul-
tiplicity of imperialisms in permanent conflict. This new form of
imperialist expansion underwent diverse phases of development, but
is still present. The eventual hegemonic role of the United States,
about which it will be necessary to specify its foundations and the
ways in which it articulates with the new collective imperialism, must
be situated within this perspective. These issues underline problems
which are precisely the ones I would like to treat below.
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The United States obtained a gigantic benefit with the end of the
Second World War: the main combatants –Europe, the Soviet Union,
China and Japan– were ruined and America was in a condition to exer-
cise its economic hegemony, since it concentrated more than half the
industrial output of the world at that time and had exclusivity over the
new technologies that guided development in the second half of the
century. Additionally, the United States had exclusivity over nuclear
weapons –the new “absolute” weapon. At Potsdam the American tone
changed; days after the bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki it
already wielded nuclear armament.
This twofold absolute advantage –economic and technological–
turned out to erode in a relatively brief time (two decades) through a
double recovery, economic for capitalist Europe and Japan, military
for the Soviet Union. We will thus recall how this relative pullback of
American power nourished an entire era in which there flourished the
discourse about the “American decline” and alternative hegemonies
even waxed (Europe, Japan, and later China).
Gaullism corresponds to this stage. De Gaulle considered that
the goal of the United States after 1945 had been control over the
entire Old World (“Eurasia”), and that Washington had managed to
make its pawns advance, destroying Europe –the real Europe, from
the Atlantic to the Urals, that is, including “Soviet Russia,” as he used
to say– by raising the specter of an “aggression” from Moscow in
which he did not believe. His analyses were, from my point of view,
realistic and perfect. But he was almost the only one to do this. The
counter-strategy that he proposed in the face of the “Atlantism” pro-
moted by Washington was based on Franco-German reconciliation as
the basis for conceiving the construction of a “non-American Europe,”
careful to keep Great Britain out of the project, since it was regarded,
and justly so, as the Trojan Horse of Atlantism. Europe could then
open towards a reconciliation with (Soviet) Russia. Reconciling and
bringing together the three great European peoples –French, German
and Russian– would put a definitive end to the U.S. project of world
domination. The inner conflict inherent in the European project can
be reduced to the choice between two options: an Atlantic Europe, the
American project, or a non-Atlantic Europe (integrated, within this
standpoint, with Russia). But this conflict hasn’t yet been resolved.
Ulterior developments –the end of Gaullism, the admission of Great
Britain into Europe, the growth of the East, the Soviet collapse– have
hitherto favored what I term the “suppression of the European proj-
74
NEW WORLDWIDE HEGEMONY. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
ect” and its “double dissolution in neoliberal economic globalization
and in the political and military alignment with Washington” (Amin,
2000). This evolution additionally nurtures the solidity of the collec-
tive nature of the imperialism of the triad.
Is this a “definitive” (not circumstantial) transformation? Will it
necessarily imply a United States “leadership” in one form or another?
Before attempting to answer these questions it is necessary to explain
with greater precision what the United States project consists of.
The project of the U.S. ruling class
The undertaking of extending the Monroe doctrine to the entire plan-
et didn’t spring, in all its insane and even criminal enormity, from the
head of President Bush Junior, to be put into practice by an extreme
right-wing junta that achieved power by a kind of coup d’état as a con-
sequence of dubious elections.
This is the project which the U.S. leadership class conceived
after 1945 and from which it has never deviated, although its enact-
ment has, quite obviously, undergone diverse vicissitudes. When on
the verge of failure it has only been possible to put it into practice with
the necessary consistency and violence at certain moments marked by
specific circumstances, such as ours as a consequence of the collapse
of the Soviet Union. 
The project has always allocated a decisive role to its military
dimension. Conceived at Potsdam, as I have earlier argued, this proj-
ect was grounded on the nuclear monopoly. Very quickly, the United
States launched a global military strategy, splitting the world into
regions and delegating responsibility for control over each of them to
a U.S. Military Command. I here again recall what I wrote before the
collapse of Soviet Russia regarding the priority assigned to the Middle
East is this global strategic vision (Amin and others, 1992). The goal
wasn’t only to “encircle the USSR” (and China likewise) but also to
obtain the means to make Washington the absolute ruler of all regions
of the planet. Put differently, to extend the Monroe Doctrine to the
entire planet –the doctrine that in fact gave the United States the
exclusive “right” over the New World in pursuance of what it defined
as its “national interests.”
In this way, “the sovereignty of the national interests of the
United States” was placed above all the other principles that frame the
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political behavior that is regarded as a “legitimate” means, developing
a systematic mistrust with regard to any supra-national right.
Certainly, the imperialists of the past had not behaved differently, and
those who seek to mitigate the responsibilities –and criminal behav-
ior– of the United States leadership at the present time, seeking
“excuses3,” must consider the same argument: that of indisputable his-
torical precedents.
We would have liked to see history change as appeared to be the
case after 1945. The conflict among imperialisms and the contempt
for international law, given the horrors that the Fascist powers caused
during the Second World War, were the elements that led to the U.N.
being founded on a new principle that proclaimed the illegitimate
nature of wars. The United States, we might say, did not endorse this
principle; rather it has, in addition, widely overridden its early initia-
tors. The day after the First World War, Wilson espoused founding
international politics anew on different principles than those which,
since the treaty of Westphalia (1648), had given sovereignty to monar-
chic states and later to more or less democratic nations, given that this
absolute character had been put into question by the disaster to which
it had led modern civilization. Little does it matter that the vicissi-
tudes of domestic policy in the United States should have postponed
the launching of these principles, since for example Franklin D.
Roosevelt, and even his successor Harry S. Truman, played a decisive
role in the definition of the new concept of multilateralism and in the
condemnation of war that went with it –the basis of the United
Nations Charter.
This beautiful initiative –one that was backed by the peoples of
the entire world of that time, and which indeed represented a qualita-
tive jump towards the progress of civilization– never enjoyed the con-
viction or the support of the leadership classes in the United States.
The authorities in Washington always felt ill at ease within the U.N.
and nowadays brutally proclaim what they had been forced to hide up
to this time: they do not accept even the concept of an international
law higher than what they consider to be the demands of the defense
of “their national interests.” I do not consider that it is acceptable to
find excuses for this return to the vision that the Nazis had developed
in their day when demanding the destruction of the League of
Nations. Preaching in favor of the law with as much talent and ele-
3 Such as, for example, Chaliand & Arnaud Blin (2003).
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gance as was done by Dominique de Villepin before the Security
Council is, unfortunately, only a “nostalgic look at the past” instead of
constituting a reminder of what the future should be like. On this
occasion the United States has defended a past that we thought had
been definitively left behind.
In the immediate postwar period American leadership was not
only accepted but requested by the bourgeoisies of Europe and of
Japan. Because although the reality of a threat of “Soviet invasion”
could only convince the weak in spirit, invoking it benefited not only
the right but the social democrats, with their adversarial cousins the
communists. It was possible to believe that the collective nature of the
new imperialism was only due to this political factor, and that once
Europe and Japan recovered their development they would seek to
unencumber themselves from the bothersome and useless tutelage of
Washington. But that wasn’t the case. Why?
My explanation requires going back to the growth of the nation-
al liberation movements in Asia and in Africa –the Bandung era, 1955-
1975 (Amin, 1989)– and the backing given to them by the Soviet Union
and China (each one in its own manner). Imperialism then found itself
forced to act, not only accepting peaceful coexistence in vast areas that
were wholly denied to it (“the socialist world”), but also by negotiating
the terms of the participation of the countries of Asia and Africa in the
imperialist world system. The alignment of the triad collective under
American leadership seemed to be useless for dominating the North-
South relations of the period. That is the reason that the Non-Aligned
found themselves facing a “Western bloc” that was virtually seamless.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the vanishing of the
national-populist régimes born of the national liberation struggles
evidently made it possible for the United States’ project to be put vig-
orously into practice, especially in the Middle East, but also in Africa
and Latin America. Economic rule over the world on the basis of the
principles of neoliberalism, put into practice by the Group of 7 and
the institutions at its service (WTO, World Bank and IMF) and the
structural readjustment plans imposed on the Third World, are the
expression of this. At the political level, we can verify that at the ini-
tial moment Europeans and Japanese accepted to align themselves
with the United States’ project, during the Gulf war (1991) and later
in those in Yugoslavia and Central Asia (2002), acquiescing in the
sidetracking of the U.N. to the benefit of NATO. This initial moment
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h a s n ’t yet been surpassed, although some signs indicate a possible
ending as of the Iraq war (2003[a] and [b]).
The American ruling class proclaims without a shade of reti-
cence that it will not “tolerate” the rebuilding of any economic or mil-
itary power capable of questioning its monopoly of domination over
the planet and, to this end, assigns itself the right to lead “preventive
wars.” Three potential adversaries can be made out.
In the first place Russia, whose dismemberment constitutes the
United States’ greatest strategic objective. The Russian ruling class
doesn’t appear to have understood this to date. Rather, it seems to
have convinced itself that, after having “lost the war,” it could “win the
peace,” just as happened with Germany and Japan. It forgets that
Washington needed to help those two adversaries of the Second World
War, precisely to face the Soviet challenge. The new circumstances are
different; the United States has no serious competition. Its option then
is to definitively and utterly destroy the defeated Russian adversary.
Could it be that V. Putin has understood this and could Russia begin-
ning to dispel its illusions?
In the second place China, whose mass and economic success
worry the United States, the strategic objective of which is to dis-
member that great country (Amin, 1996: chapter VII).
Europe ranks third in this global vision held by the new owners
of the world. But in this case the American leadership doesn’t appear
to be concerned, at least not up to the moment. The unconditional
Atlantism of some (Great Britain and the new servile powers), the
“quicksand of the European project” (a point to which I shall return)
and the converging interests of the dominant capital in the collective
imperialism of the triad, contribute to the vanishing of the European
project, kept within its status as the “European mode of the United
States project.” Wa s h i n g t o n ’s diplomacy has managed to keep
Germany in its place and the reunification and conquest of Eastern
Europe have, apparently, reinforced this alliance: Germany has been
emboldened and is taking its tradition of “Eastward expansion” up
again. Berlin’s role in the dismemberment of Yugoslavia by virtue of
the recognition given to the independence of Slovenia and Croatia
was an expression of this (Amin, 1994), and, for the rest, it has been
invited to navigate in Wa s h i n g t o n ’s seat. Nevertheless, the German
political class appears hesitant and may be divided as to its strategic
options. The option of a renewed Atlantic alignment has, as a coun-
terpart, a strengthening of the Paris-Berlin-Moscow axis, which
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would turn into the most solid pillar of a European system inde-
pendent from Wa s h i n g t o n .
We can thus return to our central issue: the nature and eventu-
al solidarity of the collective imperialism of the triad and the contra-
dictions and weaknesses of its leadership by the United States.
The collective imperialism of the triad
and the hegemony of the United States
The world of today is militarily unipolar. Simultaneously, fractures
appear to be outlined between the United States and certain European
countries, as regards the political handling of a globalized system,
aligned –in the first instance– as a whole under the principles of free
trade. Are these fractures only circumstantial and of limited scope or
do they announce lasting changes? It would be necessary to analyze,
in all its complexity, the logic that guides the deployment of the new
phase of the collective imperialism (North-South relations in ordinary
language) and the objectives inherent in the United States’ project. It
is in this spirit that I will succinctly and successively broach five series
of questions.
The nature of the evolution that contributes to 
the setting up of the new collective imperialism
I suggest in this subsection that the constitution of the new collective
imperialism has its origin in the transformation of the conditions of
competition. Some decades ago, large corporations generally waged
their competitive battles in domestic markets, be they the United
States (the biggest national market in the world) or the European
states (despite their modest size). The victors of the national matches
could situate themselves advantageously on the world market. At the
present time, the size of the market needed to reach the first cycle of
matches is close to 500/600 million “potential consumers.” And it is
those who achieve such a market who prevail in their respective
national territories. A thorough globalization is the first framework of
activity of the large corporations. Expressed differently, in the domes-
tic/worldwide duo the terms of causality have been reversed: previ-
ously, the domestic power commanded a world presence; nowadays
it’s the other way around. In this way, transnational firms, whatever
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their nationality, have common interests in the handling of the world
market. These interests are superimposed on those permanent and
mercantile conflicts that define all the forms of competition inherent
in capitalism, whichever they be.
The solidarity of the dominant segments of transnational capi-
tal with all members of the triad is real, and is expressed in their affil-
iation with globalized neoliberalism. Within this perspective the
United States is considered the defender (militarily if necessary) of
their “common interests.” This doesn’t mean that Washington consid-
ers that it must “equably share” the profits of its leadership. The
United States is bent, on the contrary, on treating its allies as vassals
and is only disposed to allow minor concessions for its underlings in
the triad. Will this conflict of interests in the dominant capital reach
the point of entailing a rupture in the Atlantic alliance? It is not impos-
sible, but it is unlikely.
The place of the United States in the world economy
The generalized opinion is that the military potential of the United
States only constitutes the tip of the iceberg that extends its superior-
ity in all domains, economic, political, cultural. Submission to the
U.S. hegemony will thus be inevitable. I consider, on the contrary, that
in the system of collective imperialism the United States doesn’t enjoy
decisive economic advantages, given that its productive system is far
from being “the most efficient in the world,” since almost none of its
segments would win against its competitors in a truly open market
such as is imagined by neoliberal economists. Witness to this is the
worsening of its trade deficit. In virtually all segments of its produc-
tive system, including high-technology goods, profits have given place
to a deficit. The competition between Ariane and NASA’s rockets and
between Airbus and Boeing is witness to the vulnerability of the
American advantage. Against Europe and Japan in high-tech produc-
tion, against China, Korea and other industrialized countries of Asia
and Latin America as regards manufactured products of a banal
nature, and against Europe and the Southern Cone as regards agri-
culture. The United States would not win the competition if it did not
resort to “non-economic” means that violate the very principles of free
trade imposed on its competitors!
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The United States only has well-established comparative advantages
in the arms sector, precisely because the latter escapes markedly
from the rules of the marketplace and benefits from government
support. Undoubtedly, this advantage brings others with it in the
civilian sphere (the Internet is the best-known example) but it is
equally the cause of severe distortions and constitute handicaps for
many productive sectors.
The United States exists as a parasite to the detriment of its
partners in the world system. “The United States depends for ten per-
cent of its industrial consumption on goods whose import isn’t cov-
ered by exports of domestic products” (Todd, 2002). The world pro-
duces, the United States (whose national savings are virtually nil) con-
sumes. “The advantage” of the United States is that of a predator
whose deficit is covered by the contributions of others, with their con-
sent or by force. The means put into practice by Washington to com-
pensate for its deficiencies are of a diverse nature: repeated unilateral
violations of the principles of free trade, arms exports and search for
oil profits (which presupposes the agreement of its producers, one of
the real motives for the wars in Central Asia and Iraq). The main part
of the American deficit is met by capital contributions originating in
Europe and Japan, the South (wealthy oil countries and the purchas-
ing classes in all the countries of the Third World, including the poor-
est ones), to which we might add the bleeding imposed in the name of
servicing the debt imposed on virtually all countries on the periphery
of the world system.
The growth of the Clinton years, glorified as the product of a
“free-trade policies” that Europe unfortunately resisted, is fictitious
and cannot become generalized, because it rested on capital transfers
that implied the encumbrance of its partners. In all segments of the
real productive system, U.S. growth has not been better than
E u r o p e ’s. The “American miracle” fed exclusively on the growth in
expenditure caused by the worsening of social inequalities (financial
and personal services: legions of lawyers and private security forces,
etc.) In this sense, Clinton’s free-trade approach provided a good
grounding for the conditions that allowed the reactionary takeoff and
ultimate victory of Bush Junior.
The causes that originated the weakening of the United States’
productive system are complex and structural. The mediocrity of the
general educational and training systems, and the tenacious preju-
dice that favors private services to the detriment of public services,
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are among the main reasons of the profound crisis that American
society is undergoing.
It should therefore surprise us that Europeans, far from reach-
ing these conclusions that become manifest on verifying the insuffi-
ciency of the economy of the United States, should strive to imitate it.
The liberal virus doesn’t explain everything either, although it has
some roles that are useful to the system, such as that of paralyzing the
left. Privatization to the hilt and the dismantling of public services will
only manage to reduce the comparative advantages which the “Old
Europe,” as Bush calls it, still benefits from. But whatever the dam-
ages they will cause over the long term, these measures offer the dom-
inant capital, which lives on the short term, the occasion for supple-
mentary profits.
The goals of the U.S. project
The hegemonic strategy of the United States is situated within the
framework of a new collective imperialism.
(Conventional) economists lack the analytical tools that would
allow them to understand the full importance of the first of these
goals. Don’t we hear them repeat to exhaustion that in the “new econ-
omy” the raw materials provided by the Third World will lose their
importance and that, consequently, the latter will be ever more mar-
ginal within the world system? Against this naive and empty dis-
course, the Mein Kampf of the new Washington administration4 con-
fesses that the United States considers it has the right to appropriate
all the natural resources of the planet to satisfy its consumers first.
The rush for raw materials (oil, water and other resources) is already
before us in all its virulence. Especially so in the cases of resources
that are running out, not only because of the exponential cancer trig-
gered by wasteful Western consumption, but also because of the
development of the new industrialization in the peripheries.
At the same time, a respectable number of the countries of the
South are destined to turn into ever more significant industrial pro-
ducers, both within their domestic markets and on the world market.
Importers of technology, of capital, but also competitors in exports,
they will be present with increasing weight in the world equilibrium.
4 I refer to The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, announced in 2002.
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This doesn’t involve only some countries in east Asia (like Korea), but
the immense China and, tomorrow, India and the big countries of
Latin America. Now then, far from this being a factor of stability, the
acceleration of capitalist expansion in the South can only be the cause
of violent conflicts, internally and internationally. Because this expan-
sion cannot, under the conditions in the periphery, absorb the enor-
mous labor force that is concentrated there. In this sense, the system’s
peripheries are “tempest areas.” The centers of the capitalist system
experience the need to exercise their domination over the peripheries
and to subject their people to the ferocious discipline demanded for
the satisfaction of their priorities.
Within this perspective, the American leadership has under-
stood perfectly that, to preserve its hegemony, it enjoys three decisive
advantages over its European and Japanese competitors: control over
the natural resources of the globe, the military monopoly and the
weight exerted by “Anglo-Saxon culture, through which the ideologi-
cal dominance of capitalism is preferentially expressed. The systemat-
ic application of these three advantages explains many aspects of
United States policy, especially the systematic efforts carried out by
Washington for control over the oil-producing Middle East, its offen-
sive strategy vis-à-vis Korea –taking advantage of that country’s “finan-
cial crisis”– and vis-à-vis China, and the subtle maneuvering that seeks
to perpetuate divisions in Europe (mobilizing Britain, its uncondi-
tional ally, to this end), and hindering a serious rapprochement
between the European Union and Russia. At the level of global control
over the planet’s resources, the United States enjoys decisive advan-
tages over Europe and Japan. Not only because it is the only world
military power, for which reason no strong intervention in the Third
World can be carried out without it, but because Europe (excluding
the former USSR) and Japan lack the resources essential for the sur-
vival of their economies. For example, their dependence in the energy
area will be considerable for a long time, even though it decrease in
relative terms. Taking control –militarily– over this region with the
war in Iraq, the United States has demonstrated that it is perfectly
conscious of the usefulness of this means of pressure vis-à-vis its
allies-competitors. Previously, Soviet power had understood this vul-
nerability of Europe and of Japan and certain Soviet interventions in
the Third World had had the aim of reminding them of it, in order to
lead them to negotiate in some other field. Evidently, the above-men-
tioned deficiencies might have been compensated via a serious
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European-Russian rapprochement (Gorbachov’s “common house”).
That is the reason why the danger of that construction in Eurasia was
experienced by Washington as a nightmare.
The conflicts that pit the United States against its 
partners in the triad
Although the partners in the triad share common interests in the world-
wide management of collective imperialism in their relations with the
South, they also have a potentially serious conflictive relationship.
The American superpower exists thanks to the capital flows that
feed the parasitism of its economy and of its society. The vulnerabili-
ty of the United States constitutes, in this sense, a serious threat to
Washington’s project.
Europe, in particular, and the rest of the world, in general, will
have to choose between one of the two following strategic options: to
employ the “surplus” capital (from “savings”) it possesses to finance
the United States deficit (vis-à-vis consumption, investment and mili-
tary expenditure), or to conserve these surpluses and invest them in
themselves.
Conventional economists ignore the problem, on the basis of a
(senseless) hypothesis by which “globalization” will suppress nation-
states, and it won’t be possible to manage economic greatnesses (sav-
ings and investments) at an international level. This is a tautological
reasoning which in its very premises implies the conclusions at which
we seek to arrive: to justify and accept the financing of the United
States’ deficit by the others because, at world level, we shall find equal-
ity between savings and investment!
Why is this ineptness accepted? Undoubtedly, the teams of “of
wise economists” that exist in the European political classes (and in
others, such as those in Russia and China) from the electoral right and
left wings are themselves the victims of the economicist alienation
that I call the “liberal virus.” Furthermore, this opinion expresses the
political judgement of large transnational capitals, which consider
that the advantages obtained from the management of the globalized
system by the United States on behalf of the collective imperialism
override its disadvantages: the tribute that must be paid to
Washington to ensure its own permanence. Because it constitutes trib-
ute and not a business with guaranteed good profitability. There are
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countries ranked as “indebted poor nations” that are forced to ensure
the service on their debt at any price. But there are also “indebted
powerful nations” that enjoy all the means that would allow them to
devalue their debt if they considered it necessary.
The other option for Europe (and the rest of the world) would
consist in putting an end to the transfusion in the United States’ favor.
The surpluses could then be put to use in the places of origin and the
economies be relaunched. Because the transfusion demands the sub-
mission of the Europeans to “deflationary” (an incorrect term
employed by conventional economics and that I would replace by
“sentenciary”) policies, so as to be able to produce a surplus of
exportable savings. This slows down the progress, always mediocre, of
Europe with regard to the artificially sustained progress of the United
States. Conversely, the mobilization of this surplus for local employ-
ment would make it possible to simultaneously relaunch consumption
(through the reconstruction of the social dimension of an economic
management devastated by the liberal virus), investment –particularly
in the new technologies (and the financing of its research)– and even
military expenditure (putting an end to the American “advantages” in
that sphere). A choice in favor of this response to the challenge implies
a new balance in social relations in favor of the working classes.
Conflicts among nations and social struggles are articulated in this
manner. In other words, the United States/Europe contrast doesn’t
pose a fundamental opposition between the interests of the dominant
segments of capital of the various partners but is the result, above all,
of the differences in their respective political cultures.
The theoretical problems suggested by the preceding
reflections
The complicity/competition among the partners in the collective
imperialism for control over the South (sacking of its natural
resources and subjection of its peoples) may be analyzed from vari-
ous different angles and viewpoints. In this regard, three observations
seem essential to me.
First observation: the contemporary world system, which I term
collective imperialism, isn’t “less” imperialist than the preceding ones.
It isn’t an “Empire” of a “post-capitalist” nature. I consequently pro-
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pose a criticism of the ideological formulations of the “disguise” that
is nurtured by this “à la mode” dominant discourse5.
Second observation: it is worth while to give a reading to the
history of capitalism, globalized from its outset, anchored in the dis-
tinction among the various phases of imperialism (relations among
centers/peripheries). Of course, there exist other readings of this same
history, especially if they are articulated around the “succession of
hegemonies” (Amin,1996: chapter III). Personally I harbor some reser-
vations with regard to the latter. For a start, and in essence, because it
is “West-centric,” in the sense that it considers that the transforma-
tions that take place in the heart of the system, at its centers, decisively
–and almost exclusively– govern the global evolution of the system. I
believe that the reactions of the peoples of the peripheries in the face
of imperialist deployment must not be underestimated because they
caused the independence of America, the great revolutions undertak-
en in the name of socialism (Russia and China), and the reconquest of
the independence of the Asian and African countries, and because I
don’t think we can account for the history of world capitalism without
taking into account the “adjustments” that these transformations have
imposed on the central capitalism itself. The history of imperialism, it
seems to me, has been constructed more by the conflicts of the impe-
rialisms than by the type of “order” that the successive hegemonies
have imposed. The periods of apparent “hegemony” have always been
very brief and the hegemony in question is a very relative thing.
Third observation: globalization is not a synonym of “unifica-
tion” of the economic system by means of the “unregulated opening of
markets.” The latter –in its successive historical forms (yesterday’s
“free trade,” today’s “free enterprise”)– has only been a project of the
dominant capital. In actual fact, this program has almost always been
forced to make adjustments in the face of demands that do not form
part of its internal, exclusive and own logic. It has only been possible
to put it into practice at brief moments of its history. The “freedom of
commerce” promoted by the greatest industrial power of its period
–Great Britain– was only effective over two decades (1860-1880) which
were followed by a century (1880-1980) characterized by conflict
among the imperialists and by the strong disconnection of the so-
called socialist countries (as of the Russian revolution in 1917, and
later that in China, and the more modest one of the countries of
5 Cf. Note 2.
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national populism (Asia and Africa, 1955-1975). The current moment
of reunification of the world market (“free enterprise”), inaugurated
by neoliberalism starting in 1980, has extended to the entire planet
with the Soviet collapse. The chaos that the latter has generated testi-
fies to its character as a “permanent utopia of capital,” phrase I
applied to it in Empire of Chaos (Amin & Anderson, 1992).
The Middle East in the imperialist system
The Middle East, with its ancient extensions into the Caucasus and
the formerly Soviet Central Asia, occupies a position of particular
importance in the geostrategy/geopolitics of imperialism and, singu-
l a r l y, in the hegemonic project of the United States. This position is
due to three factors: its oil wealth, its geographical position at the
heart of the Old World and the fact that it currently constitutes the
“belly” of the world system.
Access to relatively inexpensive oil is vital to the economy of
the dominant triad and the best means to see that this access is guar-
anteed consists, properly understood, in ensuring political control
over the region.
But the region likewise owes its importance to its geographical
position, at the same distance from Paris, Beijing, Singapore and
Johannesburg. In other times, control over this inescapable thorough-
fare gave the Caliph the privilege of extracting the greatest profits
from the globalization of his time (Amin, 1996: chapters I and II).
After the Second World War the region, located on the southern flank
of the USSR, occupied, owing to this fact, an important position with-
in the strategy of encircling Soviet power militarily. And the region has
not lost its importance despite the collapse of the Soviet adversary,
because by setting itself up there, the United States could simultane-
ously reduce Europe to vassal status and subject Russia, China and
India to a permanent blackmail born of military intervention if it were
necessary. Control over the region thus effectively allows the extension
of the Monroe doctrine to the Old World, which constitutes the objec-
tive of the American hegemonic project.
The efforts continuously and constantly deployed by
Washington since 1945 to ensure control over the region –shutting the
British and French out– hadn’t been crowned with success up to the
moment. Let us recall the failure of the attempt to associate the region
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to NATO through the Baghdad Pact, and later the fall of the Shah of
Iran, one of its most faithful allies.
The reason was simply that the project of Arab (and Iranian)
nationalist populism was in conflict with the goals of the American
h e g e m o n y. This Arab project had the ambition to force the powers to
recognize the independence of the Arab world. That was the meaning
of the “non-alignment” formulated in Bandung in 1955 by the set of
liberation movements of the peoples of Asia and Africa which had the
wind in their sails. The Soviets quickly grasped that by providing
their support to this project they would keep Wa s h i n g t o n ’s aggressive
plans in check.
But history turned this page over, basically because the nation-
al populist project of the Arab world quickly exhausted its potential for
transformation and because the nationalist powers turned into dicta-
torships without a program. The vacuum created by this state of drift
cleared the path for political Islam and for the Gulf’s obscurantist
autocracies, preferential allies of Washington’s. The region turned into
one of the bellies of the global system, producing situations that
allowed foreign interventions (including military ones) that the
régimes in power were unable to contain –or even discourage– owing
to their lack of legitimacy vis-à-vis their peoples.
The region constituted –and constitutes– within the American
geomilitary map that covers the entire planet an area considered of
top priority (as does the Caribbean), i.e., an area where the United
States has invested itself with the “right” to intervene militarily. And
since 1990 it hasn’t foregone doing so!
The United States operates in the Middle East in close coopera-
tion with Turkey and Israel, its faithful and unconditional allies.
Europe has remained outside the region, accepting that the United
States act alone in defense of the triad’s vital global interests, namely,
their oil supply. Despite the evident signs of irritation after the Iraq
war, Europeans continue as a group to navigate in the region in
Washington’s wake.
At the same time, Israel’s colonial expansionism constitutes a
real challenge. Israel is the only country in the world that refuses to
recognize definitive borders (and therefore lacks the right to be a
member of the United Nations). As did the United States in the nine-
teenth century, Israel considers it has the “right” to conquer new areas
and to treat the peoples that inhabit the new territories, colonized for
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thousands of years, like Redskins. Israel is the only country that open-
ly declares not to consider itself involved by the resolutions of the UN.
The war of 1967, planned together with Washington since 1965,
obeyed diverse aims: to dampen the collapse of the national-populist
régimes, break their alliance with the Soviet Union, force them to
reposition themselves under American orders and open new lands for
Zionist colonization. In the territories conquered in 1967 Israel put
into practice a system of apartheid inspired in that of South Africa.
And it is at this point that the interests of the dominant world
capital come together with those of Zionism. Because a modernized,
rich and powerful Arab world would question the guaranteed access
of Western countries to the sacking of their oil resources, a necessary
condition for a continuation of the wastefulness associated with capi-
talist accumulation. The political powers of the countries of the triad,
faithful servants of the dominant transnational capital, do not want a
modern and powerful Arab world to exist.
The alliance between the Western powers and Israel is thus
founded on the solidity of their common interests. This alliance is nei-
ther the product of a feeling of guilt among the Europeans, responsi-
ble for anti-Semitism and the Nazi crime, nor of the skill of the
“Jewish lobby” in exploiting that feeling. If the Western powers
thought that their interests weren’t aligned with those of the Zionist
colonial expansionism, they would speedily find the means to over-
come their “complex” and neutralize the “Jewish lobby.” I am not one
of those who naively believe that public opinion in democratic coun-
tries imposes itself on the powers. We know that opinion is “manufac-
tured” too. Israel would be incapable of a lengthy resistance against
blockade measures (even moderate ones), such as the Western powers
have imposed on Yugoslavia, Iraq and Cuba. It would then not be at
all difficult to make Israel be reasonable and to create the conditions
for a true peace, if this were desired. But it isn’t.
The day after the defeat of 1967, Sadat declared that since the
United States held “ninety percent of the cards” in its hands (that was
the expression he used), it was necessary to break with the USSR and
realign with the Western bloc, and that, thanks to this, it would be
possible to obtain from Washington the concession that would exer-
cise sufficient pressure on Israel to force it to be reasonable. Beyond
this “strategic idea” of Sadat’s –the inconsistency of which was proven
by subsequent events– Arab public opinion remained widely incapable
of understanding the dynamics of world capitalist expansion, and
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much less of identifying its real contradictions and weaknesses. Don’t
we hear it said and repeated that “Westerners would over the long
term understand that it was to their own interest to maintain good
relations with the two hundred million Arabs –their immediate neigh-
bors– and not sacrifice those relations over an unconditional support
for Israel?” This implies considering implicitly that the “Westerners”
in question (that is, the dominant capital) wish there to be a modern-
ized and developed Arab world, and not understanding that, on the
contrary, they wish to maintain it in impotence, and that to this end,
support for Israel is useful to them.
The choice made by the Arab governments (save for Syria and
Lebanon) of backing the American plan of a pretended “definitive
peace” could not lead to different results than the ones it did: embold-
ening Israel to make its pawns advance in its expansionist project.
Now openly rejecting the terms of the “Oslo Accords” (1993), Ariel
Sharon only demonstrates what we should have understood earlier
–that it wasn’t a project for “definitive peace,” but the starting point of
a new stage of the Zionist colonial expansion.
The state of permanent war that Israel, along with the We s t e r n
powers that back its project, impose on the region, constitutes a pow-
erful reason that allows the autocratic Arab systems to perpetuate
themselves. This blockage, vis-à-vis a possible democratic evolution,
weakens Arab opportunities for renewal and allows the deployment
of the dominant capital and the American hegemonic strategy. The
knot is tied: the American-Israeli alliance perfectly suits the interests
of both partners.
Initially, the apartheid system launched after 1967 gave the
impression of being able to achieve its goals. The scared handling of
daily affairs in the occupied territories by the notables and by the trad-
ing bourgeoisie seemed to be accepted by the Palestinian people. The
PLO, removed from the region following the invasion of Lebanon by
the Israeli army (1982), seemed to lack the means –from its faraway
exile in Tunis– to question the Zionist annexation.
The first Intifada burst out in December 1987. An explosion of
apparently “spontaneous” appearance, it expressed the irruption into
the scene of the popular classes, and particularly of its most impover-
ished sectors, confined in the refugee camps. The Intifada boycotted
Israeli power via the organization of systematic civic disobedience.
Israel reacted brutally, but was unable to restore either its police
power efficaciously or that of the Palestinian middle classes. On the
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contrary, the Intifada called for a mass return of the exiled political
classes, the setting up new local forms of organization and the espous-
al by the middle classes of the unleashed liberation struggle. The
Intifada was triggered by youths, initially not organized within the for-
mal networks of the PLO (Fatah, devoted to its chief Yasser Arafat, the
DFLP, the PFLP, the Communist Party) which immediately joined the
Intifada and won the sympathy of the majority of its Chebab. The
Muslim Brotherhood, left behind due to the weakness of its activities
during the preceding years, despite some actions by Islamic Jihad,
made its appearance in 1980, and gave way to a new expression of
struggle: Hamas, constituted in 1988.
As this first Intifada, after two years of expansion, exhibited
signs of exhaustion, given the violent repression of the Jews (use of
firearms against children, closure of the “green line” to Palestinian
workers, the almost exclusive source of income for their families, etc.),
the scene was set for a “negotiation” initiated by the United States that
led to the Madrid agreements (1991) and later to the peace calls in
Oslo (1993). These agreements allowed the return of the PLO to the
occupied territories and their transformation into a “Palestinian
Authority” (1994).
The Oslo accords imagined a transformation of the occupied
territories into one or several Bantustans, definitively integrated into
Israel’s space. Within this framework, the Palestinian Authority should
only be a false State –like those of the Bantustans– and, in actual fact,
be the transmission belt of the Zionist order.
Having returned to Palestine, the PLO, transformed into an
Authority, managed to establish its order, not without some ambigui-
ties. Within its new structures, the Authority absorbed the majority of
the Chebab that had coordinated the Intifada. It achieved legitimacy
through the election of 1996, in which the Palestinians participated
massively (eighty percent), while Arafat caused a plebiscite to confirm
him as president of that Authority. The Authority remained, neverthe-
less, in an ambiguous position: would it accept the role that Israel, the
United States and Europe invested it with, that of the “government of
a Bantustan,” or would it align itself with the Palestinian people that
refused to submit?
As the Palestinian people rejected the Bantustan project, Israel
decided to repudiate the Oslo agreements, which it had nevertheless
dictated the terms of, to substitute them by the employment of military
violence pure and simple. The provocation at the Mosques, carried out
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by the war criminal Sharon in 1998 (but with the support of the Labor
government that provided him with the means for the assault), and the
triumphal election of this criminal at the head of the government of
Israel (with the cooperation of the “doves” against Shimon Peres), were
the cause of the second Intifada, currently underway.
Will the latter manage to liberate the Palestinian people from
the outlook of subjection planned by the Zionist apartheid? It is too
soon to say. In any case, the Palestinian people now have at their dis-
posal a true national liberation movement with its specific character-
istics. It isn’t in the “sole party” style, with the appearance (rather, the
reality) of “unanimity” and homogeneity. It has components that pre-
serve their own personality, their visions of the future, even their ide-
ologies, their militants and their clients, but which, apparently, are
able to reach a mutual understanding to carry out the struggle jointly.
Control over the Middle East is certainly a key piece within
Washington’s project for world hegemony. How does the United States
therefore imagine it will ensure control? Ten years ago Washington
had already taken the initiative of moving forward with the curious
project of a “Middle Eastern common market,” in which the Gulf
countries would have contributed the capital, and the other countries
the cheap labor, reserving for Israel the technological control and the
role of forcible intermediary. Accepted by the countries of the Gulf and
Egypt, the project faced the rejection of Syria, Iraq and Iran. In order
to move forward it was thus necessary to topple those three regimes.
Now then, this has already been done in Iraq.
The problem then is knowing what type of political régime must
be imposed that will be capable of maintaining this project.
Washington’s propagandistic discourse speaks of “democracy.” In real-
ity, Washington only busies itself in substituting autocracies born of
an outdated populism with obscurantist, allegedly “Islamic” autocra-
cies (compelled by respect for the cultural specificity of the “commu-
nities”). The renewed alliance with a political Islam described as
“moderate” (i.e., capable of keeping the situation in hand efficiently
enough to forbid any sliding into “terrorism” –that which is aimed
against, and only against, the United States, of course) constitutes the
axis of Washington’s political option, remaining as the only possible
option. It is within this perspective that reconciliation with the archa-
ic autocracy of the system will be sought.
Faced with the deployment of the American project, Europeans
invented their own project, calling it a “Euro-Mediterranean society.”
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A bold project, filled with talk, but which likewise proposed to “rec-
oncile the Arab countries with Israel.” At the same time that they
excluded the Gulf countries from the “Euro-Mediterranean dialogue,”
the Europeans recognized that handling them was exclusively
Washington’s responsibility (Amin 2003 [d]).
The contrast between the reckless audacity of the American
project and Europe’s weakness is a beautiful indicator that the
Atlantism that actually exists ignores any sharing (the splitting of
responsibilities and association in decision-taking, placing the United
States and Europe in equal conditions). Anthony Blair, who considers
himself the advocate of the construction of a “unipolar” world,
believes he can justify this option because the Atlantism that would be
allowed would be founded on sharing. Washington’s arrogance under-
cuts this vain hope further every day, even though it may serve simply
to deceive European opinion. The realism of the intention of Stalin,
who had said at the time that the Nazis “didn’t know where to stop,”
is applicable to the junta that governs the United States. And the
“hopes” that Blair attempts to revitalize resemble those that Mussolini
placed on his ability to “calm down” Hitler.
Is another European opinion possible? Does Chirac’s discourse,
opposing the “unipolar Atlantic” world (apparently understanding well
that the United States’ unilateral hegemony reduces the European proj-
ect to being solely the European mode of Wa s h i n g t o n ’s project) against
the construction of a “multipolar” world, announce the end of Atlantism?
For this possibility to become a reality, it would still be necessary
for Europe to be able to emerge from the quicksand on which it skids.
The quicksand of the European project
All European governments up to now have allied themselves with the
thesis of liberalism. This alliance means nothing other than the end of
the European project, its double dissolution, economic (the advan-
tages of the European economic union being dissolved within eco-
nomic globalization) and political (Europe’s political and military
autonomy disappears). There no longer exists, at this time, any
European project. It has been substituted by a North Atlantic project
(or potentially that of the triad) under American command.
The “made in U.S.A.” wars have certainly awakened public opin-
ion and even certain governments (in the first place that of France, but
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also those of Germany, Russia and China). Nevertheless, these gov-
ernments haven’t put into question their faithful alignment with the
demands of liberalism. This major contradiction must be overcome in
one way or another, be it by submitting to Washington’s demands, be
it through a real break that puts an end to Atlantism.
The most important political conclusion I extract from this
analysis is that Europe won’t be able to emerge from Atlantism as long
as the political alliances that define its power blocs remain centered
on the dominant transnational capital. Only if social and political
struggles should manage to modify the content of these blocs and
impose new historic compacts between capital and labor will Europe
be able to take some distance with respect to Washington, an event
that would, in consequence, allow the rebirth of an eventual European
project. Under such conditions Europe might –indeed should– commit
itself equally at the international level, in its relations with the East
and with the South, to another path, different from the one set out by
the exclusive demands of collective imperialism, thus dampening its
participation in the long march “beyond capitalism.” Stated different -
ly, Europe will be leftist (the term “left” here being employed most
seriously) or it won’t be Europe.
Conciliating an adherence to liberalism with the affirmation of a
European political autonomy is the goal of certain fractions of the
European political classes concerned with preserving the exclusive posi-
tions of big capital. Will they be able to achieve it? I strongly doubt it.
In counterpoint, will the European popular classes be able to
overcome the crisis they face? I believe it possible, precisely for the
reasons that cause the political culture of certain European countries,
at least, to be different from that of the United States, and a renais-
sance of the left could take place. The condition is evidently that they
free themselves from the virus of liberalism.
The “European project” was born as the European mode of the
Atlantic project of the United States, conceived the day after the
Second World, within the spirit of the “Cold War” launched by
Washington –a project with which the European bourgeoisie, simulta-
neously weakened and fearful of its own working classes, aligned itself
in a practically unconditional manner.
Nevertheless, the deployment itself of this project –of doubtful
origin– has progressively modified important aspects of the problem
and of its challenges. Western Europe managed to put an end to its
economic and technological backwardness with respect to the United
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States. At the same time, the Soviet enemy is no longer there. The
deployment of the project brought together the main adversaries that
for a century and a half had marked European history: the three
biggest countries on the continent –France, Germany and Russia–
achieved mutual reconciliation. All this evolution is, from my point of
v i e w, positive, and is filled with an even more positive potential.
C e r t a i n l y, this deployment is inscribed within economic bases
inspired by the principles of liberalism, but a liberalism tempered
until the 1980s by the social dimension taken into consideration by
and through the “historic social-democratic commitment,” which
forced capital to adjust to the demands for social justice expressed by
the working classes. Afterward the deployment continued within a
new social framework, inspired by an “American-style,” utterly anti-
social liberalism.
This last turn has hurled European societies into a multidimen-
sional crisis. For a start there is the economic crisis of the neoliberal
option. A crisis worsened by the alignment of the European countries
in the face of the economic demands of their American leader, the for-
mer consenting to finance the latter’s deficit to the detriment of their
own interests. Then the social crisis, heightened by the growth of the
resistance and of the struggles of the popular classes against the fatal
consequences of the conservative option. Lastly, the attempt at a polit-
ical crisis –the refusal to align themselves, at least unconditionally, with
the United States option in the endless war against the South.
How will the European peoples face this triple challenge?
Europeans are divided into three different groups:
- Those who defend the neoliberal option and accept the leader-
ship of the United States, virtually without conditions.
- Those who defend the neoliberal option, but would wish for
a politically independent Europe, outside the American align-
m e n t .
- Those who would wish for (and struggle for) a “social Europe,”
that is to say, capitalism tempered by a new social commitment
between capital and labor operating on a European scale, and
simultaneously a political Europe practicing “other relations”
(friendly, democratic and peaceful) with the South, Russia and
China. The overall public opinion in all Europe has, during the
European Social Forum (Florence 2000) and on the occasion of
the war against Iraq, expressed its sympathy for the principles
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of this position.
There are certainly others, the “non-Europeans,” in the sense
that they do not think that any of the pro-European options are pos-
sible or desirable. These are still in a minority, but are certainly
called on to become strengthened within one of two fundamentally
d i fferent options:
- A right-wing “populist” option, which rejects the progression of
supranational political –and even economic– powers, with the
obvious exception of those of transnational capital.
- A popular left-wing, national, citizen-based, democratic and
social option.
What are the forces on which each of these tendencies lean and what
are their respective chanced of success?
The dominant capital is liberal by nature. In this sense, it logi-
cally supports the first of these three options. Anthony Blair represents
the most consistent expression of what I have termed the “collective
imperialism of the triad.” The political class, gathered behind the star-
spangled banner, is ready, if it becomes necessary, to “sacrifice the
European project” –or at least to dispel any illusion in that regard–
employing contempt for its origins: being the European mode of the
Atlantist project. But Bush, like Hitler, does not conceive any allies
other than unconditionally aligned subordinate ones. That is the rea-
son why significant segments of the political class, including the right
–even though the latter is, in principle, the defender of the interests of
the dominant capital– reject aligning themselves with the United
States as they yesterday did with respect to Hitler. If there is a possi-
ble Churchill in Europe, he would be Chirac. Will he be?
The strategy of the dominant capital may reach accommodation
within a “right-wing anti-Europeanism,” which would be content with
demagogic nationalist rhetoric (wielding the issue of emigrants, for
example) while submitting in actual fact to the demands of a liberal-
ism that isn’t specifically “European,” but globalized. Aznar and
Berlusconi constitute the prototypes of these allies of Washington’s.
The servile political classes of Eastern Europe are equally so.
In this regard, I believe that the second option chosen by the
most important Europeans (France-Germany) is hard to sustain. Does
it express the ambitions of a sufficiently powerful capital to be able to
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emancipate itself from the tutelage of the United States? I have no
answer save to indicate that intuitively I see it as rather unlikely.
This option is, nevertheless, that of the allies in the face of an
American adversary that constitutes the main enemy of all humanity.
I am persuaded that, if they persist in their choice, they will have to
face the logic of the unilateral project of that capital (liberalism) and
to seek alliances on the left (the only ones that might strengthen their
project of independence vis-à-vis Washington). The alliance among
sets two and three is not impossible. Just as was the case with the anti-
Nazi alliance.
If this alliance takes shape, will it have to operate exclusively
within the European framework if they are all incapable of renounc-
ing the priority given to that framework? I don’t think so, because this
framework, as constituted, systematically only favors the option of the
first, pro-American group. Would it thus be necessary to cause Europe
to burst apart and definitively renounce its project?
I don’t consider that necessary either, or even desirable. Another
strategy is possible: that of allowing the European project to “lie dor-
mant” for some time in its current stage of development, and in a par-
allel manner build other alliance axes.
A first priority, then, is the construction of a political and
strategic Paris-Berlin-Moscow alliance, extended to Beijing and Delhi
if it were possible. And I say specifically political with the aim of giv-
ing it the international pluralism and all the roles they ought to have
within the United Nations. Strategic, in the sense of building up mil-
itary forces capable of meeting the American challenge. These three
or four powers have all the means (economic, technological and
financial), reinforced by their military traditions, alongside which the
United States pales. The American challenge and its criminal ambi-
tions are imposed by virtue of their unrestrained character. Building
an anti-hegemonic front is currently as high a priority as in the past
it was to build an anti-Nazi alliance.
This strategy would reconcile the “pro-Europeans” with groups
two and three and with the “non-Europeans” on the left. Favorable
conditions would be created for later taking up a European project
again, which would probably also incorporate a Great Britain freed
from its subjection to the United States and an Eastern Europe that
has cast off its servile culture. We must be patient because this will
take quite some time.
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No progress of a European project will be possible insofar as the
American strategy isn’t deflected from its course.
Europe in the face of its own Arab South and the
Mediterranean
The Arab World and the Middle East occupy a decisive spot in the
hegemonic project of the United States. The response that the
Europeans offer to the American challenge in the region will be one of
the decisive tests that the European project itself will face.
The problem consists in knowing if the coastal people of the
Mediterranean and its prolongations –Europeans, Arabs, Tu r k s ,
Iranians and the people of the countries of Africa– will or will not ori-
ent themselves towards a representation of their security that differs
from that which is guided by the primacy of the preservation of
America’s world hegemony. Pure reason ought to cause them to evolve
in that direction. But up to the moment Europe has given no sign of
going that way. One of the reasons that might partly explain the
European inertia is that the partners in the European union, albeit not
too divergent, bear a coefficient of relative priorities that differs great-
ly from one country to the next. The Mediterranean façade isn’t cen-
tral to the industrial polarization of developed capitalism; the façades
of the North Sea, of the American Atlantic Northeast and of central
Japan have a density lacking a common denominator. For the people
in Northern Europe –Germany and Great Britain– the danger of chaos
in the countries located to the South of the Mediterranean does not
loom as seriously as it does for Italians, Spaniards and Frenchmen.
The diverse European powers each had, until 1945,
Mediterranean policies of their own, often conflicting ones. After the
Second World War, the states of Western Europe had practically no
Mediterranean or Arab policy, whether individually or in common,
beyond that which was implied in the alignment demanded by the
United States. Within this framework, Great Britain and France,
which had their colonial possessions in the region, fought to preserve
their advantages. Great Britain gave up Egypt and Sudan (1954) and,
after their defeat in the adventure of the tripartite aggression (1956), a
violent change of direction ensued which, in the late ’60s, implied the
abandonment of their influence in the coastal countries of the Gulf.
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France, eliminated since 1945 from Syria, finally accepted the inde-
pendence of Algeria (1962), but preserved a certain nostalgia for its
influence in the Maghreb and in Lebanon, emboldened by the local
ruling classes, at least in Morocco, Tunis and Lebanon. In parallel
fashion, the construction of Europe did not substitute the withdrawal
of the colonial powers by a new common policy operating in this
sense. Let us recall that, after the Israeli-Arab war of 1973, the prices
of oil were readjusted and the European Community, startled in its
dreams, discovered it had “interests” in the region. But this awakening
did not trigger any significant initiative on its part, for example with
regard to the Palestinian problem. Europe, both in this domain and in
others, continued to vegetate and ultimately to be inconsistent. Some
progress in the direction of autonomy vis-à-vis the United States was
seen in the ’70s, but after the Venice Summit (1980) it was eroded dur-
ing the ’80s, to finally disappear with the alignment alongside
Washington that was adopted during the Gulf War. It’s for this reason
that European perceptions regarding the future of the relations
between Europe and the Arab and Iranian World must be studied on
the basis of analyses pertinent to each one of the European states.
Great Britain has no Mediterranean or Arab policy that is spe-
cific to it. In this domain, and in others of British society in all its
political expressions (Conservatives and Laborites), the option has
been an unconditional alignment with the United States. It is, in this
case, a fundamental historical choice, which far surpasses specific cir-
cumstances and that considerably reinforces the submission of
Europe to the demands of American strategy.
For different reasons, Germany has no specific Arab or
Mediterranean policy either and will probably not attempt to develop
any in the near future. Weakened by its division and its Status, the
FRG devoted all its efforts to its economic development, accepting
having a low and ambiguous political profile with regard to the United
States and the Europe of the EEC. In an initial instance, the reunifi-
cation of Germany and its reconquest of full international sovereignty
did not modify this behavior; rather, on the contrary, they accentuated
the expressions of it. The reason is that the dominant political forces
(conservatives, liberals and social democrats) chose to give priority to
the expansion of Germanic capitalism in central and eastern Europe,
reducing the relative importance of a common European strategy,
both on the political level and on that of economic integration. It
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remains to be seen if this trend has currently been reversed, as seems
to be suggested by Berlin’s attitude in the face of the Iraq War.
France’s positions are more nuanced. A both Atlantic and
Mediterranean country, the heir of a colonial Empire, classed among
the victors of the Second World War, France did not give up express-
ing itself as a power. During the first postwar decade, succeeding
French governments attempted to preserve the colonial positions of
the country through anti-Communist and anti-Soviet Atlantist posi-
tions. Nevertheless, they did not gain Washington’s support, as was
demonstrated by the position of the United States during the tripartite
aggression against Egypt (1956). The Mediterranean and Arab policy
of France was simply retrograde. De Gaulle simultaneously broke with
paleo-colonial and with pro-American illusions, and conceived the
triple project of modernizing the French economy, leading a decolo-
nization process that would allow its substitution by neocolonialism
in the face of the old formulas, and compensating the weaknesses
intrinsic to any medium-sized country like France through European
integration. Within this last perspective De Gaulle conceived a Europe
capable of being autonomous, not only at the economic and financial
level, but also at the political level and even, ultimately, at the military
level, just as he conceived, over the long term, the association of the
USSR with the construction of Europe (“the Europe from the Atlantic
to the Urals”). But Gaullism did not survive its founder and, starting
in 1968, French political forces, both of the classic right and of the
socialist left, gradually returned to their previous attitudes. Their
vision of the construction of Europe became reduced to the sole
dimension of a “common market” between France and Federal
Germany (at the moment when German reunification occurred, in
Paris they were a bit surprised and uneasy...) and to the invitation,
employing pressure, made to Great Britain to join the EEC (forgetting
that Britain would be the Americans’ Trojan Horse in Europe).
Naturally, this change implied the abandonment of any Arab policy
worthy of the name of France, that is to say, a policy that went beyond
the simple defense of immediate mercantile interests. At the political
level, France objectively behaved, both in the Arab world and in sub-
Saharan Africa, as a supplementary force in support of the American
strategy of hegemony. It is within this framework that one must place
the Mediterranean discourse, which calls for tying the Maghreb coun-
tries to the European chariot (in the same way that Turkey, now in cri-
sis, was tied), which implied breaking the prospect of a unitary Arab
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approach and abandoning the Mashrek in the face of Israeli-American
intervention. Undoubtedly, the Maghreb’s ruling classes bear responsi-
b i l i t y, given the sympathy they demonstrated for this project.
Nevertheless, the Gulf Crisis dealt a strong blow to this project, and
the popular masses of Northern Africa expressed, on this occasion and
strongly, their solidarity with the Maghreb, a totally foreseeable event.
Italy is, including because of its geographical position, a coun-
try that is very sensitive to Mediterranean problems. This does not
mean that it has a real Mediterranean and Arab policy, and much less
that the latter has efficacy and autonomy. Because of its marginal
capitalist development, Italy was forced to inscribe its Mediterranean
ambitions within European tutelage in an alliance with other powers
in the area, more decisive than it is itself. Since its unity was achieved
in the middle of the last century with Mussolini’s fall in 1943, Italy
hesitated between an alliance with the owners of the Mediterranean
–i.e., with Great Britain and France– or with those able to contest
Anglo-French positions, namely the Germans. Atlantism, which is
exercised in Italy within a vision that implies a foreign political pro-
file under the tutelage of the United States, has been dominant in the
actions and options of Italian governments since 1947. It is equally
dominant, albeit from an even more ideological standpoint, among
certain sectors of the lay bourgeoisie (the republicans and liberals,
and some socialists). Because among the Christian Democrats there
exists the pressure of the universalism of the Catholic tradition. For
this reason it is significant that the Pope has, often, adopted more ret-
rograde positions vis-à-vis the Arab peoples (particularly on the
Palestinian problem) and the Third World than that of the numerous
Italian and Western governments in general. The step to the left by
part of the Catholic Church, under the influence of Latin America’s
Theology of Liberation, currently reinforces this universalism, of
which we find lay versions in pacifist, ecologist and pro-Third Wo r l d
movements. The “mittel” European current has its roots in the Italian
nineteenth century and in the North-South split that Italian unity
h a s n ’t managed to mitigate. Allied to the interests of large Milanese
capitals, it proposes bestowing priority on the economic expansion of
Italy toward the European East, in close association with Germany.
Within this framework, Croatia currently constitutes an immediate
objective. Properly understood, this option would imply that Italy
continue the tradition of a low international profile, and above all
remain marginal in its relations with the Mediterranean South. A par-
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allel option by Spain would isolate it even further from the European
concert, reducing it to its lowest common denominator. The
Mediterranean current, which is still weak, despite the contribution
that universalism could entail for it, is, for this reason, expressed in a
“Levantine” version: it is a question of “doing business” here or there,
without worrying about the framework of political strategy in which
the latter are inscribed. To acquire another, more noble consistency,
associating Italy to economic openings that are inscribed within a
perspective of reinforcing its autonomy and that of its Arab partners,
it would be necessary for a convergence to be achieved between this
project and universalist ideas, particularly those of part of the Italian
left, communist and Christian. The Italian right, for its part, reunited
under the leadership of Berlusconi in power, has opted to be
inscribed under the tutelage of the Washington-London Atlantic axis.
The behavior of the police forces during the G8 meeting in Genoa
(July 2001) clearly expresses this option.
Spain and Portugal occupy an important spot in the geostrategy
of world hegemony of the United States. The Pentagon considers, in
fact, that the Azores-Canaries-Gibraltar-Balearics axis is essential for
keeping watch over the North and South Atlantic and looking after the
entry into the Mediterranean. The United States forged its alliance
with those two countries immediately after the Second World War,
without exercising the least concern over their fascist nature. On the
contrary, in fact, the anti-communism of the Salazar and Franco dic-
tatorships served the American hegemonic cause well, making it pos-
sible for Portugal to be admitted into NATO and to establish American
bases of prime importance on Spanish soil. In counterpart, the United
States and its European allies backed Portugal unreservedly until the
end of its failed colonial war.
The democratic evolution of Spain after Franco’s death was
not the occasion for a questioning of the country’s integration into
the American military system. On the contrary, in fact, the formal
accession of Spain to NATO (in May 1982) was the object of real elec-
toral blackmail that made it out that participation in the EEC
demanded that accession, which was opposed by the majority of
Spanish public opinion.
Afterward, Madrid’s alignment with Washington’s positions has
been unreserved. In counterpart, the United States may apparently
have intervened to “moderate” Morocco’s claims and even to attempt
to convince Great Britain with regard to Gibraltar. In this sense, we
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may doubt the actual reality of these interventions. The reinforced
Atlantist alignment of Madrid translated into radical changes in the
organization of the Spanish armed forces, described by analysts as a
“movement toward the South.” In the Spanish tradition, in fact, the
army was spread out over the country’s entire territory. Additionally
conceived –with Franco, in an evident manner– as a domestic police
force more than as a force aimed outward, the Spanish army contin-
ued to be rustic and, despite the marked attention that the supreme
power in Madrid bestowed on the cadres of generals and officers, had
not been the object of a true modernization, as was the case with
France, Great Britain and Germany.
The socialist governments, and afterwards those on the right,
proceeded to a reorganization of Spanish forces to combat on a poten-
tial “Southern front” and committed themselves to a modernization of
the land army, of the aviation and of the navy. This change, demanded
by Washington and NATO, is one of the numerous manifestations of
the new American hegemonic strategy, substituting the South for the
East in the defense of the West. This is accompanied in Spain by a new
discourse that brings into evidence a “hypothetical enemy coming
from the South,” the identification of which leaves no room for doubt.
Curiously, this discourse of the democratic (and socialist) Spanish
media recalls the old tradition of the Reconquest, very popular among
the Catholic circles of the army. The change in the Spanish armed
forces is thus the sign of a determination on Spain’s part to exercise an
active role in the midst of NATO, in the framework of the reorienta-
tion of Western strategies, foreseeing interventions in the Third World.
For some time now, the Iberian Peninsula constitutes the first
stopover on the Washington-Tel Aviv axis, the principal European
bridgehead of the American Rapid Deployment Force (which had a
decisive role in the Gulf War), completed with bases in Sicily (which,
likewise, had never seen service until the operations against the Arab
World such as Libya, the Israeli bombardment of Tunis, etc.) and,
curiously, the facilities awarded by Morocco. Evidently, this Western
option empties the “Euro-Arab” discourse of any serious content. The
new, democratic Spain, which pretends to activate a policy of friend-
ship in the direction of Latin America and the Arab World, has actu-
ally directed its steps in an opposite direction from that of the
demands of its proclamation of principles.
The right-wing government led by Aznar has confirmed this
Atlantist alignment of Madrid’s. Even more than Italy, Spain rejects
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capitalizing on its Mediterranean position to the benefit of a new
European policy aimed at the Arab World, Africa and the Third
World, and to distance itself from the demands of the American hege-
m o n y. The French idea of a Mediterranean group in the midst of the
European Union remains, for these reasons, suspended in mid-air
and without serious points of support. At the same time, in the eco-
nomic sphere, Spanish capital, the heir of the Francoist tradition, has
placed its main hopes for expansion on the development of agree-
ments with Germany and Japan, invited to participate in the mod-
ernization of Catalonia.
While it existed, the line of East-West confrontation passed
through the Balkans. The compulsory alignment of the states of the
region with Moscow or Washington –with the sole exception of
Yugoslavia since 1948 and of Albania as of 1960– had placed a damper
on the local nationalist disputes that had turned the Balkans into the
European backyard.
Turkey placed itself in the Western camp since 1945, after hav-
ing put an end to its neutrality with regard to Hitler’s Germany. The
Soviet claims to the Caucasus formulated by Stalin following victory
were rejected by Ankara thanks to Washington’s resolute support. In
counterpart, Turkey, a member of NATO, despite its less than demo-
cratic political system, housed the American bases closest to the
USSR. There is no doubt that Turkish society continues to be part of
the Third World, although after Atatürk the country’s ruling classes
have proclaimed the European part of the New Turkey, knocking on
the door of a European Union that doesn’t want it. A faithful ally of the
United States and of its European partners, will Turkey wish to
reclaim its past and play an active role in the Middle East, making the
West pay for the services it might provide for it in that region? It
appears that the problem of the Kurds, whose very existence it fails to
recognize, has hitherto led it to hesitate in the adoption of this option.
The same applies to a potential pan-Turanian option, suggested by cer-
tain Kemalist circles, and later consigned to the historycal museum.
But currently, the breakup of the USSR might constitute an invitation
for the power of Ankara to take the leadership of a Turkish bloc that,
from Azerbaijan to Sinkiang, would dominate Central Asia. Iran
always expressed its fears with regard to a development of this type,
which would not only question the status of Iran’s southern Azerbaijan
but also the security of its vast northern Asian border with
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
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Greece did not enlist in the Soviet camp. It was compelled and forced
by the British intervention of 1948 to align with the United States. In
conformity with the Yalta Agreements, the USSR, as we all know,
abandoned the Greek resistance to its fate, a resistance led by the
Communist Party which, nevertheless, in that country as in Yugoslavia
and Albania, had freed the nation and for that reason conquered
majority popular support. In this way, the Westerners were forced to
give their support against that movement to successive repressive
regimes and, lastly, to a dictatorship of fascist colonels, without seeing
this as a major contradiction with its discourse, according to which
NATO would protect the “free world” against the totalitarian “Satan.”
The return of Greece to democracy, through PASOK’s electoral victory
(1981), risked, under these conditions, questioning the country’s fideli-
ty to NATO. The European Community then came to Washington’s
support in order, as in the case of Spain, to link the Greek candidacy
to the EEC with its continuing participation within the Atlantic
alliance. This integration into the EEC was strongly discussed by
Greek public opinion at the time. Papandreou’s choice to join despite
everything, after some hesitation and in spite of the Third World and
neutralist principles of PASOK, appears to have unleashed an irre-
versible evolution even at the level of mindsets, flattering the Greek
p e o p l e ’s aspirations towards modernity and Europeanism.
Nevertheless, Greece’s new European partners haven’t offered that
country much, keeping it all the time in the position of poor relative
in the construction of the community.
Athens’ faithfulness to the Euro-American West hasn’t earned it
real support in its conflict with Turkey. Indeed, even though the Greek
dictatorship bore a measure of responsibility in the Cypriot tragedy
(1974), the open Turkish aggression (operation Attila) and the later
creation of a Turkish Republic of Cyprus, in clear violation of the
island’s status, not only have been accepted, but probably also
endowed with the services of the Pentagon, in the face of which
Europe once again gives way. It is evident that, to the United States,
friendship with Turkey, a considerable regional military power, ranks
far above Greece, however democratic the latter may be.
The Balkans-Danube region as a group (Yugoslavia, Albania,
Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) in 1945 came under Moscow’s aegis,
be it through Soviet military occupation and acceptance by the Yalta
partners, or through their own liberation and the choice of that option
by the people of Yugoslavia and Albania.
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Ti t o ’s Yugoslavia, isolated during the years 1948-1953, between
M o s c o w ’s ostracism and Western anti-Communism, had successfully
achieved a strategy of construction of a “non-aligned” front, which
earned it a friendship with the Third World, particularly after the
Bandung Conference (1955). Analysts of the period’s geostrategic think-
ing curiously point out that this approach was not very sensible given
the country’s Mediterranean dimension. Perhaps Italy’s abandonment
after the Second World War of its traditional visa requirements and the
solution found in 1954 to the difficult problem of Trieste were the rea-
sons for this “historical forgetfulness.” Yugoslavia lived after that as a
state concerned above all with the problems of balance in its regional
relations and, especially, by that of the world balance between the super-
powers. Because, in the first place, it had managed to capitalize on the
double Northward and Danubian attraction of Croatia and Slovenia and
the Russian and Balkanic one of Serbia. The rapprochement initiated by
Khrushchev and continued by his successors, recognizing Ti t o ’s neu-
trality as positive in the world arena, as well as the weakening of the
régimes of the Warsaw Pact as of the ’60s and especially in the ’70s, for
a time guaranteed Yu g o s l a v i a ’s security, which had ceased to be regard-
ed as the crux of any regional conflict. Yu g o s l a v i a ’s diplomacy was then
able to deploy in the international arena, giving the country a dispro-
portionate weight in regard to its size. But, although this diplomacy had
undoubtedly gained points in Asia, in Africa and in Latin America, it
failed in Europe, where its call for an expansion of the neutrals’ front
never found a favorable echo. Nevertheless, vis-à-vis the Europe of
N ATO, from the North to the South of the continent, between two adver-
sarial military pacts, Sweden, Finland and Austria might have been able
to seek positive common initiatives that differed from the spirit of the
Cold Wa r. Later, the Greece of PASOK attempted to expand the
European neutral field, this idea leading in 1982 to the proposal for
cooperation toward the de-nuclearization of the Balkans, aimed, simul-
t a n e o u s l y, at certain member countries of the two alliances (Tu r k e y,
Romania and Bulgaria) or at neutrals (Yugoslavia and Albania). These
proposals also found no echo at all.
The decomposition of Southeastern Europe as of 1989 changed
the entire problem. The erosion and then the collapse of the legitimacy
of the régimes –founded on a specific development, whatever their lim-
itations and their negative aspects may have been– caused the bursting
apart of the unity of the leading class, the fractions of which attempt-
ed to found their legitimacy on nationalism. The conditions were pro-
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vided not only for allowing the offensive of savage capitalism under-
pinned by the United States and the European Union, but also for
Germany to take up the initiative in the region again, throwing fuel into
the fire –through its recognition of the independence of Slovenia and
Croatia, which the European Union itself reaffirmed– and consequent-
ly accelerating the splitting asunder of Yugoslavia and the civil war.
C u r i o u s l y, the Europeans attempted to impose in Bosnia the coexis-
tence of the communities that they had insisted on separating! If it is
possible for Serbs, Croats and Muslims to coexist in the tiny Yu g o s l a v i a
that Bosnia turns out to be, why couldn’t they have coexisted in the
large Yugoslavia? Evidently, a strategy of this type would not have had
any success, which allowed the United States to intervene in the very
heart of Europe. In Wa s h i n g t o n ’s strategy, the Balkans-Caucasus-
Central Asia axis is a prolongation of the Middle East.
From the analyses proposed above and which concern the polit-
ical and strategic options of the countries of the Northern Coast of the
Mediterranean I extract an important conclusion: the majority of
these countries, yesterday faithful backers of the United States in the
East-West conflict, continue aligned with the American strategy of
hegemony vis-à-vis the Third World, and particularly vis-à-vis the Arab
countries and those of the Red Sea-Gulf region. The other countries
(Balkanic and of the Danube), yesterday involved in some manner or
another in the East-West conflict, have ceased to be active agents in
the permanent North-South conflict, and have turned into passive
objects in the face of Western expansionism.
Conclusions: the Empire of Chaos and the permanent
war
I have termed the project of dominance of the United States –the exten-
sion of the Monroe doctrine to the entire planet, particularly since the
collapse of Soviet Russia (1991)– the Empire of Chaos. The growth of
the resistance of the nations of the Old World announces that they will
not accept submitting so easily. The United States will be called on to
substitute international law by recourse to permanent warfare (a
process that has begun in the Middle East, but which already points
toward Russia and Asia), slipping down the fascist slope (the “Patriot
Act” has already given its police powers with regard to foreigners
–“aliens”– that turn out to be similar to those the Gestapo had).
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Will the European states, partners in the system of collective imperi-
alism of the triad, accept this drift that will place them in subordinate
positions? The thesis which I have developed places the accent not so
much on the conflicts of interest of the dominant capital as on the dif-
ference that separates the political cultures of Europe from that which
characterizes the historic shaping of the United States, and finds in
this new contradiction one of the main reasons for the probable fail-
ure of the United States’ project6.
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THE INSPIRATION for this paper is obvious. I refer to the Eduardo
Galeano’s classic, The Open Veins of Latin America. We ask ourselves,
therefore, can the open veins of Latin America be transformed into
open paths toward its liberation, toward the reduction of its internal
inequalities, toward the return of economic development, toward a
new place in the contemporary world? Is there a dialectical transfor-
mation of “open veins” into “open paths,” or shall we continue to read
Borges as master of our mirage?
It is convenient not to make a precarious repetition of what can
be found expressed in ECLAC papers: the last two decades witnessed
stagnation, backward movement or, at most, in some cases, mediocre
growth. Latin America was subjugated by neoliberalism –let us call it
by the name with which it became popularized in criticism, although
it is, in itself, somewhat confusing– in the last period of last century,
and continues under its domination. We are the region with the great-
est inequality, even in comparison with Africa. Internally, inequality
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increased in our societies between the beginning of the 1990s and the
beginning of 2000. Mexico and Brazil almost haven’t changed in this
period but more egalitarian societies such as Argentina and Uruguay
stood out for a process of a radical social polarization. The known
exception is the usual one: Cuba, which receives us so generously, but
whose own progress is truncated by the general stagnation of Latin
America, which causes it to take on the risks of “socialism in one coun-
try alone.” Which in no way diminishes but rather exalts its dignity
and the immense sacrifices of its people.
Within the general diagnosis, specific situations are hidden:
from the sizzling transformation of Mexico into the largest individual
exporter to the United States, within the sphere of FTA –which, never-
theless, did not prevent the default of its foreign debt in the early
1990s nor allowed a solution to the issue of Mexican inequality– to the
deafening failure and incredible regression of Argentina, once, in the
early twentieth century, one of the world’s five largest economies.
Chile saw the least erratic development since the Pinochet dictator-
ship, but its workers already taste the bitter grapes –in a beautiful
wine-growing country– of privatized social security, now that the
moment has come to pay the bill. In any case, the Chilean isolation-
ism with regard to Latin America places it in an almost exclusive
dependence on the North American market, and in fact Chile has
regressed in terms of the social division of labor –it has returned to its
condition of an primary-exporting economy still anchored in the good
old state-owned copper. The Uruguayan and Paraguayan economies
suffer the effects of the Argentine backsliding and of Brazil’s neoliber-
alism and MERCOSUR hasn’t been enough, in the state in which it
finds itself, to give them their dynamism back. Colombia has become
a tragedy, the characteristics of which we are all familiar with, and is
on its way to transforming itself into a non-State and into a non-
nation. Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia experienced such violent spasms
that not even the most boldest social science will risk making predic-
tions: it is possible to go from the Shining Path to Alberto Fujimori
and from the latter to Alejandro Toledo, from experiments in the
Margaret Thatcher style avant la lettre to Evo Morales, and from dol-
larization with a forceps to the anti-capitalist indigenous movement,
virtually without mediation. Venezuela suffered the most unrestrained
corruption under the most social-democratic party the continent has
known, and has been daily experiencing innumerable attempts to
destabilize its Bolivarian revolution, including the scandalous attack
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against the presidency of the republic personally led by the president
of the businessmen’s association.
Rather than a rosary of our weaknesses, what this brief listing
describes is the extremely strong erosion of democratic and republi-
can institutions by neoliberalism, an open declaration of war by capi-
tal against the possibilities of political action. Paraphrasing Atilio
Boron –this Executive Secretary who with his courageous team car-
ried out the true miracle of recovering our CLACSO– capitalism in the
periphery is showing itself to be totally incompatible with democracy.
After the crisis of the dictatorships, a breath of liberty swept
over Latin America. All over the continent, the revitalization of politics
operated by the conjunction of rising social movements, renewed
labor movements (clear-cut case of Brazil), the foreign-debt crises, the
creation of new mass parties centered on the workers (once again the
Brazilian example with the Workers’ Party or PT), the patching up of
misguided party antagonisms (typical being the Chilean reconciliation
between Christian Democrats and socialists), the new alignment with-
in Argentina’s Justicialism, the popular rejection of Andresist corrup-
tion in Venezuela and a renewed identification with Bolivarian ideas,
generated the miracle of the democratization of Latin America. And
with it, the promises of banishing the almost Auschwitzian neoliber-
alism experiments. For the first time in the history of the region, in its
thirty-five countries there existed no dictatorial régime. It seemed that
the grotesque mix of dictators, minor chieftains, and petty tyrants in a
few pseudo-democratic régimes had ended, to give way to the unani-
mous predominance of democracy.
However, something entirely unforeseen happened. Perhaps we
had underestimated the “dirty work” of the dictatorships, the havoc
wreaked in the social structure, in the increase in inequalities, in the
governmental ability to regulate conflicts, in the identity between the
national project for the dominant classes and the national project for
the dominated classes. A kind of asynchrony, to say the least, had
taken place: the bourgeoisies gave up on a national project, and the
space of politics was, thus, transformed into a confinement for the
dominated classes. The wave of democratization was encapsulated by
globalization, with all its consequences: the dictatorships had defini-
tively inserted the economies of Latin America in the financialization
of capital, which to an extreme degree sterilized the power of the state
in this new and original democratization.
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The response of the political forces that took over government power
after the dictatorships was to step up the pace to complete the work of
financialization, attempting to insert the different countries, under
diverse formulas, in a mistaken, supposedly homogenizing globaliza-
tion. Customs protection was eliminated in the name of the benefits of
free trade, the government corporations which had constituted them-
selves into the pillars of industrialization since the 1950s were priva-
tized, and the labor markets structured into a precarious Welfare State
were deregulated in different ways. Some went quite far: through inte-
gration into FTA Mexico lost its autonomy for any economic policy;
Argentina privatized everything and established a dollarization that
ended by eliminating all non-customs protection and reached the limit
of setting up the parity between the peso and the dollar as a law, thus
denying those who had been elected the capacity to govern. De la Rúa
was the paroxysm of this destatization of the currency. Brazil, under
the double mandate of Fernando Henrique Cardoso, privatized the
powerful government-owned industrial base, retaining only Petrobrás,
in a transfer of property that endorsed the structures of power and the
relations between classes and between the latter and politics. There
still remained a significant private industrial base, undercut, however,
by opening up trade indiscriminately. It would be lengthy, tedious and
superfluous, in the face of the formidable arsenal of data, analyses and
interpretations by ECLAC, to reconstruct the disasters expressed in
the main economic indicators.
This fragmentation of class relations is not without conse-
quences for politics, radicalizing social tensions to an unsuspected
degree, and a political step of such magnitude is required that the very
implosion of class relations advises against waiting. The high levels of
unemployment and of informal employment dethroned from a politi-
cally central position the categories organized in formal employment
to which they had risen: even the election of Luiz Inácio “Lula” da
Silva to the presidency of the Brazilian republic did not entail the wax-
ing of labor power as the political basis of the PT. It has a different
meaning. Unemployment and off-the-books employment, which in a
country like Brazil reached something like 60% of the economically
active population –and in Argentina the percentage is even greater–
created a new class that the political lexicon of the left and of the
social sciences isn’t even capable of naming: they are not informal
workers, they are unemployed but not jobless: they are not a “margin-
al mass” in the conception of José Nun: they are a lumpen peasantry,
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without the pejorative nuance that the term undeniably had in the
hands of the bearded one of Tiers. It is in politics that they become a
lumpen; or, better said, it is in anti-politics.
This powerful deconstruction destroys the relations of represen-
tation: who is represented today by the parties themselves that arose
from the old social bases? Whom does Argentina’s Justicialism, by
itself already divided into powerful bureaucratic and even gangster-
like fractions, represent? The picketers? Ask them themselves. Does
the PT represent the sixty percent of the sum of informal workers and
unemployed in Brazil? Do the traditional political parties of Colombia
represent the forces in conflict for over 30 years, worsened by the
arrival of the paramilitaries on the scene? Evo Morales is the new man
of the coca growers, and he constitutes real news, because Bolivia’s
parties had long ceased to have any truly popular insertion, and the
Revolutionary Nationalist Movement (MNR) went over to the oli-
garchies’ side a long time ago. The indigenous movement in Ecuador
is also a novelty, in the same sense as the movement in Bolivia.
Fujimori was a conservative reaction to anarchy: but the immense
digestive system of the plundering dominant classes quickly swal-
lowed him and transformed him into the greatest symbol of the cor-
rupt impunity of the old Peruvian dominant classes. Toledo comes
with Stanford in his baggage and already experiences a demoraliza-
tion that makes his Ph.D. impotent.
Institutional politics spin ineffectually, because the conditions
and the constraints imposed by globalization make democratic and
republican institutions useless and superfluous. Central Banks are the
real national authorities, and they are not democratic institutions. In
the Schmittian definition, the sovereign is he who decides the State of
Exception. National States have turned into States of Exception: all
public policies are policies of exception. And who decides among us?
Institutional policy led the most transformation-minded popu-
lar forces into a trap. It is these new popular forces, which finally
reached the thresholds of power, which implement the exception: of
the surpluses agreed on with the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
of the pressure to institute the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA), of the submission to the World Trade Organization (WTO), of
our conversion to free exchange and free trade.
Latin America has forgotten the fundamental lesson of Raúl
Prebisch, about the asymmetry of forces in the center-periphery rela-
tionship. Meanwhile, the national bourgeoisies, entirely subordinated
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to globalization, renounce politics. They prefer to place their trust in
the mechanisms so revealingly pointed out by Foucault: compulsory
coercion, procedures, institutionalities, etc. All of them, automatisms
that annul politics.
The Brazilian case illustrates this to satiety: Lula’s government,
which promised to be transformative, surrendered to obligations;
there is no political opposition, even opposition by economic sectors,
whichever they might be. The paradox thus emerges that the forces
that won the elections struggle among themselves, while the dominant
classes provoke the conflicts: the case of land reform in Brazil is noth-
ing but that. The Landless Movement (MST) attempts to obtain gov-
ernment compliance with the necessary number of settlements, and
the government doesn’t carry the land reform out, perhaps not
because of a lack of political will but because of the surpluses in fiscal
approaches imposed by the IMF, while the media exaggerate the con-
flict between the MST and the government. Consequently, both are
weakened and anti-land reform positions begin to strengthen.
It should also be doubted that the neoliberal period has exhaust-
ed its agenda. To provide an example, let us return to the case of the
Brazilian government which continues to deepen the neoliberal
“reforms.” Now, assuming that the neoliberal agenda is really exhaust-
ed, the issue that appears is a more complex one: what should be done
to repair the deep organizational wearing down of the working class-
es and minimally restore the regulatory capacity of an entirely pillaged
state? How is economic growth to the restarted if the government
investment that was decisive in the industrialization of Latin America
is impossible because government finances have been strangled by the
heavy servicing of the domestic and foreign debt and the privatiza-
tions? Trust in the market as a mechanism for the distribution of
resources must be cast into doubt even more vigorously than in the
golden days of ECLAC, considering that the distribution of income has
worsened, and therefore investments only go to the sectors that han-
dle the demands of the high-income classes, perpetuating the perverse
concentration already pointed out and condemned by Celso Furtado.
Economic growth without a redistribution of income becomes even
more concentrating, and without the state as a regulatory force the
transformative project has everything needed to be the executioner of
its own promise.
What is left in Latin America to the national states that are pre-
cluded from acting on development policies is the administration of
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the policies of functionalization of poverty. These are policies of excep-
tion that transform the states into States of Exception. They are mar-
keting states that invent names such as “bolsa-escola” (school scholar-
ship), “bolsa-alimentação” (food scholarship), “primeiro-emprego”
(first job), “começar de novo” (new beginning), “Fome Zero” (Hunger
Zero) –the most pretentious of all, which shows up the anti-universal
character of these policies with extreme clarity. Meanwhile the social
security policies that promoted a greater redistribution of income in
the annals of capitalism in the central countries are annulled in the
periphery by the privatizations and the “reforms” –the new term for
semantic piracy.
As labor forces have been highly eroded, and have lost the abili-
ty to propose policies and carry them out, or to veto the anti-reforms,
the national states of Latin America are close to what, in the past, the
literature called populism. But the name is equivocal; that populism
entailed the inclusion along “the passive path,” in an authoritarian
m a n n e r, of the working classes in politics, while neopopulism –let us
accept it for now– implies the exclusion of workers from politics and
their transformation into the objects of compensatory policies. May
Nun forgive me, but through the policies for the functionalization of
poverty the “marginal mass” turns into the maintenance of the “reserve
armies” suitable for more primitive work processes, with which to win
a functional spot in the accumulation of capital. It isn’t poverty, how-
e v e r, that moves that accumulation, but the molecular-digital revolu-
tion at the dynamic center that makes poverty functional for the accu-
mulation of capital. The economies of Latin America now belong to the
platypus family, a lopsided combination of high income, conspicuous
consumption, accumulation of capital commanded by the molecular-
digital revolution, extreme poverty, modern lumpen-peasantry, and
subjection by financial capital, technical and scientific ineff e c t u a l n e s s .
Argentina, which had given us the only Nobel in a scientific field, phys-
iology-biology-medicine, now lies asleep at the Recoleta cemetery: here
lies the promise of a nation.
Why is the challenge greater today than that which arose in the
years of “developmentalism” (desarrollismo), which found its best for-
mulator in the brave ECLAC? Firstly for a fundamental strategic rea-
son: the previous situation –characterized by an “unequal exchange”
between producers of raw materials (Latin America) and producers of
manufactured goods (the dynamic center)– could be overcome by put-
ting into practice ECLAC’s proposal par excellence: industrialization.
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Today, globalization is above all a financial system. The principal con-
tradiction doesn’t refer to the fact that it is the multinationals them-
selves who are present in the industrialization that substitutes for
imports –which worsens financial dependence because it is one of its
structuring elements– but the fact that it is global money (the dollar
and the euro) which constitutes the prior assumption and the result of
the financing of the economies of the Latin American periphery. In
other words, it is international money itself which finances Latin
America’s productive activity. And there is no “substitutive industrial-
ization” for global money. In this case, the medicine kills. The equa-
tion of dependence and that of its solution are more complex.
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FOR A CUBAN who tries to be coherent with the history of Cuba and
of America it constitutes an immense honor to have been granted the
privilege of transmitting a message to the people present here. It also
implies a great responsibility because I must do it in the name of the
culture represented by José Martí. The Apostle and Simón Bolívar
are the topmost symbols of the history of America; they represent a
culture that since its conception has been linked to the immediate
problems of our historic development and, therefore, can today pro-
vide answers and point out possible paths for facing the challenges
of the current world.
As President Fidel Castro pointed out at the close of the
International Conference for the Balance of the World, held in hom-
age to the 150th anniversary of José Martí’s birth, our Apostle identi-
fied God with the idea of good. In the name of Martí’s acceptance of
God, that is, of good, I bring the word born of our deepest convictions
that flower from loves and thoughts rooted in our spirit. To love, to
think and to act – this is the message of Martí that I would modestly
like to expound to you.
TO LOVE, THINK AND ACT
FROM LATIN AMERICA
ARMANDO HART DÁVALOS*
* Education Minister since the victory of the Cuban Revolution until 1965. Director of the Office of the
Martí Program attached to the Council of State. He is president of the José Martí Cultural Association.
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The natural sciences have created symbols for delving into knowledge
about a reality that encompasses both the infinite spaces of the Universe
and the inexhaustible micro world. Without them we would not have
attained the heights of knowledge that man has conquered. Those of a
social character also require their own symbols. They are present in the
great social, economic, cultural and political processes. Also in the peo-
ple and in the individuals who represent and promote them.
Myths and symbols are indispensable for establishing relations
within human consciousness between levels of reality that present
themselves as contradictory and as vastly separate in space and time.
In a world burdened by ferocious and vulgar materialism that express-
es a very dangerous fragmentation of reality, they are more necessary
than ever before in history. They must enable us to find and extract
conclusions regarding the invisible thread that –according to Martí–
links individuals in history. We will thus be able to understand the
drama which originates in the past and to attempt to envision a future
that can only be attained with the actions of millions of people and of
many generations. Let others reject the need for myths and symbols.
People –as Mariátegui said– need multitudinous myths. Martí’s apos-
tleship is therefore more current and necessary than ever.
Over a hundred years ago, conservative European thought
reached the conclusion that by the end of the twentieth century the
decadence of the West would take place. Similarly, the illustrious
Cuban patrician Salvador Cisneros Betancourt pointed out at the
beginning of the nineteenth century that the path that the United
States then trod would lead to the decadence of its immense power
and warned, thinking about Cuba, that United States leaders should
always remember that there is no small enemy.
Already in 1887, on presciently analyzing the dangers that were
shaping up from the United States, our National Hero pointed out:
“Like immense and slow phantoms, the vital problems of the Americas
are arising in space: the times demand something more than factories
of the imagination and the generation of beauty. On all faces and in all
countries, as symbols of the era, one can see hesitation and anguish.
The entire world is now an immense question mark.”
How to answer this question in the twenty-first century when the
challenge presents itself in a more dramatic and universal manner?
As this conference itself demonstrates, Latin America and the
Caribbean is the only region of the world with the possibility to draw
up a consistent thesis in relation to the major challenges that the
twenty-first century poses us, and we can do it with the participation
of illustrious representatives of the North American people such are
present here.
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It is in Latin America and the Caribbean where the indispensable cul-
tural reserves are located for facing the grave crisis we have before us.
Our Americas can, due to economic and social factors linked to our
immense spiritual tradition, present formulas for a dialogue with the
world, including the North American people and society themselves, in
relation to the future of humanity. For these reasons, I invite you to
study Latin American thought and specifically that of Martí, who
arrived at a set of universal ideas not only through abstract formula-
tions, but also by pointing out some very concrete things. A genius with
words, he said that doing is the best way of saying. He set this out bril-
liantly in prose and in poetry. He also confirmed it in his actions, ideas
and principles that serve to know and understand a reality which one
often cannot reach with rational thought.
His scintillating verses delved into substantive aspects of human
sensibility and managed to reveal truths and feelings that were hidden
in the skein of a rationalism which by virtue of being exaggerated and
inconsistent has become irrational and has led us into the most atro-
cious primitivism, because when intelligence isn’t accompanied by love
it turns into error, evil and irrationality that nurture the criminal
instinct. As I have said, the genius of the Apostle resides in these analy-
ses: love, reason and a vocation for action, this is what he taught us.
Since this synthesis can only be attained on a social and histor-
ical scale with a culture inclined toward action, the Apostle took it to
the terrain of facts and to his pedagogical ideas and to those on culti-
vated politics. This leads to an understanding of the possibilities and
needs of a philosophical elucidation oriented towards drawing up pro-
grams such as are needed by today’s world.
Let us issue a reflection on the basis of what the cultured
Europe called the New World, that is to say, from Alaska to Tierra del
Fuego, and of the role it should perform in this new century.
In the Manifesto of Montecristi which Martí signed along with
General Máximo Gómez in May 1895, by which they explained to
Cuba, America and the world the bases for Cuba’s drive toward inde-
pendence, essential ideas were pointed out which are still astonish-
ingly current. For example: “The war of independence of Cuba, locus
of the array of islands which, within the span of a few years, the trade
of the continents will run through, is an event of great human scope,
and a timely service that the judicious heroism of the Antilles offers
toward firmness and fair treatment among the nations of the
Americas, and toward the world’s still vacillating balance.”
In a letter to his very close Mexican friend Manuel Mercado
dated May 18, 1895, unfinished because death stole up on him the
next day, he pointed out that everything he had done and would do
would be to “prevent in time, through the independence of Cuba, hav-
ing the United States spread through the Antilles, and having it fall
even harder with that power on our lands of the Americas.” The
Apostle did not forget a substantial aspect; he sent a message to the
United States people when, on another occasion, he stated that the
Cuban war of independence was also being carried out to save the
honor of the great northern republic which would find a more secure
greatness in the development of its territory –unfortunately already
feudal and split into hostile sections– than in the ignoble conquest of
its smaller neighbors and in the war which the aligned world would
have to wage against its ambition. It is the vision of Martí that we
wish to have reached all the people of the world and especially that of
the United States.
As I was listening to the extremely interesting speeches of the
first day1, I asked myself what the reaction of United States society
may be in the face of the universal drama that the oligarchy of that
country is strongly unleashing. I have faith in the potentialities, in
the best democratic tradition of the United States, and trust that sen-
sible people will emerge in that nation’s leadership who will under-
stand that they have no possibility of relating to the world other than
on the basis of a crucible of ideas such as those of A. Lincoln, R. W.
Emerson –whom José Martí so admired– and Martin Luther King,
whose symbol will grow ever greater in the midst of the United
States people.
It is very important to take into account that Martí conceived
these ideas in the heart of the United States –a land where he resided
for more than a third of his life– precisely at the time that the imperi-
alism was taking shape. It was there that he crowned his thinking and
turned into the most profound analyst of U.S. reality in the latter half
of the nineteenth century. For this reason, his ideas on balance permit
a philosophical enlightenment that serves to draw up the political and
educational programs that we need today.
There are two key ideas in Martí that help us to locate, on a
philosophical foundation, the political, educational and cultural paths
along which to face these processes. They are firstly the views on
world balance that we have previously referred to, and secondly the
usefulness of virtue and the possibilities of human improvement. The
idea of a world balance is based, like his entire worldview, on the
integrity of the diverse orders of reality as an essential guiding law rul-
ing nature, art, science, economics and social relations. And since this
synthesis can only be attained on a social and historical scale when
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1 See the articles by Francisco de Oliveira and Samir Amin in this same volume.
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oriented toward action, the Apostle applied it to the spheres of educa-
tion, culture and practical politics.
On the basis of these conclusions, we issue an invitation to study
his ideas regarding what he called the science of the spirit, his stand-
points on the relations between evil and stupidity and between good-
ness and intelligence, his statement that the meaning of humanity
resides in the capacity to associate together, his criterion regarding the
importance of education and culture in human liberation and his eth-
ical ideas. Martí’s statement regarding every individual being a dor-
mant beast should also be studied. “It is necessary to place a leash on
the beast. And man is an admirable beast: he has the attribute of car-
rying his own leash.” The leash is culture.
All these aspects constitute essential keys to reaching a concep-
tion of the world on the basis of justice and of solidarity among men.
This crucible of ideas analyzed in relation to the best universal philo-
sophical thinking makes manifest a measure of science and utopi-
anism, of reality and dream such as is required to attain a better world.
This is because in Martí there took place a synthesis of the
immense knowledge of European modernity; the purest ethical tradi-
tion with Christian roots, which from the outset didn’t place itself in
Cuba in an antagonism with science; the unbiased influence of
Masonic ideas in their most universal sense and in their sense of
human solidarity; the Bolivarian and Latin American tradition that
he enriched with his life in Mexico, Central America and Ve n e z u e l a ,
and the anti-imperialist ideas and sentiments arising from the very
innards of the U.S. empire where he lived more than fifteen years,
and where he rounded out his political, social and philosophical
thinking from the viewpoint of Latin America’s interests. He was
undoubtedly the most profound analyst of United States reality in the
second half of the nineteenth century.
In 1892, José Martí founded the Cuban Revolutionary Party and
three years later, after intense political and organizational labors, he
issued a call to the necessary war against the Spanish empire that
turned out to be the prelude to combat against the incipient U.S.
Empire. In the 1920s this patriotic and anti-imperialist tradition
blended with the socialist ideal and deepened its popular content and
its content of social justice.
In this way, Cuban culture reached the new millennium with
the highest synthesis between European thinking and that of the
New World, and in so doing took on the articulation between Europe
and the Americas on the basis of half a century of practical experi-
ence in the confrontation with the imperialist policy and therefore
with the greatest technological and economic power that has ever
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existed in humanity and which is, additionally, located 90 miles from
our shores.
A nation that has had this capacity for combat and for resist-
ance to face such grievous obstacles for around a hundred and fifty
years has the ability to provide answers to the essential problems fac-
ing the Cuba of today and of tomorrow but which –let it be clearly
known– affect not only our country, but involve all mankind.
If in the twentieth century anti-imperialist thinking and its rad-
ical universal humanism were exalted, in the twenty-first it is neces-
sary to study the philosophical ideas of Martí that are indispensable
not only for our country but for America and for humanity as a whole.
There is no alternative to posing problems of a philosophical charac-
ter, leaving behind terminologies of European making that set up a
barrier against the masses, and taking up the thinking of the greatest
philosophers of all times again.
Antonio Gramsci stated that every great philosophy starts out
with a critical analysis of the formulations of common sense. Let us
consider the first: every person needs to eat, clothe himself, and have
a roof, before engaging in philosophy, religion and culture. From it, let
us derive the second: there is no man, in the universal sense that we
all know, without culture.
What teaching do we Cubans extract today from these ideas and
their ulterior consequences? The first and most important lesson
resides in that the main deficit of what was called the left in the cen-
tury that has concluded was to have divorced social and class struggles
from the best Latin American cultural tradition. This did not occur
that way in Cuba. Among us, as I have already pointed out, the politi-
cal, economic, social and cultural ideas arising from two major
sources were articulated in the twentieth century: the historical mate-
rialism of Marx and Engels, which is the highest stage reached to date
by European philosophy, and the culture on Latin American and
Caribbean foundations whose highest stage exists in José Martí.
At a universal level, in the twentieth century it proved impossible
to relate the great discoveries of historical materialism to the weight of
subjectivity in history itself. For this purpose there lacked culture.
This incites us in the twenty-first century to study, in the light of
the human sciences and their great discoveries, the importance of the
subjective factor in understanding the events we have before us.
Hence the value of Fidel Castro’s words when he insists that cul-
ture is the essential element for national and international politics at
these crossroads times.
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The material foundations of civilization require culture, as a need;
without it they would lack the immense accumulated wealth, without
it there wouldn’t really be a highly developed economy.
When the noble aspirations of liberty, equality and fraternity
have been tossed overboard by the vulgar materialism that has been
imposed in the world that is called unipolar, we Latin Americans and
Caribbeans present ourselves with a universal cultural richness of the
highest humanistic value. It is difficult to find another region of the
world that by virtue of its history and traditions possesses the voca-
tion of solidary universality of Latin America. Among us the narrow
and fanatic nationalisms that are painfully present in other regions
d o n ’t exist. Latin American and Caribbean nationalism includes the
ideal of multinational integration and a generous disposition to
embrace the world.
We set out from a tradition of spirituality and ethicality that is
manifested in the search for a better tomorrow for the world. It is
present, in an unmistakable manner, in the major movements of ideas
that have taken place over the last fifty years in our broadly-defined
fatherland. They are: the renewal in socialist thinking that was gener-
ated by the Cuban Revolution and that we represent in Fidel Castro
and Ernesto Guevara; the artistic and literary explosion, and the
esthetic thinking related to, and having its bulwark in, Alejo
Carpentier and the marvelous real; the social and philosophical think-
ing and the ethical dimension that we notice in the theology of libera-
tion when we analyze it as a function of the kingdom of this world; the
popular-education movement.
These idea processes have a common denominator: they take
reality very much into account and, likewise, pose themselves a utopi-
an vision, i.e., a project, an aspiration, an ideal of human improve-
ment toward the future. The crisis in Western thought resides, pre-
cisely, as we have already pointed out, in that it divorced these two cat-
egories: utopianism and science. Latin America can, on the basis of its
history and traditions, present a solution that twins intelligence and
love as a liberation project.
Selfishness doesn’t need to be encouraged; it exists with a spon-
taneous force that is often overwhelming and destructive. Love and
solidarity are the higher features of human intelligence that require
stimulation. An endeavor aimed at promoting ideas and feelings of
solidarity lies at the essence of the postulate of José Martí that is
required for the social and historical balance of individuals, commu-
nities, nations and humanity as a whole.
The social agents of change posed by Marx and Engels turn out
to be insufficient. They were presented for the Europe of the nine-
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teenth century and we are in the western hemisphere of the twenty-
first century.
It is essential to find new categories to conceive the way of
changing the world.
The drive toward transformation must be materialized from
the starting point of the fully objective fact that current events are
related to material and spiritual needs derived from the identity of
communities, nations and groups of nations given the geographical
area, given their aspiration toward a higher civilization, and given the
existence of the universality which is today called globalization. Let
us study postmodern challenges on the basis of these three cate-
gories: identity, civilization and universality. These have economic
roots, and the vortex of the postmodern cyclone passes through them.
This is the new dimension that has been reached by the social, his-
torical and cultural drama in the years following the fall of the Berlin
wall. At the end of the Second World War these confrontations were
already discerned and unfolding, but the existence of a bipolar bal-
ance contained, or at least mitigated, a radical rupture of such con-
flictive relations.
Latin America and the Caribbean are in a condition to offer, in
answer to the evident fragmentation and decadence of Western
thought, the solidity of our cultural tradition and its utopian value
directed toward the aim of integration.
In practical terms, what does this aspiration toward universal-
ity compel us to?
In the first place, we must not fall into the trap of analyzing our
relations with the United States by focusing on the political issue
exclusively within the framework of the interests and criteria that are
handled in the midst of that country’s government elite. It must be
done from a wider perspective; it must be adjusted and must take into
consideration the possible influence to be exerted on the public opin-
ion and people of the United States. It is necessary, at the same time,
to effect an international mobilization of the widest social sectors in
favor of the aims we pursue.
Secondly, we mustn’t have the slightest weakness or slackness in
the face of the arrogant policy of United States governments. As the
Che pointed out, we cannot make the slightest concession to the impe-
rialists. This formulation has today greater reasons for being applica-
ble than when Ernesto Guevara issued it.
In the third place, it is necessary to ensure the unity of the peo-
ple, division being one of the factors that most weakens the people’s
capacity to struggle, to advance and to resist; for these reasons, we
Cubans look after unity as after the apple of our eyes.
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Fourthly, unity and firmness in the face of hegemonic and unipolar
power demand the defense of the interests of the immense majority of
the population, and respect for the tradition of our peoples, which is
expressed in their culture; within it, the role performed by intellectu-
als is of enormous importance.
All this leads us to exalt the role of the pedagogical practice and
practical politics that constitute the most singular constriction made
by the Apostle to the history of political and educational ideas. They
are also linked to the immense juridical culture that has an ample tra-
dition in our people. In this manner, pedagogy, politics and the law
must be articulated to form a powerful front of ethical concepts and
principles, which is an essential subject of the politics of our times.
Governability is talked about. It is, however, impossible without
the law and without ethics. In the current world, for it to be possible,
justice must be recognized in its most widely encompassing and uni-
versal sense. Say “man” and all rights have been said, stated the
Apostle. He also declared: “Let the world be grafted onto our republics;
but the trunk must be that of our republics.” And for this to happen and
have the ability to promote stability in the present and toward the
future, it is necessary to have ethics and law guaranteeing universal jus-
tice. For such elevated proposals what is indispensable is a democracy
with full popular participation and with the incorporation of all social
sectors without discrimination of any kind. This requires new forms of
government very different from those of the past.
A thinking that may serve as the trunk for our ideas must not be
sought outside our fatherlands; it must be sought in the history of our
countries. On the basis of what is ours, we can find in that history that
which is essentially Latin American as a creative force to face the chal-
lenge that today’s world finds before it. With regard to this principle,
José Martí averred, “The incompetence does not reside in the incipi-
ent country, which requires forms suited to it and useful greatness, but
in those who want to rule original countries, with a singular and vio-
lent composition. With laws inherited from four centuries of free prac-
tice in the United States, from nineteen centuries of monarchy in
France. With a decree by Hamilton one cannot the halt the charge of
the plainsman’s horse. With a phrase by Sieyès one cannot end the
stagnation of the clotted blood of the Indian race (...). The government
must be born from the country. The spirit of the government must be
that of the country. The form of government must be suited to the way
the country itself is constituted. The government is nothing else than
the balance of the natural elements of the country.”
For all this, political action is necessary, and, in turn, it is indis-
pensable to delve deeply into the best political ideas. I have main-
tained that the singularity of the politics of José Martí, and of his dis-
ciple Fidel Castro, resides in having overcome the old watchword,
with its reactionary tradition, of “divide and conquer,” to establish the
principle of “unite to win.”
However many analyses we carry out in the infinite maze of eco-
nomic facts and figures, the path to a solution to these problems can
only arrive from political ideas and watchwords. This is the only way
of breaking with the horrendous vicious circle into which politics fell
in the twentieth century, and it is what will lead us to practice.
Since the late 1940s and early 1950s our country’s most pro-
gressive forces exalted the watchwords of political freedom, eco-
nomic independence, social justice, and combat against corruption
and immorality.
The first three were the reflection of the social and economic
struggles that our country undertook for its liberation. The fourth
expresses the need to fight corruption and the violation of ethical and
juridical principles. This latter is a key issue for any revolutionary.
Those in the Americas who aspire to the liberation of their
people must begin by condemning the violations of the law and the
i m m o r a l i t y, the vices, the larceny and the thievery of traditional
politicians. Cuba’s road to socialism started out that way. It is a
reflection that I consider perfectly valid, in the current circum-
stances, for any process of change that is carried out among our peo-
ple of the Americas.
Let us definitively overcome divisive “isms”; let us seek out, with
elective methods, as was propounded by the Cuban philosophy of the
beginning of the nineteenth century, the path of the truth, and through
this selection we shall find the social and philosophical thinking that
the Americas require. We shall never find it with Byzantine debates
about the diversity of philosophical and political systems that came to
us from outside, whichever they are, from what was called the left or
from what was called the right.
Enough of talking about culture without grasping that its primary
value is justice. It is necessary to be well-educated, but one must aspire
to culture in its widest sense; justice must be exalted to the highest level,
suitable for defending the interests of all people, be they New Yo r k e r s ,
Afghans, Iraqis, Cubans, Argentines, French, Chinese or Vietnamese. In
one word, all, without exception. To sum it up I will quote two ideas of
President Fidel Castro that may illustrate what we are stating: “Great
crises lead to great solutions.” And this other one: “The great asset of the
human mind for the future consists in the enormous potential of genet-
ically received intelligence that we are incapable of utilizing. This is
what we have at out disposal, there resides the future (...).”
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In order to find that formula let us, as the Apostle did, relate goodness
to the intelligence and happiness of each individual, on one hand, and
evil to stupidity and the unhappiness of the other. This can be studied
on an individual scale and also at a social level. The modern advances
in psychology confirm this thesis of Martí’s that the feelings, the emo-
tions and the intellectual capacity of the individual are in a very direct
relationship and are those which allow individual balance within each
person in particular; and it also finds its confirmation in descriptions
made in the physiological field of the operation of the human mind.
This, of course, is valid at a social and historical level; it can be verified
through the detailed examination of universal history.
Political and social systems perish not only through evil, but
also because they are guided wrong-headedly; this is demonstrated
through the history of Cuba by its relation with Spanish colonialism
first and later with U.S. neocolonialism. It is a historical truth that
must be taken very seriously into account when the twilight of the
system of capitalist domination, loaded with perils for humanity, is
taking place. But as Fidel Castro has said, this is a period that addi-
tionally offers possibilities for generating wealth and greater happi-
ness for all people.
Yes, we are in a period following the modern era, that is to say,
it is postmodern, characterized by the greatest and most profound cri-
sis in the institutions and political, legal, ethical and cultural values of
so-called Western civilization. Those that retain their formal validity
are already impotent for facing the drama of humanity in the recently
begun century; for this reason, it becomes necessary to create a space
for the study, research and promotion of ideas about the need for bal-
ance in the world, one that is led by a dialogue removed or distant
from the enormous limitations imposed by the world’s immediate con-
flicts of a practical nature.
To this end, the International Conference for the Balance of the
World agreed to organize the José Martí Project of World Solidarity
aimed at the creation, on an international scale, of a space for reflec-
tion, study, research and the promotion of ideas on the need for bal-
ance in the world oriented toward serene dialogue, removed from the
enormous limitations imposed by the conflicts of an immediate polit-
ical character of the current world. We aspire to promote the widest
possible representation of civilizations and people of the world, of the
international organizations most vitally interested in these goals, and
–on the basis of the universal consensus expressed in the creation of
the United Nations after the World War– to support the updating of
the multilateral ideals that will guarantee the right of nations, people,
cultural identities and human beings to peace, culture and economic
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and social development. We call on all those present to offer their
backing to this initiative that already enjoys the endorsement of
U N E S C O .
We are the inheritors of a beautiful intellectual tradition that
allows us, today more than ever, to think with our own head and –as
Martí indicated– to make the forms of government emerge from the
country itself.
We stand at a crucial moment in the history of the world and of
our Americas. The new factor that presents itself is that while so-
called Western civilization finds itself at a pessimistic and right-wing
crossroads, our Americas today contain the –at least initial– seeds of
a world of hope.
When Martí was told that the proper atmosphere was lacking
for the war of independence, he replied that he wasn’t speaking of
atmosphere but of subsoil. In Latin America there is a world of hope
that additionally is already emerging toward the surface in the entire
hemisphere. Compare the political situation of the current world
with the fact that there exist five Latin American states where major
changes are gestating –I refer to Argentina, Brazil, Ve n e z u e l a ,
Paraguay and Bolivia. The recent events in Bolivia confirm the bank-
ruptcy of neoliberal policy and the fact that the masses are becom-
ing conscious of the real causes of the problems that burden our
countries. Let us not forget this because, emerging from the subsoil
of the Americas, is the greatest hope of the world of today. I am not
being triumphalist; I know the difficulties well and I also know that
the changeover is very difficult, but the seeds have been sown, the
beginnings are there; let us make us of them and search, employing
every means, for the way to give an ideology, philosophy, theory to
the new process that is taking shape and that appears, strongly, in
the idea of the Social Forums of São Paulo: another, better world is
possible. Latin America is in the vanguard for finding that better
w o r l d .
Let us fulfill the commitment we have as the small human
genus.
Martí said in relation to the Cubans who refused to fight for
independence that it seemed unbelievable that with such a glorious
future ahead there were people born in our land who would bind their
lives to Spain’s rustic and rotten monarchy. Paraphrasing these ideas
of the Apostle’s, we can say that it is incredible that there are Latin
Americans who, in the twenty-first century, reject the determination to
help the world with the ideas of our national heroes and thinkers and
bind their lives to decadent and corrupt imperialism.
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Let us unite our intelligence and our hearts to say to our peo-
ple and to all of humanity: a better world is possible. It is the moral
republic of the Americas, the formula of triumphant love that Martí
p r o p h e s i e d .
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The subject that convene us
THE MAIN GOAL of this conference was to examine the p r o b l é m a t i q u e
of the new worldwide hegemony, the options for change and social
movements. Without fear of exaggeration we might say that in their
complex articulation these matters identify the fundamental challenges
faced today by the men and women of our time who want to build a
better world. Another world –as demanded along the length and
breadth of our planet in recent years on the basis of a clear realization
that the current world is unbearable because of its injustice and preda-
tory nature. This world is the result of capitalist civilization, which like
the monster in the most dreadful allegories devours its off s p r i n g ,
exhausts its non-renewable resources and irreparably destroys the
environment that our species requires for survival. Wi l l i a m
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S h a k e s p e a r e ’s reflection, when he makes one of his characters say, “Yo u
take my life when you do take the means whereby I live,” seems highly
fitting. The predatory nature of capitalism, exacerbated in its current
phase, has led precisely to this point: depriving three quarters of
humanity of their livelihood and destroying the environment that made
it possible for human life to appear and maintain itself on this planet.
A civilization which in the name of eff i c i e n c y, rationality and progress
slowly and silently carries out the biggest genocide known in the histo-
ry of humanity. Every year near forty million people, most of them chil-
dren, die of hunger and curable diseases. In other words, in just one
year capitalism annihilates more than half the number of victims
caused by the Second World War over six years. The large social
movements that today challenge this situation do so on the basis of the
conviction that other world is not only possible but also necessary and
urgent. I shall attempt, in the following pages, to set forth a brief sum-
mary of the debates held within the framework of this event. The
emphasis will be placed both on the main areas of agreement and on
the issues under dispute.
A new phase?
There is an extremely wide consensus in the sense that the world
imperialist system has entered a new phase in its evolution. This tran-
sition didn’t escape the notice of its spokespeople and ideological rep-
resentatives, who hurried to endow this new stage with a name that
underlined the dazzling features of its appearance while carefully hid-
ing its deepest essence: globalization. The more striking aspects of this
process seem to substantiate the idea of an increasing globalization of
productive processes and of the operation of the diverse markets.
Nevertheless, the scope of this phenomenon has been extraordinarily
exaggerated and nowadays the available research already demon-
strates that the much trumpeted globalization –which the French cor-
rectly call mondialization, something like “worldization,” to allude to
the will-related, not at all natural, elements that boost it– is a phe-
nomenon that acquires a different solidity depending on what is being
talked about. The international financial system has, no doubt, been
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1 We have examined this subject in Tiempos violentos. Neoliberalismo, globalización y desigualdad en
América Latina, 2004 (1999), which includes a detailed bibliography on the issue.
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globalized; but the same has not happened with trade in agricultural
products and with a broad swath of the service sector1.
The champions of neoliberalism were not tardy in announcing
that the advent of globalization brought to an end “the age of impe-
rialism”. This was now duly acknowledged while before its sole exis-
tence had been stubbornly denied, attributed to the feverish imagi-
nation of critics on the left, always ready to give vent to their viscer-
al hate against the system with all types of charges and challenges.
According to the right, the imperialist experience, already ended,
was explained by a series of factors allegedly foreign to capitalism.
Standing out among them were militarism, nationalism and protec-
tionism. Exhibiting a colossal disregard for the lessons of history
they isolated these factors from the reality of capitalist development,
as if it hadn’t been precisely the latter which engendered them, and
re-edited the dusty thesis of “sweet commerce” proposed, as Albert
Hirschman rightly observed, by the first ideologists of bourgeois
society over the course of eighteenth century. A thesis which, in
essence, held that the development of trade calms spirits and curbs
p e o p l e ’s “bellicose instincts.” If they trade, they said, there will be no
wars. And despite the thorough refutation provided by history (and
by the present) this thesis reappears in our time in the writings of
globalization theorists.
The accelerated and profound changes experienced as of the
closing decades of the last century left popular movements, and the
left itself, deeply disconcerted. If the organic intellectuals of the right
hastened to salute the novelties as a radical break with the opprobri-
ous imperialist past, in the leftist camp confusion reached unthought-
of levels when some of its most respected theorists stated, in agree-
ment with their alleged adversaries, that global neoliberalism
expressed the historical overcoming of imperialism, and that we were
in front of a new reality of international politics and economics that
could be given the name of “empire.” An empire, naturally, without
imperialist relations of domination. An empire without imperialism,
acknowledged in a play on words whose most important effect was to
produce the ideological disarmament of contesting social forces. Since
we have examined those theses –maintained fundamentally but not
2 Hardt’s and Negri’s theses have been subjected to extremely tough criticism from the moment they
were rendered in Empire (2000). Daniel Bensaid, Alex Callinicos, Néstor Kohan, Ellen Meiksins Wood,
Leo Panitch and the author of this article have discussed this work in detail from diverse perspectives.
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exclusively by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri– in extenso elsewhere,
we shall not attempt to refute them once again in this paper2.
Nevertheless, what is being ratified for a long time now and has
emerged quite clearly from the discussions of this Conference is that
globalization could be better characterized not as the overcoming of
imperialism but as a new phase within the imperialist stage of capital-
ism. Maybe we should ask ourselves whether it isn’t a new “higher
phase,” to employ Lenin’s celebrated expression, which poses serious
problems of interpretation when it comes to identifying its fundamen-
tal features. In the discourse of neoliberalism, globalization is none
other than the ratification of the inexorable “naturalness” of capital-
ism, exalted as a kind of “natural order of the universe,” and the final
stage of the historical movement finally imposed on the entire surface
of the terrestrial globe and which expresses the selfish and acquisitive
nature of the human species. As Franz Hinkelammert has pointed out
in several of his writings, the corollary of this reasoning is the dehu-
manization of those who oppose the world dominance of capital. And
in the same way that the native peoples of the Americas were massa-
cred without remorse because, after all, their very condition as human
beings had been denied to them because only beasts could be opposed
to the advance of “civilization,” the current victims and the opponents
of capitalism will suffer the same fate. They too constitute a surplus
population, unexploitable and superfluous, which does not deserve any
respect and for whom human rights constitute a merciful fabrication.
Genocide continues its march undaunted (Hinkelammert, 2002).
Things being this way, for the ideologists of neoliberalism glob-
alization has unequivocal epistemological and political implications.
With regard to the former, the primacy of the pensamiento único ( “ t h e
single dominant thought”), constructed on the premises of neoclassi-
cal economics, the only one capable of deciphering the meaning and
defining features of the new society. With regard to the latter, the
enshrining of the Washington Consensus paradigm as the only possi-
ble economic policy, to which all others must be subordinated. As
Margaret Thatcher put it, “there is no alternative.” It is for this rea-
son that social or political p r o b l é m a t i q u e s are posed as merely tech-
nical matters, independent of any ideological position. It is unneces-
sary to stop to refute this worldview constructed by the ideological
apparatuses of capital. Let us say, simply, that this entire argumenta-
tion does not resist the evidence provided by history and by the con-
temporary situation.
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The interpretation that emerges from the discussions held in this
Conference shows that, far from diluting imperialism in a kind of
benevolent empire, an empire that is innocuous and harmless, global-
ization has, on the contrary, produced a radical accentuation of the
traditional features of imperialism, extraordinarily strengthening its
genocidal and predatory nature.
The limits of classical theorization of imperialism
The foundations of the above-mentioned confusion are symptomatic
of the shortcomings of the traditional theorization of imperialism in
front of the transformations experienced by the capitalist mode of
production over the course of the twentieth century. As was recalled
at the time by the Indian Marxist Prabhat Patnaik in his brief essay
which appeared in the Monthly Review at the beginning of the 1990s,
the term “imperialist” had virtually disappeared from the media, lit-
erature and discourses of socialists and communists alike. (Patnaik,
1990) The same happened with the word “dependence,” paradoxi-
cally in a period in which dependence reached humiliating extremes
in our countries. Whoever pronounced those words was quickly cat-
alogued as an incurable nostalgic or a fanatic that stubbornly close
his eyes to the evident transformations that had occurred in recent
years. No “well-thinking” intellectual, politician or leader could
incur in such an aberration within neoliberal capitalism without
turning into the laughing-stock of the global village3. In any case, and
setting this issue aside, the truth is that the vanishing of the p r o b l é-
m a t i q u e of imperialism and its disappearance from horizon of visi-
bility of peoples was a symptom of two things. On one hand, of the
irresistible ascent of neoliberalism as the ideology of capitalist glob-
alization in the last two decades of the last century; on the other, a
symptom of the notable transformations that occurred from the end
of the Second World War on, which questioned some of the very
premises of the classical theories of imperialism formulated in the
first two decades of the century by Hobson, Hilferding, Lenin,
Bukharin and Rosa Luxemburg, to mention only the main figures.
Let us look at this latter in greater detail.
3 Regarding the ravages wrought by “well thinking” in our time, and especially among left-wing move-
ments, consult the magnificent essay by the Spanish writer and playwright Alfonso Sastre (2003).
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(a) To begin with, let us say that a decisive aspect of these theories
was the tight association existing between imperialism and crisis of
capitalism in the metropolitan economies. The former was seen,
e s s e n t i a l l y, as the mechanism by which mature capitalism transitori-
ly resolved the crises generated by the increase in the organic com-
position of capital and the decreasing trend of the profit rate. The
period that began after the end of the Second World War plunged this
relation flagrantly into crisis. Indeed, the “golden age” that unfolded
between 1948 and the mid-1970s was the most successful boom peri-
od in the history of capitalism. At no other time had a cycle of pros-
perity persisted over the course of almost three decades, with rates of
economic growth that were so high and that reached almost all capi-
talist economies. But, contradicting the postulates of classical theo-
rization, that period was at the same time one of the most aggressive
ones from the standpoint of imperialist, especially U.S., expansion,
over the entire face of the earth. The classical connection between
capitalist crisis and imperialist expansion was thus broken, triggering
the perplexity of those who still clung to the classical formulations of
imperialism. Capitalism was booming and imperialism was extend-
ing ever more strongly. The theory required an urgent revision
(Panitch & Gindin, 2003: 30-31).
(b) Another verification that came to worsen the theoretical confusion
in the ranks of the left was the following: in classical formulations the
race for the appropriation of colonies and the carving up of the world
had an inescapable colophon in inter-imperialist war. Economic rival-
ry sooner or later translated into military rivalry and armed conflict.
There was the precedent supplied by the two great world wars that
shook the first half of the twentieth century to provide an irrefutable
proof of the truth of that assertion. The novelty contributed by the
capitalist reconstruction of the second post-war period was that the
exacerbated economic competition among the metropolitan countries
has never been translated in the last fifty years into an armed
encounter among them. To Kautsky goes the merit of having been the
first in glimpsing these new realities, which does not preclude the fact
that his thesis of “ultra-imperialism” suffers from serious defects. One
of them, perhaps the main one, is his having concluded that the coali-
tion among the imperialist monopolies of the great powers would
inaugurate an era of peace. If the ideological mentor of the Second
International was able to accurately discern this trend toward inter-
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imperialist convergence, his strong Eurocentrism prevented him from
foreseeing that the latter would not bring about a Kantian “perpetual
peace.” War was to continue, except that it would now take place in
Third World settings and would take place against their peoples. In
any case, and to summarize, this new situation posed a serious chal-
lenge to the conventional wisdom of classical theories of imperialism,
steeping the left into a paralyzing perplexity.
(c) Lastly, another issue that threw classical theorizations about impe-
rialism into crisis was, in the current phase of accelerated mondializa -
tion of capitalist accumulation, the unprecedented expansion of capi-
talism across the length and breadth of the planet. While, as Marx and
Engels noted in the Communist Manifesto, capitalism has always been
a social regime of production characterized by expansionary tenden-
cies, both in physical and in social geography, the classical theoriza-
tions of imperialism rested on an assumption that in our times is
unsustainable: the existence of vast peripheral regions (or “agrarian”
regions, as was the customary expression at that time) in which capi-
talism was virtually unknown. As Ellen Meiksins Wood accurately
points out, classical theories of imperialism “assume, by definition,
the existence of a ‘non capitalist environment’ as a condition for its
very existence”. (2003: 127) In other words, metropolitan capitalism
required the presence of an agrarian, primitive, peripheral pre-capi-
talist world to provide it with the necessary oxygen to survive the
harsh conditions imposed by the crisis in the metropolises. Hence the
violent struggle to carve up the world and the interminable colonial
annexation wars. Nevertheless, our time is the witness of an acceler-
ated mondialization of capitalism, especially after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, the implosion of the former Soviet Union and, almost simulta-
neously, the opening of China to market forces, all of which presup-
poses the constitution of a worldwide space –we might say a global
one– in which the predominance of capitalism is unarguable. Despite
the virtual subsuming of the former “agrarian regions” to the logic of
capital, imperialism continues its march and, albeit with many prob-
lems, survives its own crises. As Perry Anderson accurately pointed
out, when it appeared that in the 1970s and early 1980s it was facing
its most serious crisis since the times of the Great Depression, the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of China blew fresh air on
capitalist reproduction (Anderson, 2003).
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Responses to the new challenges
Now then, the transcendence of these changes –which are certainly
not the only ones, although they are the most important ones– has
given rise to three different attitudes. On one hand, there are those on
the dogmatic left who refuse to recognize the reality and importance
of these changes, arguing that they are only superficial transforma-
tions lacking in significance. Nothing important has changed and
therefore nothing needs to be changed or revised in classical theory.
“Essentialism” hinders the construction of policies because it is
unable to establish differences: Scandinavian capitalism is the same
thing as the capitalist governments of Latin America. As capitalism
continues to be capitalist, imperialism is the same. Its changes are
merely superficial. The theory remains unscathed and there is nothing
to modify, because nothing has changed.
There are, next, those who on the basis of the recognition of
such changes turn to backing theses located on the antipodes of those
they had traditionally favored. In some cases, as in the work of
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, to recognize –implicitly and with
embarrassment– the final victory of capitalism and to seek consolation
in a proposal of “democratic radicalization” which, both in fact and in
theory, limits itself to softening the most irritating aspects of bour-
geois dominance without proposing its abolition. As regards the sub-
ject that we are dealing with, those who adopt this defeatist attitude
announce “the end of the imperialist era” and the advent of a new
form of international organization, “the empire,” which is supposed to
have freed itself from its predecessor’s defects. The locus classicus of
this position is, of course, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s book,
Empire (2000), to which we have referred above (Boron, 2002).
There are, lastly, those of us who, recognizing the enormous
importance of the changes alluded to, insist that imperialism hasn’t
transformed itself into its opposite, nor has it been diluted into a
vaporous “international system” or into the vagueness of a new “glob-
al system of domination.” It has been transformed, but continues to
be imperialist. In the same way that years do not convert the young
Adam Smith into the old Karl Marx, nor does the identity of an indi-
vidual vanish by the mere passing of time, the mutations experienced
by imperialism haven’t even remotely led to the construction of a
4 In this section we base ourselves extensively on our Empire & Imperialism (Forthcoming).
139
ATILIO A. BORON
non-imperialist international economy4. It is undeniable that a fun-
damental continuity exists between the supposedly “new” global logic
of the empire –its fundamental actors, its institutions, norms, rules
and procedures– and that which existed in the presumably extinct
phase of imperialism. Beyond certain modifications in its morpholo-
g y, the strategic actors of both periods are the same: the large
monopolies of transnational reach and with a national base and the
governments of the metropolitan countries; the institutions that mar-
shal international economic and political flows continue to be those
that put their ominous seal on the imperialist phase that some
already consider concluded, like the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), the World Bank (WB), the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and others of their ilk; and the rules of the game of the international
system are those that are dictated principally by the United States
and global neoliberalism, imposed by coercion at the height of the
neoconservative counter-revolution in the 1980s and early 1990s
through a combination of pressures, loan’s “conditionalities” and
manipulations of every kind. Through their design, purpose and func-
tions these rules of the game do nothing but reproduce and perpetu-
ate the old imperialist structure in which, as it would say in T h e
L e o p a r d, “If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to
change.” Paraphrasing Lenin we might say that the empire imagined
by Hardt and Negri, or by the theoreticians of globalization, is the
“higher phase” of imperialism and nothing more. Its operating logic
is the same, and so are the ideology that justifies its existence, the
actors that energize it and the unfair results that reveal the dogged
persistence of the relations of oppression and exploitation.
But as we said earlier, such a dynamic form of production as
capitalism –“which incessantly revolutionizes itself,” as Marx and
Engels remind us in the Communist Manifesto– and such a flexible his-
torical product as that of imperialism (its structure, the logic of its
operation, its consequences and its contradictions) cannot be fully
understood via a Talmudic rereading of the classical texts. It is obvi-
ous that today’s imperialism isn’t the same as before. The “gunboat
diplomacy” of Theodore Roosevelt is today substituted by a much
more lethal weapon: the army of economists and “experts” of the IMF,
the WB and the WTO. Foreign indebtedness and the conditions set by
the multilateral banks controlled by imperialism are much more effi-
cient instruments of domination than those employed in the past.
Occupation armies are necessary in very specific circumstance –as in
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Iraq, for example– but the routine of imperialist oppression can do
without them on a day-by-day basis. Docile governments, media con-
trolled by the monopolies and converted into mere propaganda facto-
ries, demobilized and demoralized civil societies, and corrupt politi-
cians are much more useful than Marine platoons or Apache helicop-
ters. If, in the past, coups d’etat and military dictatorships were
required to impose imperialist policies, in today’s Latin America this
job is performed by “democratic” governments arising from the popu-
lar vote and that have made a cult of betrayal and mendacity. Lastly,
except for very specific situations like Iraq and Afghanistan, territori-
al occupation has become redundant since, by means of trade open-
ing, privatizations and deregulation, the economies subjected to impe-
rialism are today more dependent than ever without the need to fire a
single shot or deploy a single soldier.
That is why we said that imperialism has changed, and in some
aspects the change has been very significant. But it can never be over-
stressed that, despite everything, it has not been transformed into its
opposite, as is suggested to us by neoliberal mystification, turning into
a “global” economy in which all nations are “interdependent.” It con-
tinues to exist and to oppress peoples and nations, and to sow pain,
destruction and death in its wake. Despite the changes it preserves its
identity and structure, and continues to perform its historical role in
the logic of the global accumulation of capital. Its mutations, its
volatile and dangerous mixture of persistence and innovation, require
the construction of a new approach that will allow us to grasp its cur-
rent nature. This isn’t the place to proceed to an examination of the
diverse theories on imperialism. Let us say, by way of summary, that
beyond the transformations indicated above, its fundamental attrib-
utes pointed out by the classical authors at the time of the First World
War continue to be current by virtue of the fact that imperialism is not
an accessory feature or a policy pursued by some states but a new
stage in the development of capitalism. This stage is marked, today
with greater forcefulness than in the past, by the concentration of cap-
ital, the overwhelming predominance of the monopolies, the height-
ened role of financial capital, the export of capital and the carving up
of the world into different “spheres of influence.” The acceleration of
the process of mondialization that took place in the last quarter of a
century, far from mitigating or dissolving the imperialist structures of
the world economy, did nothing but extraordinarily strengthen the
structural asymmetries that define the insertion of different countries
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in it. While a handful of nations within developed capitalism rein-
forced their capacity to, at least in part, control productive processes
on a worldwide scale, the financialization of the international econo-
my and the increasing circulation of goods and services, the enormous
majority of countries saw their foreign dependence deepen and the
gap that separates them from the metropolises widen to scandalous
levels. Globalization, in sum, consolidated imperialist domination and
deepened the subjection of peripheral capitalisms, ever more inca-
pable to exercising a minimal control over their domestic economic
processes. This continuity of the fundamental parameters of imperial-
ism can ill be disguised by a change of name, calling what previously
was imperialism “empire.”
Characterization of the new phase: lonely superpower
or imperial triad?
Now then, how should this new phase of imperialism be character-
ized? Let us recall what has been suggested in some of the papers that
have been presented at this same podium and very especially the con-
tributions of Samir Amin, Noam Chomsky and Perry Anderson col-
lected in this book. In the first place, what becomes clear is that a very
pronounced centralization has taken place in the worldwide structure
of imperialism, the center of gravity of which has shifted markedly
toward the United States. This is a conclusion which, as is known, is
very controversial. From this same rostrum Samir Amin posed the the-
sis of a “collective imperialism,” the idea of an imperial triad. This the-
sis is not unaware of the already mentioned trend but, to our under-
standing, strongly diminishes the centrality exercised by the U.S. in
sustaining and reproducing the imperialist system at a worldwide
level. In any case it is convenient to point out that this is one of the
major subjects of debate; a debate which, of course, has not yet been
settled. What seems to us is that on the basis of what has been dis-
cussed here the imperial triad –the United States, Japan and the
European Union– is only apparently such. Stated differently: it is a
triad in some aspects but not in others. Which might be the aspects in
which this triad is diluted and gives pride of place to the “lonely super-
5 Of Ana Esther Ceceña we recommend her compilation along with Emir Sader (2002).
power”? Which are those in which imperialist domination is consti-
tuted as a collective undertaking?
It seem irrefutably evident that at the military level the triad does not
exist. At the most recent presentation of the panel on “War and Trade
in the Empire,” the Cuban economist Orlando Martínez and the
Mexican professor at UNAM Ana Esther Ceceña presented over-
whelming data relating to the extraordinary centralization of military
power in the hands of the United States, unprecedented in history5.
Thus, talking about a triad in this sphere makes little sense. From the
military standpoint, the European Union and Japan are merely small
satellites of the United States, which are in no condition to act
autonomously of the directives emanating from Washington. The
European Union has been unable, for decades, to raise the flag first
hauled up by Charles de Gaulle in pursuit of a common defense poli-
cy. Its economicist meanness is revealed by the distance between the
ardor with which the leaders in Brussels defend their common agri-
cultural policy from the indecorous pusillanimity with which they
broach issues relative to common European defense.
The United States is currently responsible for half the world’s
expenditure on armament, and maintains bases and military training
missions in one hundred and twenty-one countries on the planet,
something absolutely unheard-of in the history of mankind. That
country has, without any doubt, turned into that “lonely sheriff” who
was talked about in a very important article, written some years ago
already by one of the greatest theorists of the U.S. right: Professor
Samuel Huntington. In the military terrain there is no such triad, nor
is there a collective imperialism. The only thing there is is the almost
all-pervading power of the United States and a discourse of world
domination by force that, as Noam Chomsky recalled in his speech,
has only one precedent in the twentieth century: Adolf Hitler.
The already mentioned centralizing trend is also perceivable,
albeit in a more attenuated form, in the economic arena. The available
data speak of a high concentration of wealth, technology and markets
to the benefit of the large transnational corporations of the United
States. Transnational, it is necessary to point out, because of the scope
of their operations but not because of the nature of their ownership
system: they are U.S. corporations, just as there other companies that
are French, German or Japanese but have a global scope. According to
a study produced by the Financial Ti m e s a little over a year ago, 48% of
the five hundred largest transnational corporations have their head-
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quarters and are rooted in the United States. And if instead of focusing
attention on the five hundred biggest we direct our glance at the super-
elite constituted by the world’s fifty largest corporations, 70%, i.e. 35
companies, are of U.S. origin. And this is repeated when one looks at
the proportion constituted by U.S. corporations in different branches
of industrial production, or of services. In the computer field, of the
w o r l d ’s ten largest computer companies, seven are from the U.S. And if
we speak of the production of software, of the top ten, nine are from
that country; and in the pharmaceutical industry six of the ten biggest
ones are from the United States. In other words: imperialism evidently
has a center of gravity that is located in U.S. territory.
This is another feature that has been accentuated in the current
phase: the first was the military question; the second, which we have
just seen, that of economic concentration. There is a third, which is
the increasing tyranny of financial markets, whose dynamism and
implacable voracity are to a great extent responsible for the reces-
sionary trends that prevail in the world economy. Ninety-five percent
of all the capital that circulates daily in the international financial sys-
tem, equivalent to a figure higher than the combined gross product of
Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, is purely speculative. They are move-
ments of capital deposited for a term not higher than seven days; that
is to say, a period absolutely incompatible with the possibility of
investing that capital in a productive process that generates economic
growth and social welfare.
It is precisely for this reason that Prof. Susan Strange called this
system by a very appropriate name: “casino capitalism.” This parasitic
and profit-obsessed capitalism generates extremely high profit mar-
gins in favor of its purely speculative nature, and enormous corporate
risks, because in the same way that very large amounts of money are
earned in a financial operation that only takes a few minutes, a for-
tune can be lost overnight. This capitalism discourages investment in
productive sectors, because even the capitalists most inclined toward
investing in the production of goods find it hard to resist the tempta-
tion to place a rising share of their stock of capital in short-term spec-
ulative operations which, if successful, will guarantee them profit
rates unthinkable in the industrial sector. This therefore generates dis-
investment in the productive activities, prolonged economic recession,
high unemployment rates (because for these speculative operations it
isn’t necessary to hire too many workers, nor to build factories or sow
fields), a general impoverishment of the population, fiscal crisis
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(because it is a mechanism of accumulation through which capital
controls can be evaded, weakening states’ financial foundations), and
all this, in turn, has a very negative impact on the environment and, it
goes without saying, on economic growth. It is unnecessary to state
that the center of all this system is located in the United States. Not
only the center; so is its principal political operator in the interna-
tional arena, the White House, through the control that the Federal
Reserve and Wall Street exercise on international financial markets
and on the misnamed multilateral financial institutions, like the IMF,
WB and WTO, which, as recognized by Zbigniev Brezinski, are mere
agencies of the United States government (Brzezinski, pp. 28-29).
One of the consequences of all the above has been the milita-
rization of the international system and a rising trend to resort to vio-
lence to preserve a world order –in actual fact, a scandalous disorder–
that is ever more unfair and inequitable. Another consequence: the
crisis of the United Nations system and in international law. We have
heard it in various presentations, particularly those made by Noam
Chomsky and Perry Anderson. We can observe it, additionally, by
watching the international scene on a day-by-day basis and the sorry
role performed by the United Nations in this crisis. We see it, too,
when we verify the accelerated dismantling of multilateral negotia-
tion systems and the weakening of international law. The most evi-
dent proof was the invasion and the razing of Iraq without the
authorization or the consent of the United Nations. Another of the
consequences: the criminalization of social protest, in which the fig-
ures of the poor, the unemployed, the homeless or undocumented
and, in general, of those who are condemned by the system, are
Satanized and turned into sinister and dehumanized figures. In this
w a y, the victims of capitalism, those who are condemned to exclusion
and to slow genocide are transformed into criminals, drug traff i c k e r s
or terrorists. Thanks to the alchemy of neoliberal globalization the
victims evolve into culprits. Another of the consequences that is veri-
fied both in the central countries and in those on the periphery of the
international capitalist system is the apparently unstoppable hollow-
ing out of democratic régimes. Democracies that are ever less demo-
cratic, that have ever less popular legitimacy; that promote apathy
and lack of interest in public affairs. Politics has turned into some-
6 This being a point that roundly disproves the neoliberal premise that the market is “the other face” of
democracy. For an examination of this fallacy see Boron (2000).
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thing that frequents the marketplace and is subdued to its tyranny;
the street and the public square, deprived of its dynamism, are mere-
ly nostalgic memories of their past; elections have degenerated into a
painful sham devoid of meaning and of transformational eff i c a c y.
Examples abound everywhere, as can be seen by reading the diverse
papers collected in this book6.
All these precedents demonstrate that the morphology of the
international imperialist system has, indeed, undergone major modi-
fications. However, the latter have not altered the essence of the sys-
tem. Globalization did not put an end to imperialism nor has it caused
the latter to turn into its opposite. What it did do is accentuate the fea-
tures that traditionally characterized this phase of capitalism, on the
basis of a deepening of injustice and of inequity both within nations
and in the international system. The traditional mechanisms of impe-
rialism continue to stand: the exaction of natural resources and
wealth; the sucking in of the periphery’s surpluses towards the metro-
politan centers; the role of financial capitalism, which, as we said
above, has burgeoned extraordinarily; the monopolistic concentration
that has reached unprecedented levels; the framework of rules that
neoconservatism continues to be, in its most globalized form; and,
above all, there still persist those institution that in past, when it was
said that imperialism was at its peak, made possible the iron-clad dic-
tatorship of capital over the peoples and the countries of the periph-
ery. Once again we refer fundamentally to the IMF, the WB, the Inter-
American Development Bank (IDB) and the WTO, institutions which
far from representing the international community are the docile
instruments of the dominant classes at worldwide level and above all
of United States imperialism.
Pending issues
Many matters, however, remain pending when it comes to obtaining
an adequate and sufficient diagnosis of the imperialism of our days.
C u r r e n t l y, one of the most important is the correct identification of
the situation in the imperial center. There is a debate that has been
underway for a long time, which has already materialized at the three
World Social Forums in Porto Alegre and that also appeared at the
meeting in Havana: it is the controversy over the current reality and
the economic, political and military future of the United States.
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Positions hover around two poles: there are those who assert that,
after the crisis of the 1970s, we are in the presence of a recomposition
of the U.S. hegemony in the military, economic, political and social
fields; and there are those who, on the contrary, support a thesis that
postulates the weakening of the United States in the world arena. The
U.S. would thus have passed its peak and now faces its inexorable
twilight. It is a debate that has not been settled and that in the future
we shall need to continue broaching in all its complexity because it is
in no way a minor issue.
The supporters of the latter view, which in its most general for-
mulation we do not share but which it is convenient to examine in all
its details, maintain that the United States has begun a slow but incur-
able decadence, and that because of this, the center of gravity of the
world economy is shifting irreversibly towards Southeast Asia. The
consequence of this mutation is that the imperialism we know today
will surely not survive in the future. There are many works which
point in this direction. The most recent and substantial in its argu-
mentation is a book by Professor André Gunder Frank whose title –Re-
Orient– proposes, precisely, returning to the Orient because it is there
that the center of the world economy of capitalism supposedly was,
several centuries ago, and will be (in a relatively near future). If this
trend comes to pass, the United States would cease to perform the
decisive role it now plays in the international system. We are not con-
vinced by this posture because it underestimates the irreplaceable role
that, at least for the foreseeable future, the United States performs and
7 It is no minor fact that in Latin America and the Caribbean there do not exist any study centers or
research programs exclusively focusing on analyzing the problématique of the United States in its most
varied aspects. The little there is is to be found in Cuba, especially in the framework of the Center for
Studies on America (CEA). Mexico had a couple of institutions devoted to the subject but they were pur-
posely dismantled during the neoliberal wave unleashed by Salinas de Gortari and, above all, with entry
into the Free Trade Agreement. It was no longer necessary to study the United States, something which
certainly caused upset and distrust in governing circles North of the Rio Grande. Meanwhile, in the
United States the centers, institutes and programs devoted to the study of Mexico and Mexican-U.S.
relations add up to over a hundred! Brazil, too, currently has no study center devoted to the United
States, although there is an attempt underway at the Fluminense Federal University (UFF). In the rest of
the countries of the region there aren’t even any attempts. The Menemist Argentina that exalted the “car-
nal relations” with the United States had no reason to busy itself with the subject, and the same goes
for the other governments of the region. An extremely clear, clamorous proof that the other side of
imperialism is colonialism over knowledge and power, and of the persistence of a tradition of subjec-
tion that has become flesh in our countries. We don’t even make so bold as to venture to study those
who, as Simón Bolívar said at the time, “seemed destined by Providence to plague the Americas with
miseries in the name of freedom.” Regarding colonialism over knowledge and power, see the excellent
compilation by Edgardo Lander (2000).
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will continue to exercise as the final custodian and coercionary rein-
surance of the imperialist system. Additionally, it seems to us that a
thesis like this one –as do others, which posit the impregnable and
invincible nature of the empire– could eventually have serious demo-
bilizing consequences, above all for us in Latin America and the
Caribbean. Nevertheless, it is very important to discuss it. The future
course of the United States and its role in the preservation of the impe-
rialist order is a central issue for our peoples and, for this reason, con-
stitutes a subject which will never be studied in excess7.
The other issue is the following: how to refine the analysis of
imperialism in the current situation. I firmly believe that this is a very
important point, both in the terrain of theory and in that of practical
struggle. It is necessary to avoid falling into views of imperialism that
transform it into an omniscient, omnipresent and omnipotent phe-
nomenon. If such a view gains strength in the ranks of its critics and
coagulates in public conscience the logical consequence is irrefutable:
imperialism is invincible, unbeatable, impregnable and, therefore, it
makes no sense to even attempt to fight against it. We believe it impor-
tant to point out that the geometry of imperialism is very complex and
cannot be reduced to one dimension alone. To paraphrase an image
proposed in a recent article by Joseph Nye (2003), one might say that
imperialism deploys its assets on three levels, as if on three different
chessboards. A first chessboard is the military one, in which, as was
seen above, U.S. supremacy is absolute.
Of course it is convenient to introduce a note of caution here,
because what is the meaning of an absolute military supremacy? Does
it mean it can inexorably win all wars? But what does “win” mean?
What is the lesson to be derived from Iraq or from Afghanistan? Robin
Cook, former Foreign Minister of Great Britain, and who resigned pre-
cisely because of opposition to the complicity of Tony Blair’s govern-
ment in the pillage perpetrated by George W. Bush and his friends,
wrote a few days ago that “conquering Iraq probably was easy, but
governing it as an occupied nation is a much more difficult challenge”.
(Cook, 2004) The lesson which we can derive from recent events is the
following: the formidable power of the United States military machin-
ery allows the U.S. to raze a country. However, as is proved by the
cases of Afghanistan and Iraq, Washington has demonstrated it is
impotent when it comes to controlling the countries it has devastated.
The North Americans have been unable to re-establish an order, even
if it be an authoritarian and despotic order, to enable society to func-
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tion again. Consequently, although U.S. military supremacy appears
unarguable, the following question remains: when is a war won? After
George W. Bush’s famous public appearance in San Diego, on May 1st;
2003, many more North American victims have been harvested than
before. It is therefore necessary to review with extreme care what it
means to win a war. United States military supremacy may be very
large, very overwhelming, but it reaches a certain point. And territori-
al control, the “normalization” of the conquered society, continues to
be the true acid test that decides whether a war has been won or not,
this being a truth that has been recognized by all the great theoreti-
cians of war, from Sun-Tzu to von Clausewitz and Nguyen Giap, nat-
urally including Machiavelli. It is also convenient to recall, to temper
the diagnoses that only look at the asymmetries in weaponry, that the
United States was defeated in Cuba, at the Bay of Pigs, and that it suf-
fered a catastrophic and humiliating defeat in Vietnam. To summa-
rize: the military supremacy of the U.S. is unquestionable, but it is not
absolute.
The economic terrain would be the second chessboard on which
imperialist relations are deployed. Although in the first one U.S. supe-
riority is enormous, in this one Washington enjoys an undoubted but
already much more limited predominance. Not only is it unable to
impose a given international economic order on the countries of the
periphery but it cannot even achieve a serious and effective agreement
with its own allies in the European Union and Japan. The successive
failures of WTO gatherings and of the proposals to sign the FTAA
(Free Trade Agreement of the Americas) are more than convincing
proof in this regard. In other words: thirty years after the occurrence
of the crisis in the Bretton Woods system –the “international order”
shaped at the end of the Second World War– even today imperialism
has been unable to build a stable economic order to replace it, with the
ability to contain and solve the crises and contradictions roiling with-
in it. Naturally, such a lack has not prevented the imperialists from
continuing with their policies of pillage and sack. What can indeed be
pointed out, instead, is that those operations are carried out within an
increasingly unstable and unpredictable framework, and that they
must resort ever further to the militarization of their domination for
the system to work. All this doubtlessly conspires against the long-
term stability of the system and the possibility of optimizing the
results of their investments and corporate strategies.
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The field of international civil society would be the third chessboard
on which, according to Nye, imperialism plays it match. There the
position of the United States is much more unfavorable after the dis-
articulation of the strategic alliances, the political and governmental
systems and the ideological orientations that operated since the end of
the second postwar period. The interminable succession of wrongs
and dislocations of all kinds suffered by peoples, especially in the
periphery, and the contradictions ensuing from the hegemony of
neoliberalism, have led as a result to the constitution of an extremely
broad array of social movements with overwhelming strength and
which express themselves all over the world, from Seattle to Porto
Alegre, and including Genoa, Gothenburg, Tokyo and Paris. In Latin
America, and this was pointed out by Perry Anderson in his presenta-
tion, it is necessary to recognize the exceptional importance earned by
Zapatism by issuing that first summons, at an international level, to
the struggle for humanity and against neoliberalism. That exhortation
acquired universal citizenship status with the holding of the World
Social Forums in Porto Alegre and, afterwards, with the propagation
of these protests along the length and breadth of the planet. This
“movement of movements,” which encompasses large masses of work-
ers, of youths, of women, of indigenous peoples, of minorities of every
kind, of social sectors previously not incorporated into the dialectic of
the confrontation with capitalism, now appears with extraordinary
force, revealing the increasing weakness demonstrated by the old
organizations (especially parties and unions) that, in a previous phase
of capitalism, represented the demands of the sectors oppressed by the
system. And this change in international civil society has been so siz-
able that the uncontested hegemony that neoliberal thinking enjoyed
until a few years ago –and which, for example, allowed the “lords of
money”, as they are called by Subcommander Marcos, to meet in
Davos enjoying virtually universal popularity– has evaporated to the
point that they now have to gather in remote and inaccessible places,
as if they were a gang of malefactors, in order to discuss their world
domination plans. And this reveals the enormous change that has been
recorded in the world correlation of forces, which, for the first time
since the mid-70s, leads to an anti-neoliberal and potentially anti-cap-
italist counter-offensive that puts the dominant financial oligarchies
on the defensive.
We believe, in consequence, that taking these precedents into
account –and others which it would be necessary to add as the work-
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ing agenda unfolds– it should be possible to advance toward a more
elaborate and nuanced characterization of what imperialist domina-
tion is today, avoiding the theoretical and practical immobilism of
those who assert there is nothing new under the sun and, at the same
time, the pessimism that is the result of a summary evaluation –and
one which in our judgement is superficial, being one-sided– of impe-
rialism on the basis of United States military predominance.
A conclusion that is an invitation
No doubt about it –we are living in a very special moment in the his-
tory of imperialism: the transition from a classical phase to another,
whose outline is only now being drawn but whose general shape can
already be clearly discerned. Nothing could be further wrong than
postulating the existence of a nebulous “empire without imperialism.”
Hence the need to argue with these theses, given the exceptional grav-
ity of the current situation: a capitalism that is ever more regressive
and reactionary in the social, economic, political and cultural spheres,
which criminalizes social protest and militarizes international politics
on the basis of the absolute primacy of force. In the face of a situation
like this one, as we maintained, only a precise diagnosis of the struc-
ture and operation of the international imperialist system will allow
social movements, parties, unions and the popular organizations to
broach the new days of struggle with some possibility of success. No
emancipatory struggle is possible in the absence of an adequate social
cartography of the terrain on which the battles will be fought. It is use-
less to lovingly project the features of a new society without a realistic
knowledge of the physiognomy of current society and of the path
which it will be necessary to traverse in the construction of that world
in which (almost) all worlds will fit, to paraphrase the saying of the
Zapatists. All the worlds of the oppressed, we would add, in order not
to fall into a dangerous romanticism. In this new world that it is essen-
tial to begin to build right now there will be no room for the world of
the militarist hawks; for the clique of the Bushes, Blairs, Aznars,
Sharons and company; for the monopolies that turned humanity and
nature into their prey; for the politicians and social leaders who
accompanied and/or consented to the holocaust unleashed by neolib-
eralism. A post-capitalist and post-imperialist world is possible, but
first we have to change the current one. And this is not achieved by
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working on the basis of illusions but by acting with the grounding of
a realistic and precise knowledge of the world we wish to leave behind
and of the road we have to travel.
Allow me to conclude by saying that these discussions, stimulated by
that noble striving of the social scientists and humanists linked to the
CLACSO network to recover critical thinking, were facilitated by a
very important factor: the contact established between Latin
American critical thinking and the practice of the social movements
that fight against neoliberalism, neoliberal globalization and, in the
ultimate instance, against capitalism. This interaction has had a vir-
tuous effect on both sides: it has enriched the output of social scien-
tists, making it more acute and penetrating. And it has also improved
the quality of the social leadership. At the conference which we repro-
duce in this book, Perry Anderson said that this continent is the only
one which, in a constant manner and with significant theoretical den-
s i t y, had developed a notable intellectual production contesting and
criticizing capitalism. We believe that this contact between social sci-
entists and social movements marks a new milestone in the develop-
ment of the social sciences, which in Latin America –and in the rest
of the world– were activities that were carried out in the safe but ster-
ile spaces of academe. Academicist sterility was a fundamental ele-
ment in determining the deep crisis into which the social sciences fell
as of the 1970s, a crisis from which they haven’t yet recovered. The
type of approaches and approximations that we have seen at this
Conference in Havana has demonstrated to be much richer. The
essential theoretical discussion that characterizes the social sciences
has been enormously favored by the tight link that has been estab-
lished on this continent, even though in an unequal manner, between
the practice of social scientists and the praxis of social movements.
To promote this dialogue is one of the distinctive goals of CLACSO
and of many other national institutions in Latin America, and the
success of this undertaking summons us to continue along this line,
deepening this linkage, and knowing that in this manner we not only
contribute to build a better world but, at the same time, produce
social science of better quality.
This is, in very broad terms, a brief summary of the issues that
have been discussed this week. Having said which, I would like to ask
President Fidel Castro Ruz if he would have the kindness to pro-
nounce the closing words of this conference. Thank you very much.
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I WAS TELLING Atilio that I congratulated him on his speech and I
wasn’t thanking him for his invitation. Distinguished academicians,
scientists, representatives and leaders of social organizations, dear
guests: I must tell you I have a bitter worry. From what I have been
able to hear and from what I have been able to read of the papers pre-
sented, I am aware and understand full well that this is an event that
has surpassed expectations. A series of earnest, well-meditated works
have been presented. I am also familiar with the impressions garnered
among many colleagues who have been present or who have followed
it in the papers or on television. Also of those who, on Cuban televi-
sion, saw two round tables this week. One of them devoted to the
encounter in Mexico1, the other to what happened this week here in
Havana, and through which millions of people were able to hear the
CLOSING ADDRESS*
FIDEL CASTRO RUZ
1 This refers to the International Conference “In Defense of Humanity,” held in Mexico City on October
24 and 25. Henceforward, all footnotes are editor’s notes.
* Speech given by the President of the Councils of State and of Ministers of Cuba, Fidel Castro Ruz, at
the closing ceremony of the 21st General Assembly of CLACSO and 3rd Latin American and Caribbean
Social Sciences Conference on October 31, 2003, at the Conventions Palace, Havana, Cuba.
arguments, the opinions of extremely eminent academic personalities
and respected and admired leaders of social and political movements,
or if you prefer, revolutionaries or quasi-revolutionaries.
Battle of ideas
We are in the habit of not carrying out surveys. We know what surveys
are like. The questions are phrased seeking certain answers and they
are often carried out in sectors that have specific opinions, for which
reason –naturally, one cannot say that this is always the case– opinions
are announced that do not correspond to the general case. The method
we have been employing, especially when the battle was launched for
the return of the child Elián2, is that of collecting spontaneous opin-
ions. There has always been a section of our party which collects opin-
ions and a very large number of people cooperate on every subject, in
order to orient us properly. This has been done for many years. I was
referring rather to what we have been doing for four years, and which
is to employ that team to ascertain opinion daily on the most impor-
tant problems or most outstanding events that occur: an important
round table, a major gathering... In sum, that is our habit. The only
instruction received by the 17,000 people who cooperate in collecting
spontaneous opinions is that from those that are positive opinions
(from our point of view they would be the revolutionary opinions), a
representative sample must be chosen; and the opinions we call nega-
tive –there is a somewhat more subtle term: the opinions that contain
critical nuances– must all be written down in the list we receive. This
method has been very useful.
On those first days related to the case of the child kidnapped in
the United States –I mean the child kidnapped by the United States;
the United States kidnaps thousands of children; I refer to the case of
that child, for whom we decided to give battle, backed by demonstra-
tions, gatherings, marches, etc.– among the opinions that were col-
lected daily there were a number that were violent, absurd. They said:
why isn’t a commando unit sent to rescue the child in the United
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2 Referring to the Cuban child Elián González, who was illegally taken out of Cuba on a boat by his moth-
er Elizabeth Brotons. The boat sank and of the 14 people who attempted to reach United States soil, only
three survived, Elián and two adults, who were rescued by two fishermen in waters close to Florida. The
child’s father, Juan Miguel González, who was unaware of his son’s departure from Cuba, immediately
requested his repatriation. Elián remained in the United States for over seven months until his return to
Cuba was decided.
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States? And such opinions appeared repeatedly. They were a minority.
And thus, they weren’t critical opinions, but were opinions that
demonstrated lack of knowledge, disorientation. Think about the idea
of a Cuban commando unit disembarking in the United States to look
for that child. I was struck by the frequency with which that opinion
was found. This struggle of opinions was decisive. We couldn’t rescue
this child by force. It was evident madness, but it demonstrated the
state of opinion of irritated people who stated things without thinking
about them. All these issues were discussed every day and often those
points of view were useful to me because it was necessary to wait. I
was able to observe that those opinions were based on lack of knowl-
edge, lack of experience, lack of information, even a lack of certain cri-
teria. There were times, even, when we collected a series of absurdi-
ties. And I read them out at a public event broadcast live to the entire
country. I have even been able to see how criteria and opinions evolve.
We have experienced a process of deepening of the knowledge and of
the consciousness of our population. There is a lack of information
here! Here it is necessary to effect a strong criticism of certain points
of view because they are erratic!
I am speaking about something that, as I said, began four years
ago. It is in December that four years will be marked since that strug-
gle began. This was such a tough, such a bitter case, that it led me to
take the decision to demand the child’s return. Which couldn’t be by
force. I said that the child had to return, and this battle was really won
through the mobilization of the people; it was won through a battle by
international opinion. Since then I have been employing that term,
which we now see being repeated ever more frequently: “battle of
ideas.” Even when, seven months later, the child returned, we had
already decided to continue that battle. Because the child could come
back and it was stupid to delay it so long. It even gave us time to stage
José Martí’s anti-imperialist rostrum in front of the United States inter-
ests office. During the course of that battle a lot of experience was accu-
mulated and, it goes without saying, the battle of ideas was won.
And it was even won employing these modern media that are so
frequently used to confuse the world and to mislead it. This is because
there is also a certain competition among large corporations, from the
United States and from other countries. We had thought up a form of
making some television broadcasts that reached Angola –where a large
number of our men had been clustered on that country’s southern bor-
der, facing the Namibia occupied by the South Africans– through a
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station with Soviet technology; and employing I don’t know how many
towers, we caused some hours of Cuban broadcasting to reach the
55,000 Cubans who were then there. It may seen a bit exaggerated, but
there are certain problems that if not looked into entail the almost cer-
tain risk of a defeat. The revolution could not run that risk. I must say
that, more than an internationalist mission, the revolution was stak-
ing its very existence. Imagine what would have happened in circum-
stances like those, in which we were ready to reach the ultimate con-
sequences, if there had been a major defeat with high casualties. I
must add that this always compelled us to carry out a type of war, ever
since we launched the revolution, that would entail a minimum num-
ber of casualties, for one reason or another. When we were in the
mountains, because there were very few of us; and when the revolu-
tion was already in power and carrying out an internationalist mission
–a duty, as we understood it– we had the responsibility for the destiny
of a process and for the fate of a people. Maybe, on hearing this, one
gets the idea that we carried out foolhardy actions. No. Because the
first action that might be termed foolhardy, and which many described
as such, was to launch a revolution starting practically with nothing.
At the moment I was referring to, four years ago, we had even
forgotten about it already. One day it occurred to me to think –and
this will make you laugh, and with reason– and I asked some col-
leagues how much a balloon might cost. I was thinking of a balloon
that is used in the United States to broadcast television to Cuba.
A c t u a l l y, with a tiny little piece of equipment costing a few cents we
have managed to neutralize that arbitrary, illegal action, which vio-
lates international norms, of putting a balloon 3,000 feet up for the
TV signal to reach our country. And not precisely to teach us English,
or to teach us history, geography, science, literature, culture... but to
channel toward our country the mountain of lies and calumnies with
which the United States’ official policy has operated with regard to
our country and, from what I see and hear and from what we know,
with regard to the rest of the world. One must not forget the monop-
oly of the mass media which the United States has enjoyed. And our
intellectuals have met more than once to discuss the extremely seri-
ous problem of the atrocious cultural invasion suffered by the peoples
of Latin America and the rest of the world. And which in my judge-
ment and in view of the cultural level that these analyses have
reached is an issue that needs to be included. It is an issue to which
Ignacio Ramonet, well known to all, has fundamentally devoted his
157
FIDEL CASTRO RUZ
work. But if it is illegal we intercept it, because there is not only the
lie of a political nature but also all the poison from an ethical stand-
point, all the exaltation of violence, of consumerism, etc. Because
even Internet communications in our country are limited given the
lack of an infrastructure that will connect us via international cable.
Which limits our possibilities and is a problem needing to be solved.
While, over there, in a moment of madness they installed 60 million
kilometers of optical fiber under natural gas pipelines, etc., of which
around 3 or 4 million are employed. There are 100 billion dollars of
optical fiber buried and wasted there.
Major changes have taken place. And new forms of communi-
cation gradually appear, but they were not within our reach at that
time. We managed to finance a satellite. There were like 5,000 study
centers in the United States that listened to these events, these broad-
casts, over a span of time. When we managed to air the broadcasts, we
provided the signal for free inside and outside, so that 10, 15, 20, 25
international TV networks would come in, and at the ceremony at
which we marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the blowing up of a
Cuban flight in mid-flight, which annihilated our entire champion
youth fencing team which in a regional competition had won all the
gold medals, at that ceremony at which we remembered the twenty-
fifth anniversary of that great terrorist act organized within the United
States, by people trained by the United States, and financed by the
United States, forty foreign broadcasters reported on it; some broad-
cast it complete and others broadcast some minutes of it. It was inter-
national television networks, including United States broadcasting
networks, that made it possible, in certain circumstances because it
doesn’t always work that way or even remotely like it, but competition
has been created.
Suppose there is a demonstration by half a million people –a
real half million, because we know how many people there can be. In
a square meter there rarely fit more than four people, and squeezed
together there may be five. We are in the habit of using underestimates
so that many agencies didn’t even question the figures when there was
a demonstration by thousands of women, or of youths, or of mothers
with their children –these are events that every station will surely
broadcast. Or the events in Iraq or the resistance in that country. Or
things such as happen to some of the very illustrious guests whom we
greatly appreciate and who in one case, faced by a question by a TV
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station, said, “And why don’t you look me up in the United States and
interview me there?” Need anything more be said?
Cuba and the United States people
In this way we managed to get the world to know, and more impor-
tantly, we managed to get the United States people to know, the truth
of what was going on. Among them such atrocious things as the fact
that they reconstructed the setting in which that child’s tragedy had
occurred and they kept interrogating him for eight hours. A six-year-
old boy who had undergone the tragedy of a sinking in which he had
lost the person he loved the most: his mother. And to me this was a
great proof of the virtue of the U.S. people. I have never let myself be
carried away by irrational hatreds, or to be blinded. I attempt to ana-
lyze things coolly. The precedent had already taken place of the war in
Vietnam and of the participation of the people of the United States in
ending that war. The protests against the injustice of that war gradu-
ally gained ground. Hundreds of thousands of youths who had been
sent to that war were undergoing their compulsory draft. It wasn’t
even a professional army: they were recruits, a similar situation to that
of the Nicaraguan process in which the dirty war led them to the
defeat of Sandinism by virtue of the fact that soldiers were compelled
by law to go and fight and die in that war. In the case of the kidnapped
boy there was no war, there were no victims, there were no bodies.
What there did exist were facts all related to the child and to the rights
of his family. Eighty percent of U.S. public opinion backed the return
of the child and it was a decisive factor. Without that support of pub-
lic opinion the same would have happened as in the case of many oth-
ers that have been taken illegally.
There are numerous reports about people who are seriously
injured or who die as a consequence of a law that we call murderous.
The “Cuban Adjustment Act,” by which a criminal, someone who kills
a tourism worker or a fisherman to travel illegally to the United
States, people with criminal records to whom they would never give
a visa, by virtue of that law which is already over thirty years old, are
recognized as legal immigrants, with full rights –Cubans who set foot
on United States soil. In Cuba they award only 2,000 visas, when
there is always an enormous demand for visas or number of people
attempting to emigrate as there have already emigrated 14 or 15 mil-
159
FIDEL CASTRO RUZ
lion Mexicans, without counting Central Americans and citizens of all
countries, from Haiti, Santo Domingo, even Puerto Rico, supposedly
a wealthy colony. The statistics are known of those who have opened
the gates wide for Cubans as a result of that law. And they have
included murderers, and that has cost who knows how many lives.
One can speak of thousands of lives and along that path how often
has a father taken the child way from the mother, and how often the
mother taken the child from the father completely illegally. The only
time we decided to undertake that battle we were committed to
undertaking it and winning it. And we won it without the least use of
force, without the least resort to violence, only moral force, the force
of arguments and condemnation. And there remained in reserve a
number of very strong measures of a civil nature. There was no need
to employ them, since 80% of the population –which speaks highly of
the U.S. people’s virtues– supported the cause! A bad cause demands,
in the first place, that the citizenry be tricked. In that they are indeed
experts, or have been experts. Historically, over the course of a cen-
tury or more, history demonstrates it.
What I am saying is a factor to take into account, because I
believe that the battle about which I have been talking will have to be
won, or will sooner or later be won, with the support of the North
American people. It isn’t a question of whether they are powerful or
not. I believe that there is something more powerful than weapons:
ideas, reason, the morality of a cause. Of course, this is so at each
moment in history. But this is the moment in history in which ideas
propagate fastest. Much faster than at the time of the French
Revolution, when the thinking of the Encyclopedists arrived through
pamphlets, and thus Francisco de Miranda, a precursor of independ-
ence, and several others drenched themselves in those ideas and had a
very large influence. I am not attempting here to present a thesis.
Rather, my concern was with having to improvise some words, giving
in to the pressures of my friends when I didn’t have the time to pre-
pare and dictate a speech, to read all the points of view and documents
presented here. I would have liked to. I have moved around with a
stack of papers from one place to the next to try to be well informed.
In fact, to go through the documents, things, ideas that we have posed.
For this reason I have brought some materials along in case I need
them. Really, what I am doing is expressing what my point of view
was, posing some ideas, not presenting a thesis. That is the regret I
came with and the reason I did not say thank you. Because this is a
very earnest event. Documents, analyses have been presented that will
enter history within a limited timespan, and information, criteria,
viewpoints have been contributed that have taught us a lot. I intend to
continue to learn. That is why I say that what I am trying to do here is
to provide some criteria, some points of view, some opinions; to
express some feelings with the drawbacks inherent in improvised
speeches. Because among other things you know when they start but
not when they end. Because one idea triggers another. Because one is
in the habit of explaining things. I don’t like to say this is so because
it’s so. I try to explain myself and that is where I run into complica-
tions. I didn’t want to speak yesterday, but I didn’t have any way out.
Today I came with the intention of being brief and I maintain it. Don’t
you be discouraged.
Militarization on a planetary scale
Within what each person thinks, I have the absolute conviction that
the U.S. people will play a very important role. The U.S. people aren’t
our enemy. It is the imperialist system that is our enemy. It is the
empire that has emerged from that country –I won’t call it nation. It is
a bit conventional to use the word “nation.” That sum of states, that
power that has been attained by what was born from a small group of
colonists who came to this hemisphere seeking more religious free-
dom, which is where, in my judgement, evident ethical principles
arise. This power had –yesterday one of the panelists mentioned that
it had over a hundred military bases– and of course that little base they
have here illegally3. It is the only base that is there against the will of
the government, because, supposedly, in Europe, in Asia, in Japan and
everywhere, they accept the presence of those bases. From time to
time some country, I don’t know if it was the Philippines, did not agree
with a base over there. Someone also recalled that space has turned
into a possession of that great power’s. Any place in space. And refer-
ence was made here, I think by Prof. Chomsky, to the idea of turning
it into a military base and ferrying nuclear weapons there that might
be used from space. And ever more bases! There was also talk here of
the bases in Latin America. And a few days ago, as news arrived from
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Guantánamo, at the eastern tip of Cuba. It is believed to be the biggest military base of all those which
the United States has outside its territory.
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Bolivia in the midst of the most acute phase of the crisis, I read a
report that spoke of the United States troops located on the border
between Peru and Bolivia, ready to go into action if circumstances
required it. The conditions are ready for an intervention. Bases every-
where they are given permission. Military exercises. These large and
extremely powerful armies, navies and air forces of Latin America are
constantly alongside the armed forces of the United States, are carry-
ing out exercises, along Patagonia, along southern Argentina, along
Chile. Every so often they also sell a submarine. And they don’t sell air-
craft carriers because they have become very expensive and turn out
to be almost useless. But they carry out exercises every day. And these
exercises –why? Who is going to attack? We have no news that the
Martians– not the followers of Martí but the inhabitants of Mars –are
readying an expedition that will endanger the independence, the sov-
ereignty of those countries.
Why the maneuvers? Well, it’s silly to ask why. One would have
to ask why a lot of garbage exists. They aren’t even necessary to keep
countries dominated. They aren’t even necessary for the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) or the World Tr a d e
Organization (WTO) to exist. They aren’t necessary for the existence
of the system of domination imposed on the world. They aren’t nec-
essary to establish neoli-beral globalization, or fascist neoliberal glob-
alization as one of the clever journalists present wrote. They are train-
ing troops for world intervention. That is what they do in the coun-
tries of Latin America: train the troops with which they will intervene
at any moment. As if we were to engage in joint exercises with the
armed forces of the United States! We, who offer to cooperate with
the coast guard in any operation! We have proposed it, and no. We
have proposed agreements to combat the traffic in immigrants, and
no. There is that murderous Cuban Adjustment Act by virtue of which
no sooner do they set one foot down there, they already have the right
of residence and of employment; it is a great dilemma at this time. On
one hand, taking measures, tightening the screws, to impede illegal
entry into the United States; and, on the other hand, keeping a law
that is applied to only one country in the world, which is Cuba, giv-
ing right of entry. But if with fake papers they take a plane in any
country and manage to enter the United States they have the right to
identify themselves as Cubans and to be working the next day and to
reside in the United States! What a contradictory measure! I don’t
know how they will be able to maintain it. This morning I read a
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cable that posed the need to squeeze much tighter against illegal
immigration. All the world knows that the number of millions of ille-
gals isn’t rightly known. There has been talk of five million, of six;
there may be more. They have threatened to expel them There was
talk here, too, of the situation of the immigrants. Someone asked why
they weren’t given education, why they couldn’t go to school, why
they did not receive medical services. Those immigrants produce sur-
plus value, and more surplus value than anyone.
And excuse me if I have just used a Marxist term. All of that isn’t
forbidden. As I always say, we have a large theater here that was called
Carlos Marx. This theater continues to be called Carlos Marx. There is
a statue that was made by a brilliant Soviet sculptor. A statue of Lenin
in a park that is called Lenin. The park continues to be called Lenin
and the statue of Lenin hasn’t been made to explode with a ton of
dynamite. You know that what has become fashionable in many parts
of the world is to tear down statues, change the name of all cities. It is
a lack of respect for history. If I was called Fidel when I was born
nobody would think to say that Juan was born instead of Fidel, that
day at that place, the son of that father and that mother. That’s because
historical events have to be respected in general.
Well, the truth be said: we changed names too. We did it for ide-
ological reasons. There were many sugar centers and they were given
the names of people, of heroes of the revolution. Here, many schools
bear the names of illustrious personalities. I was born between three
large sugar centers that bore the names of big U.S. corporations. One
of them even was what was then called the United Fruit Company. In
the United States they also change the names of corporations. They
associate, build up something new. But, well, one feels shame. I can-
not call Petrograd Leningrad. Intellectuals know that Lenin was a
great intellectual, a great fighter and one of those who tried hardest,
in the midst of his daily work, to investigate imperialism. And he
based himself on other authors too, but he was one of the first who
used the term “imperialist” in the modern sense of the word. Now
there is going to be a need for someone who emulates Lenin and
defines this imperialism of today. The new imperialism is an imperi-
alism with different characteristics from that which we could talk
about in 1914. With an expansionary power that was already advanc-
ing. At that time if there was one principal power it was the land of
Blair, a great glory of the civilized, progressive and democratic think-
ing of our era (one mustn’t be slanderous...) Even in the United States
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it is known that Roosevelt wasn’t very happy with Great Britain. One
knows about his discussions with Winston Churchill there in Tehran
and other places; it is known that Roosevelt hoped that after the war
India and other countries would attain their independence, since they
were large markets in which Great Britain’s merchandise and products
had privileges. They had their contradictions. Until the Second World
War, the British empire prevailed; the United States even entered into
its isolationism. It is known that Roosevelt was the author of the
lengthy struggle to enroll the United States against Nazism. What
would Roosevelt have said –Roosevelt, whose personal qualities we
know, who was the president of a great power that was then ranked
second as a world power alongside the U.S.S.R. too (Germany was still
a fearsome military power, and he fought against that power)! And
now, if he saw all these things that you have been discussing here, if
he had this information... He was a cultivated person, he read, he
knew about politics. He faced the worst crisis that capitalism had
encountered. I said yesterday that historical events come earlier or
come later depending on subjective factors. I am absolutely convinced
of it, simply by reading history and observing events. These events and
statements made in the name of the United States by the government
of the United States, that would have floored Roosevelt. There are,
truth be said, more intellectuals who should get down to reading
Roosevelt’s speeches in the years before the war and the pronounce-
ments of Hitler who spoke of the vital space that it was necessary to
conquer there where there were inferior races, in the east, in Russia,
in the Ukraine, which were then the Soviet Union. I suggest a com-
parative study. There are so many things to research, so many things
to remember, to compare in order to extract the pertinent conclusions.
Roosevelt never imagined a power such as that which today imposes
itself on the world, such as is today predominant in the world. Which
does not mean that such a power is invincible. It has been said that its
technological superiority is fabulous, that this power alone gathers a
technology and a wealth greater than that of all the other great pow-
ers. Well, there no longer are great powers, there is one great power.
Great powers were two equal things, and there no longer is anything
equal between the military power of the United States and the current
power of Russia. China is a great nation, it is a strong power and it is
launching a stage that will lead it to be one of the great nations of the
world by virtue of its size, its population, its talent. Because one can-
not but recognize that the Chinese are talented –suffice it to know that
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the Chinese can read and write... in Chinese. One must recognize they
have the right to a Nobel prize.
Imperialism is not invincible
What is it that condemns that power of a military nature –with those
hundreds of bases that were being talked about, and independently of
the alliance of reactionary forces existing all over the world– to end?
Ideas that are just, at the right moment, in the appropriate historical
circumstances. As is known, there hasn’t been a single empire that was
eternal. Hitler at one time spoke of a thousand-year empire. He
dreamed of a Germany so powerful that for a thousand years it would
be the biggest power in the world. Actually, of the thousand years,
there were nine hundred and eighty-eight years left over. If there is
someone of those who think that this empire will last a thousand
years, by virtue of its fabulous technological, scientific, economic, mil-
itary power, maybe it won’t reach a hundred years. In all certainty that
power won’t make it to fifty. That power ranges, I sincerely believe,
between twenty and fifty years. I don’t refer to the U.S. nation, whose
destruction or decadence nobody wishes. We desire for the people of
that great state the same fate we can wish and should wish for every
other people of the entire world. Starting from the premise that this
world can be fixed. Without ceasing to be realistic.
What characterizes this moment almost with a precision meas-
ured in minutes is that it is a time of change, of a switch in direction
in history. And not to establish powers but to establish rights. The peo-
ples of today have, in certain senses, fewer rights than the famous
clans that are talked about. Fewer rights than the tribes of Asia, Africa
or the Middle East. I don’t know the details of this because little is
known about the history of this humanity. According to scientists this
species is called Homo sapiens, rightly or wrongly. Because over the
course of history it has demonstrated –if we take last century as a ref-
erence, no other conclusion can be arrived at– it was a century filled
with absurdities, lacking in wisdom. Let us hope that in this century
our species earns itself the title of Homo sapiens. Although we have
started out very badly. Moreover, another conviction: we are the point
in which it is decided if this species survives or perishes. Survives
despite the errors, the lack of wisdom that it has suffered. But it is the
great things, marvelous things, feelings and values that human talent
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has been able to create that encourage the hopes of realistic optimists.
Up to this very moment we are moving backwards, but we are already
at the point in which widespread –I won’t say universal– conscience is
being acquired of realities. This minute is transcendental. It is full of
queries, of a wish for hope and a wish for solutions. This meeting has
demonstrated it and you were expecting what you have been unable to
produce and could not have produced: a series of recipes for solutions
to problems. But you have achieved a lot. I haven’t seen, and I have
been at many meetings, such an interesting meeting as this one. Five
years ago discussions still hovered around something else. Ten years
ago what there was was universal demoralization; never have I seen so
many people change their clothes, never have I seen so much oppor-
tunism and so much cowardice. Here there has been the courage to
condemn; I refer to everyone, also to the courage of those who think
differently. One must not be fanatical; we have the duty to be rational,
to trust in criteria and points of view.
Democracy
A lot is talked about democracy, and in all frankness I say to you that
finding it is very difficult. A needle in a haystack. There isn’t a model
for democracy; I dissent with the point of view of one of the lecturers.
Perhaps in some corner of the world there exists some democratic for-
mula. Somebody mentioned fraternity, equality and liberty, famous
watchwords of the French Revolution. None of the three exists if we
speak in earnest. There is envious talk of the freedom that was known
by the people of the clan. There was no imperialism, there was no
colonialism, there was no slavery. They lived freely collecting fruit,
hunting, until someone invented a club to seek food. Slavery repre-
sented progress because they ceased to eliminate the prisoners taken
in wars, because a surplus could already be achieved. It is a theory that
must have some truth in it. It would be necessary to analyze other fac-
tors: the parasitism that was being launched. One should never try to
attach a sole explanation to the problem. Already slavery was consid-
ered progress. And now, when a power, by virtue of its wealth and its
military power governs the world and imposes its laws, how can it
stated that it is the end of history? That already what is being done is
what should exist for ever and ever, amen. Unarguably, the history of
this humanity, and not because it was said by Karl Marx should one
be opposed to it, is the history of the exploitation of man by man to an
ever greater degree. Where does Bill Gates live? Because I assume he
does not live inside a computer. Let us assume he lives in New York.
There are hundreds of people who live under bridges and cover them-
selves with newspapers. What is equal between Bill Gates and that
man who lives covering himself with newspapers under a bridge?
There are now in the United States several million people who
are illiterate, but mainly functional illiterates, who have failed sixth
grade, who suffer the consequences of a disastrous educational sys-
tem. I refer to primary and high-school education, not to university
levels. The best professors in the world end up there, the Nobel win-
ners. They have all the research centers they want. From the coun-
tries of Latin America they have thousands and thousands of profes-
sional people, university people, the best trained people, who have
emigrated to the developed countries. To those countries, so demo-
cratic and so honest, that haven’t spent a cent on them, on training
them; and most of them have gone to the United States. And those
countries have neither research centers, nor resources; no possibili-
ties. When has a Latin American won a Nobel prize, except in litera-
ture? An entire novel emerges from one’s head, but research, in addi-
tion to a head and to knowledge, requires the means and the
resources that allow it to be carried out. How can there be equality
within a society in which millions of illiterates and semi-illiterates
exist? In this world which now has six billion inhabitants. And some-
one recalled here that within eight years there will be around 7.2 bil-
lion inhabitants in this small planet in a destruction phase. I believe
that Evo4 spoke yesterday about the existence in Bolivia of a law to
privatize water. And water is ever more scarce; it is a statistical fact,
the product of scientific research. And water may possibly be one of
the causes of military conflict. One need do no more than glance at
the map of the Middle East, and see how much water each one has,
where it rains, which one has irregular terrain. Now there is talk
about the problem of Iraq. Soon the talk will be about the lack of
water in Iraq. And on this water depend Syria, the Middle East, Israel,
Jordan and Iraq. Well, since some of them have oil, nature gave oth-
ers water, and I will sell water. There are already water exports in that
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4 Evo Morales is president of the federation of coca leaf producers in Chapare, and popular leader of
the struggle against neoliberal policies. Over the last four years he has been a congressman for the
Movement Toward Socialism (MAS) in Bolivia.
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region. Of course there are places where oil is cheaper than water. In
Venezuela, for example, oil is cheaper than water.
The air is being poisoned too. There is no equality. How is a
man who can’t read and write to understand the problems of the
world –the IMF, the WTO, the Group of Eight, the OECD, the bank-
ing system, what is inflation and deflation, what does speculation
with the currency mean? I was trying to speak of the millions that are
invested in speculation. A generally accepted figure about that specu-
lation refers to 1971, when Nixon unilaterally suppressed gold con-
version since the United States was left with 10 billion dollars in gold
of the 30 billion it had had at the time of Bretton Wo o d s5. Afterwards,
in the midst of world chaos and due to the conflicts in the Middle
East, one day a group of countries got together and established a
limit on oil production. Another phenomenon that cannot be forgot-
ten took place, and it was that oil began to rise in price. In the years
1974/1975 oil reached 35 dollars per barrel. When the revolution won,
at world market prices, with a ton of sugar one bought eight tons of
oil. To d a y, as a consequence of neoliberalism, several factors have led
to the end of the agreements on basic products. Brazil set itself to
producing cane, even to make alcohol when gasoline cost 500 dollars
a ton. I remember I was doing the math to know how many dollars
they obtained from a hectare of cane. Sugar was still at 10-12 cents a
pound and production rose to 20 million tons of sugar; in India the
same happened: 20 million tons of sugar. In Mexico the state sectors
thought after the signing of the Free Trade Agreement with the United
States that they would sell all the sugar they produced and when the
moment came to export the sugar they were not allowed to. The fruc-
tose industry had already arisen, fructose costing half of what beet
sugar costs, and Mexico began to have surplus sugar. What will hap-
pen, if it hasn’t happened already? I haven’t had the time to follow the
history of the Mexican sugar sectors. The state had ruined them and
therefore they were being privatized. They were told they would have
a future under the Agreement, but now they don’t buy their sugar and
the world price has hit rock bottom. Therefore, what does the state
do, those marvelous, super-democratic social systems –one must
5 The Bretton Woods (New Hampshire, United States) agreements were signed in 1944 and established
the new rules of the game that were to regulate the operation of the international economy after the
Second World War ended. Those agreements also gave rise to the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and to the World Bank (WB).
never forget that? (One must not be a slanderer!) They nationalize the
plants when they are ruined! They cannot close plants down because
there is so much inequality in society that closing five plants could
mean strikes and social problems. The remedy arrives, the so-called
anti-neoliberalism, the anti-privatization: it is the philosophy of
nationalization every time that private industries are ruined. That
was the philosophy before this neoliberal globalization: everything
that was ruined went over to the state. With which the loss of prestige
of the state increased enormously, because in the hands of adminis-
trators who stuck their hands into everything it worked even worse.
We arrive at the moment in which the Brazilian case took place: the
biggest iron company in the world that was profitable, privatized. The
phone companies, privatized. Forty billion dollars in corporations
that were profitable –they privatized them. They had 70 billion dol-
lars in reserves!
But the IMF exists, and there exists a law that isn’t at all dem-
ocratic. And you know how the IMF lends. There is a clause that with
17% it is decided if there is a loan or not6. An extraordinary, superde-
mocratic case, of a country that says yes or no to a Third World coun-
t r y. That business of the so-called First World entails a bit of con-
tempt towards us, and I confess it: those never have problems with
IMF loans. But it does occur for a country of the Third World, where
there are so many people going hungry, so many sick people lacking
medical assistance, so many illiterates, such a scarcity of schools, of
food, of employment; in those cases they must indeed argue in order
to get a loan. And that’s when the conditions, the worst, are imposed
on them. But this is not a static phenomenon. When the Cuban revo-
lution won, Latin America owed 5 billion dollars. I was the bird of ill
omen because I visited Argentina; in those days I had passed through
Brazil; three or four months had passed since the victory of the revo-
lution. In Argentina there was Frondizi. Perón was who decided
which candidate won; he wasn’t going to propose him but he had
become friendly with the workers; in those days there were gold
reserves from after the war. We know that history. But the workers
had many things they had never had. Some theaters, some clubs. A
rich country. Maybe the only bad thing that could have happened to
Argentine workers, in the midst of unquestionable benefits, is that
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6 Loans must be agreed with 85% of the votes of the Board. The United States has 17% of those votes,
with which it exerts de facto veto power over the IMF’s decisions.
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they were left with capitalism. All that oligarchy was humiliated but
it was not nationalized; it was not confiscated.
We confiscated. But we were prepared to pay within a pruden-
tial, appropriate time. And what we got was a blockade. The country
of constitutions and of laws, as is stated, did not wish to discuss an
indemnity formula. Credits had already been suspended. Money in
reserves there was none. A silly fact: the money had been stolen by a
government that enjoyed the support of that great power that
embraced and armed it. Ah, because that government, too, was
described as democratic. Because every government is called demo-
cratic: like Argentine during the disappearances, Chile under
Pinochet, Central America, El Salvador, Nicaragua. With none of those
countries were ties broken. With none did they cease to trade. With
South Africa they not only traded but had large properties there. None
did anything save amass money, covet a lot of gold; neither broken
relations, nor economic blockades. Not that I am advocating those
things, but I am making comparisons. No, it was necessary to block-
ade Cuba. Cuba had no business in South Africa, no factory, no indus-
try. Cuba fought against the South African fascists. Cuba spilled its
blood while all the others maintained ties and business. Cuba doesn’t
have a screw there. Cuba must be blockaded. And it’s not a question of
a month or a year. It must be blockaded forty-four years. Nobody
should believe that it has been forty-two years. The blockade began on
the first day. Credits were cut off. The money in the reserves had
already been transferred by the war criminals, who were no better
than those who were judged and punished there in Nuremberg. They
took the money and founded those organizations that today almost
govern more than the government of the United States. It was pre-
cisely those people and the descendants of the millionaires that took
the country’s money.
And for us, the blockade. Well, the dirty war. In the first months
after we carried out the land reform the plans for destroying the rev-
olution were launched. It seemed that the same was going to happen
as in Guatemala. You know that it was an agrarian reform that led to
an intervention of the United States in combination with the moves
of some military chiefs. The pretext was that the Guatemalans, they
s a y, had bought a shipload of weapons in Czechoslovakia. I don’t
know if someone who buys weapons in Czechoslovakia today is
invaded. Because today the Czech republic is one of those great pup-
pets, those perfect democracy where if they don’t look out there won’t
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be a Gypsy left because they will exterminate them. They will do to
them what the Nazis did to the Jews. Don’t believe that the hatred
they feel for the Gypsies is any less in those marvelous democracies
of Eastern Europe, which are more pro-U.S., which are already mem-
bers of NATO. It is the reign of justice and progress, the greatest striv-
ing ever for the welfare of humanity! Why, they are more imperialist
than Aznar, which is saying a lot already! Yes, Aznar, who is going
round recruiting youths in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, in the
Dominican Republic which is suffering a terrible crisis of fourteen
hours without electricity, of entire areas that have been up to three
days without power, where the peso has been devalued to 33 pesos
per dollar. Nobody talks about that. It seems the euro has carted off
all the publicity. And Bolivia –nobody says what is going on there.
And the m a q u i l a d o r a s, whose fate is well known: Mexicans had the
experience of the m a q u i l a d o r a s, which the owners are already carting
o ff to China. M a q u i l a d o r a s that don’t pay taxes, that take components
there to be assembled and although they are paid a bit higher wages
than what domestic industry pays, the people massively want to emi-
grate to the United States. And 500 human beings are dying on the
border per year. More than died during the 29 years of the Berlin
Wall. About the Berlin Wall the press talks, the world still talks. But
about the wall there is between the United States and Mexico, in the
territory that was snatched away from that country in an expansion-
ary war –that wall isn’t mentioned. There are already 500. I have seen
a cable talking about the organizations that exist in the occupied U.S.
territory that have organized themselves as groups of hunters, to hunt
those who don’t die suffocated, run over on the highways, high-speed
roads, trying to escape the vigilance.
That phenomenon is also threatening this collective or sole
imperialism, whichever way you want to call it. It is a matter of taste.
I only see one giving orders and telling the others what they have to
do. And the others will in any case be sub-imperialists, vice-imperial-
ists, office assistants of an imperialism. What do they do? The obey
orders. It is terrible to obey orders. We have all defended the United
Nations, and on principle, although it has committed more than one
mistake, because that famous empire has twisted its arm more than
once. Now they are going to convince us that there is democracy in the
United Nations, and that they are providing an example to the entire
world of what democracy is. There, where 80% vote against the block-
ade because it is already something so contemptible and so disgusting
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that nobody defends it. The United States is left with the vote of Israel
and of a little island –well, for me there are no big or little islands– of
a small state. Three votes. Year after year it was been growing. The
scare was so great when the socialist camp fell that we got 56, 57 votes
against the blockade. It was a tragedy to see the ambassadors to the
United Nations, where they hid themselves, what they did, what they
invented, whether they went to the bathroom, because the voting is
open. If at the United States the voting were secret as the rules estab-
lish, the number of votes there against the proposals of the United
States would be multiplied tenfold. One must be bold to vote at the
United Nations. Notice that in a secret vote they expelled the United
States government from the Human Rights commission. Cuba is
always chosen. The country that has submitted most motions in favor
of the true rights and interests in favor of peoples is Cuba. It has never
abandoned a cause. Of course, that voting is secret. And in secret votes
Cuba obtains an uproar. And that secret voting punishes a hypocriti-
cal policy of condemning Cuba on human rights. Nobody wants to
condemn Cuba.
Terrorism
We have a clear position on terrorism: during the revolution acts of
terrorism were never carried out. I mean to say: there never was eco-
nomic sabotage against cane and that kind of activity. I don’t recall in
our entire little war, which lasted twenty-five months, the case of a
single civilian killed because of that war. To d a y, defending the father-
land has turned into terrorism. We are opposed to actions that lead to
the death of innocent people. We shall never support any action like
that. The causes may be understood; we have to analyze and explain
them. Circumstances are not alike in all places. In some it is easier to
stick to a line. And we stuck to it during the entire war. Never was a
prisoner beaten, mistreated, executed. Of course, the policy toward
the population and the policy toward the foe were factors that helped
us to win the war in a very short time and with a minimum of
weapons. First the foes fought to the death, and then there were sol-
diers who surrendered. They had a certain discipline, they had mili-
tary training because Batista’s soldiers were drilled, and by United
States instructors. But then every time they were in a losing battle
they did not resist to the last. The knew they would not be executed
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after defeat. It is an ethics we have stuck to, and yet, how often have
they stated that there is torture in our country! Prove a single case of
torture. We offer them what we possess and what we don’t possess,
we give them everything, if they can prove just one. There is the his-
tory of what happened at the Bay of Pigs, an invasion with merce-
naries, attacked by United States planes with Cuban markings. A sur-
prise attack. But on August 15 they touched our airfields, our tiny air
force. There were more planes than pilots. We committed the fool-
ishness of having the planes all lined up, as the Soviets had when the
World War started –technology of Soviet academic discipline. Thank
goodness we applied our own criterion in all essential things. But
some foolishness did get copied. For us it was a line of conduct in the
w a r. We made laws establishing punishment with severe penalties. In
the matters related to the penalties our own criteria have gradually
varied, although we never sympathized with capital punishment. But
the problem was when our small guerrilla force had the need to apply
a severe penalty, and they were very few. The problem resided in seek-
ing, in selecting the people to carry out the execution of the penalty.
That was an order that our fighters found repugnant. That is the
m o r a l i t y, the ethics, in which we have organized ourselves over the
course of 44 years. I would dare to ask whether anyone has heard of
a war in which no enemy prisoner has been executed. I don’t know if
the United States war of independence was so absolutely saintly that
they never shot a prisoner. On the basis of what I know of the histo-
ry of wars, of all wars and everywhere, shooting prisoners almost
forms part of a culture. Sometimes they do so en masse; other times
they do so individually. I don’t know of a single case. But when we
were attacked using our own markings, we had many more casualties
than the attackers. It was precisely because of the surprise attack and
because the fighting took place day and night, without any rest,
which gave no time to the invaders to set up a puppet government
there, so that in such a democratic manner as they have always acted,
they would have invited us as platoons of the different countries of
the OAS accompanying, for example, the 40,000 soldiers sent to
Santo Domingo at the time of the Dominican rebellion in 1965.
They now come to Latin America to recruit youths to invade
Iraq. In 500 years that had never happened. Unheard of. Never did a
Spanish gentleman come here to recruit Latin Americans to fight in
Morocco, in the Philippines, in any colony! The only case: Spaniards
sent a troop of Cubans to the war of independence of the United
States. Entire battalions of mulattos were sent and fought for the inde-
pendence of the United States. So that if they really brought us free-
dom in the year 1898, including the sacrifice of paying Spain 150 mil-
lion dollars for the purchase of Cuba, well, it left us even –Cubans had
gone to fight for the independence of the United States. From the log-
ical point of view you know the history well. It isn’t my intention to
describe it here. But, well, this man comes here to recruit Latin
Americans under the command of the Spanish legion, and the part
about the group of mercenaries is under the command of the Polish
leadership. None other than the country that for 600 years was invad-
ed every ten or twenty years. There the church of the Catholic religion
and the Polish nation were united over the course of those years.
And today, there, at the head of that force; under the command
of the Spanish legion, the young Latin Americans. It’s horrible. What
are they doing there? It would have been fairer to send a million dol-
lars to the Dominicans instead of asking for Dominican blood for a
war of conquest. Everybody knows what the Cuban position has
been. During the other war we were on the Security Council, and we
had a critical position7. We could not be in agreement with the occu-
pation of Kuwait. That was politically unfair and mistaken. It’s as if
we now claimed Florida since it was a possession of the colony of
Cuba. There were serious political mistakes and we condemned them.
Neither did we favor other actions, which in our view were mistaken,
undertaken by the Iranian leadership. And with the same morality we
condemn a war of conquest to take possession, by military means if
n e c e s s a r y, of the reserve of oil that is so essential for this civilization.
So essential that it cannot do without it, so essential that it is destroy-
ing nature and poisoning the atmosphere. It has been proven and it
was known that no such weapons existed. It is known how many chil-
dren died. A blockade... The blockade against us was tens of years
o l d e r. Currently, by virtue of a law that was sabotaged as much as pos-
sible, the sale of food for cash is authorized to our country. A major-
ity of the Senate with 36 against backed the suspension of the ban on
travel to Cuba. It is the United States government that bans travel to
Cuba, but all this is being weakened. Will it reach half a century? That
blockade against Iraq wasn’t as harsh as that against Cuba. At some
point it was able to sell fuel.
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I was explaining that we feel we have the moral standing to condemn
this war. Ninety-one percent of Spaniards condemned the war against
Iraq. Consider that Spain, rather, had historical relations with the
Arabs; consider that the Spanish language has many words that come
from Arab! Why this fury? This gentleman has turned into a bootlick-
er of the United States. Some call him “the Spanish Celestina,” with
this business of going around seeking Latin American youths to go
there to kill, to back the occupation of Iraq. It should be discussed
whether the Celestina should continue. What is the Spanish Celestina
up to, recruiting young men to spill their blood in an unjust war of
conquest? I’m extremely grateful, but I’d be more grateful if they real-
ized that it is time for Latin American countries not to move around
with Spanish-Portuguese baby walkers. They belong to the same hon-
ored institution as we do: the Ibero-American Summit. Although we
are the only undemocratic country in the hemisphere. They want to
question Chávez, but they still grant us the great honor of being the
only undemocratic one. But that is what democracy is! Cuba was con-
quered with twelve horses. Thank goodness they didn’t get as far as
India. If Columbus had been right they would have got there with the
twelve ponies. First they called us Indians by mistake; then came
another one and called us Americans; then came our friends from the
north and took that “Americans” bit away from us. The neighbors up
north are the Americans everywhere; we aren’t. I would be content if
they would call us inhabitants of the planet Earth; ultimately that’s
what we will end up being first of all.
Here there has been no talk about ecology and I don’t know
what new world you are going to build if the inhabitants of the plan-
et disappear. There is another thing that isn’t mentioned and it is the
unequal terms of exchange. It seem that academicians cannot speak
of certain things. Today the price of coffee is an infinitesimal frac-
tion of what it was. What our country produces has been replaced
through science and technology. Perhaps Latin Americans have con-
tributed to this development. Nobody is going to protest against the
development of science, technology, production. But what they pro-
duce they sell to us at higher prices and what we produce they buy
from us ever more cheaply. Trade agreements: the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA) is the latest fashionable word; before it was the
F TA. And they had created the WTO, which has evolved enormously.
It has turned into one of the main sacking instruments. Those who
hold 90% of the world’s patents already want to double the number
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of years that the patent remains in force. That is the brilliant future
that awaits us. Of course it’s worth giving one’s life for that imperi-
alism, for that democracy!
Venezuela was robbed and I have no problem with saying so: I
am a brother of the Bolivarian movement. I am ready to give my life
for the Bolivarian movement. Although I respect opinion. Very often
one doesn’t know or doesn’t have all the factors for evaluation avail-
able. I recall that in the last forty years in Venezuela, under those
super-democratic governments, independently of what they stole, cap-
ital flight totaled around 300 billion dollars. You must surely be think-
ing of today’s dollars. But it’s the dollars of before, which were worth
much more. This car costs 10,000 dollars; the ton of wheat stood at
186. U.S. wheat is not of bad quality. I am not speaking of other wheat
that is sold to us. I don’t want to give adverse publicity to anyone; at
least for the time being I won’t speak. Especially about some products
from very humanitarian countries that have taken humanitarian aid
away from us. It’s a miracle we’re alive. Humanitarian aid: four mil-
lion per year over the last four years, on average. Well, one sometimes
accepts humanitarian aid out of courtesy. There are other times when
one accepts it with real gratitude, even if it is worth one cent. But
some European humanitarian assistance, I say in all honesty, can only
be received out of courtesy. Because humanitarian aid and hypocrisy
are irreconcilable at least in the feelings of a revolutionary. How much
did they buy from us? Around 1.5 billion dollars: raw materials, which
might be nickel, tobacco; no longer sugar because they had already
ruined the country with their subsidies. An elementary calculation of
the earnings they can make selling to Cuba for 1.5 billion dollars: I get
around 400 million dollars. They sell much more expensively to it,
they charge it higher interest. If there is a credit it is much more
expensive. All the arts are known on how to earn money; let us call it
delicately, so as not to use the word “steal” money, so as not to say “pil-
laging” of countries. They give us a million dollars (in humanitarian
aid) for every 100 million in profit. The blockade also helps there. You
buy and pay this amount, or I don’t sell it to you. I give you a credit
and you pay usurious interest, or I don’t give it to you. Many developed
countries with those democracies have benefited from the blockade.
I was referring to whether they gave or didn’t give. It is we who
are giving humanitarian assistance to you. We also demonstrate to you
how much we have helped the countries of the Third World. We have
8,000 medical students from countries of Latin America, the Caribbean
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and other places. How many of our doctors go to Africa? And where
there isn’t a medical school, they organize one. And all this is done for
free. At our universities there are 15,000 students on scholarships. If
you work out how much a study course costs at a U.S. university, espe-
cially at a medical school, the result of the cooperation in human value
that we can produce is of around 400 or 500 million dollars. Investing
in human capital, we can help in very high amounts. It is the aid that
this blockaded country provides to the countries of the Third Wo r l d .
This aid is gradually transformed into technological assistance. We
have developed a great program for teaching how to read and write
over the radio and we have given it to several countries. We have devel-
oped other highly important things in educational matters. Our coop-
eration with the countries of Central America, Haiti... Our country
serves 75% of the Haitian population. Cuban physicians have reduced
child mortality in the areas where they work in Guatemala from 42 to
6%. We could work out how many tens of thousands of lives were
saved. And we would be wrong because we could measure them in hun-
dreds of thousands of lives saved. The number of fellow countrymen
who are providing services in the field of health is higher than ever. The
country was left with 3,000 doctors of the 6,000 it had when the revo-
lution won. The doors were opened. The neighbors up North wanted to
take our doctors away from us. That empire which has moments in
which it is tougher and others when it is less tough; it depends on per-
sonalities, on different factors. And that’s because everything evolves.
But everything evolves in favor of greater power, of a greater capacity
to cause harm, political evolution, scientific evolution, the disappear-
ance of the other power, in sum. This was over forty years ago.
Thousands of doctors weren’t ready, when the revolution triumphed, to
go up into the mountains, to go to the countryside. That’s because it
was really necessary to come from a higher class to get a high-school
diploma and to study medicine at the only medical school there was.
Today the country has 84 medical schools. The moment came when we
graduated 80,000 from high school per year and 6,000 medical students
graduated. Today our country has at least twenty times as many uni-
versity graduates as when the revolution won. And we advance in the
search of a comprehensive general culture, toward the massification of
college education. It is the fate of a generation that we are discussing.
How does a man who is in the fourth grade choose between one gov-
ernment program and another? It is evident that what ends up being
predominant is a political machinery, money, propaganda. How is one
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to explain that democracy can be spoken of when everybody knows
that the most important thing in a United States election campaign is
money? Everybody knows that the current president had a record
amount of campaign money. Everybody knows that the large oil com-
panies had given the largest amount of money they had ever con-
tributed to the election campaign. Everybody knows that despite every-
thing that was written by the Encyclopedists and what the U.S.
Constitution says, in the 1800s slavery persisted. One would have to
explain what kind of democracy that was. I’d be ready to discuss
whether democracy exists in the United States today. It was in 1861, no
less, that that bloody war began and slavery formally ended8. I would
ask what democracy U.S. blacks enjoyed. And today I ask: what democ-
racy is there in the ghettos? I believe that ignorance, in this period
more than in any other, is the fundamental instrument of a, let’s say,
mental order, if not of an economic order or instrument of power. I
w o n ’t say that in the Roman era education was a fundamental element.
One should see how many citizens could read and write. It was a sys-
tem of domination via force. I ask myself: how can a citizen think in
this ill-named civilization? In this world, a trillion dollars are invested
in commercial advertising per year. Commercial advertising forms an
important part of the GDP. The man of the tribe, of the clan, decided if
he could kill a boar or a deer. Not today. Today you are told what meat
you have to cook, if it is hog or boar meat. What clothes you must wear.
In tribal days people thought, although they knew very little; today peo-
ple are subjected to levels of advertising that cancel thinking. For what
other reasons are a trillion dollars spent on commercial advertising?
See what a democratic civilization! See what absolute freedom! The
exercise of intelligence is suppressed. Because they can exert domi-
nance through ignorance. We have been talking here about the subject
of the FTAA. I have given long speeches about the need to shape con-
sciousness. The battle of ideas, almost everybody is admitting, is a
question of shaping consciousness.
8 This refers to the U.S. Civil War, 1861-1865, in which the pro-slavery and separatist South was defeat-
ed by the Northern states.
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Imperialism, the FTAA and Latin America
When military technology is talked about, the great power enjoys an
immense superiority. When it arrives, it invades and conquers the ter-
r i t o r y. But it is unable to administer it. You know that we have been
regarded by the United States as a terrorist country. I have met a
series of administrators, officials. I have met James Carter, and inde-
pendently of the points of view that I did not share I must admit he
is a man of culture. Bill Clinton is a man of culture. I said that
Roosevelt was a statesman. But some others boasted of only having
read two books in their life!
Someone mentioned here the pretexts for an invasion of Cuba.
Fifteen pretexts had already been drawn up and had been approved.
That was what gave rise to the risks of a nuclear war. Among those pre-
texts was that of seeking the way to reach a passenger plane: they are
around there and are easy to find. Because they accused us, on
account of the bringing down of a plane, of I don’t know how many
violations. The number of times they violated our airspace! I don’t
know what would happen if one sent a plane to fly over Miami, or
Washington, or New York and they told it to stop and it didn’t. It would
be interesting to ask anyone what the United States would do if a
Cuban plane did that. It wouldn’t last even five minutes. The
Torriccelli law came, the Helms-Burton law, and the blockade was
tightened much more to try to strangle the country. The truth about
the United States is seldom known. Accusing the country of being ter-
rorist! Why? Because it felt like it. Consider that thousands of Cubans
have died. The plane with young people that they exploded; they killed
the entire fencing team. And it was done by someone who was living
in Miami. That place is full of terrorists –proven. With regard to the
May 20 speech they gave us the order to renounce socialism. There
you are. At a commemorative ceremony that gathered millions of real
people. Because it is said out there that 20,000 people gathered and it
isn’t true. I say that in Cuba’s smallest township many more people
gather than do for the presidential campaigns of many United States
candidates who obtain victory. Because those democracies don’t draw
anyone. Only on the basis of ignorance can that picture be painted.
Why don’t they carry out a plebiscite? I see it ever more unlikely,
because people are already in the know. The fact that 91% are opposed
to the plans of the Celestina is already a lot. A very recent fact, I don’t
remember the exact date: the vast majority of Latin Americans are
learning to discuss what an unjust war is, a measly movie and cheap
propaganda. Now there is a movement against the FTAA that is grow-
ing with your efforts and those of the forces of the left, but three years
ago it wouldn’t have been impossible for them to impose the FTAA
through a plebiscite and to tell fifty tales regarding the great virtues,
the wealth they would have, the employment, the exports index. A
hundred billion produced by the maquiladoras! What percentage had
Mexican components? I believe that 5 or 6% of the components of
those exports were Mexican, and only 18% of the components of the
other industries that exported to the United States were Mexican.
Today the remittances or the money from the remittances that arrive
in Mexico from the United States reaches 14 billion dollars. The great-
est income in hard currency of an oil-producing country are the remit-
tances. Although oil has maintained its price, which is above 30 and
on occasions up to 35 dollars per barrel. And now one knows about the
unemployment figure which rises. The number of jobs that are lost
each month and each year. The agreements were opposed by some –a
minority. Mexicans didn’t know what the FTAA was, what the FTA was.
And among Mexicans there is a certain level of education, because the
revolution built many schools and took a series of very positive steps.
It was a true social revolution in its time. Before the Mexican revolu-
tion the tremendous poverty led to the explosion of the revolution.
Such as Bolivia’s poverty leads to today. I remember that when the
uprising took place the miners used dynamite and they even defeated
the forces of repression9. In Cuba the MNR triggered a lot of enthusi-
asm. I don’t want to be presented as an agitator. Nor as a partner. I am
not your partner, Evo. I am your brother.
I said at one point that in 1959 Latin America owed 5 billion.
Today it owes 750 billion. We fought major battles over this debt busi-
ness. Here there were a great many meetings of students, of unions, of
women, of intellectuals, of political personalities. It is known how
much is owed, the problems are known, it is known that happened with
Argentina, it is also known that in Brazil the 40 billion dollars produced
by the privatizations were lost in six weeks seeking money to maintain
the parity between the real and the dollar. They employed certain
mechanisms and created a currency with parity. By creating a curren-
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cy with parity this determined the end of the election campaign, with a
violent crisis preceded by that of Southeast Asia. There the others
injected around 80 billion dollars because that crisis wasn’t convenient
for them any more. That crisis had been extremely serious and they
provided help. But the fact is that everything that was contributed by
the privatization lasted barely six weeks. It was just before an election
campaign and in such circumstances there are certain criteria. If you
owe your political strength to the fact of having annihilated inflation
and having placed the currency on a par you would have to be truly
someone committed to renounce all interests to proceed to do what
should have been done: devalue that currency. The crisis aided the tri-
umph of Lula and of the progressive forces. But in what condition did
they leave him the country! Nobody knows it exactly, but some calcu-
lations put Brazil’s foreign debt at between 250 and 300 billion dollars.
As much as all of Latin America owed, and that doesn’t count the
domestic debt. A social situation that demands an urgent solution.
Nobody can ask Lula today to speak of the foreign debt. That was his
struggle, but they left him such conditions that it is impossible to talk
about the foreign debt there save within specific parameters. Before
Lula left the opposition the IMF acted and lent 30 billion dollars and
only 5 billion had been used. They left 25 billion. The reserve has the
Brazilian government well handcuffed. I won’t rush to condemn the
Brazilian government. It is too soon. The situation is very difficult. He
has the commitment to hunger zero. It is a country that has many
resources. I believe it is a country that can do things. One cannot ask it
to incinerate itself. This is how I think. One has to take into account the
conditions it is in and to give it a bit of time. When we began the revo-
lution there was a lot that we didn’t know. Yes: these are always very
delicate subjects. I think that in two years’ time Brazil will be self-suf-
ficient in fuel. They have found major natural gas fields. The depend-
ence generated by fuel imports is a big bill. I think it is a country that
can be self-sufficient even up to 80 or 90%. I would even be laughing at
a possible blockade. Self-sufficient in fuel! With an industry that has a
certain degree of development, that produced 100 million tons of food,
soybeans, beef, etc. They have the food resources. It even manufactures
certain equipment. I don’t see that this process could fail. Yesterday a
cable by a miracle stopped short of saying he was promoting armed
struggle! I am not speaking about a rifle, or about a bullet. When I
speak about weapons I speak of those that we have. We –without stray-
ing from our doctrine of struggle, which must encompass dialectics.
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Without straying either, even one minute, from knowledge of the
weapons in the possession of the potential invader, of a people
brought up in the doctrine of war; all the people know that this coun-
try couldn’t be dominated –it could be attacked. But to reach the
extreme of what they attempted to do in Iraq... we have no wish. They
make a mistake and suffer the consequences. I was recently talking to
someone and said that however extraordinary they may be, weapons
serve for specific types of actions, in specific types of wars, and then
afterwards they can put them all away because they won’t be of any
use. An enormous arsenal of weapons isn’t enough. Also necessary is
an enormous printing plant producing green bills every day. There is
no economy that resists that, and that one least of all. They have
already over-abused the privilege of being the issuers of all the cur-
rencies in the world, the privilege of storing the money of all the cen-
tral banks, of storing the money earned by anybody who sells oil. The
United States economy has, among other things already mentioned,
the privilege of having everything, of having the money of all the
countries of the world. Like Japan, which has an amount of treasury
bonds in its power. From the economic point of view there appear
risks that threaten that economy. There are the fiscal deficits. There
are the budget deficits, which this year will surpass 400 billion dol-
lars. There are some surveys that point out that U.S. public opinion is
today more worried about economic problems than about the prob-
lems of the war itself. Changes are taking place. Criticism appears.
Polls appear. One must recognize the great merit of a group of U.S.
intellectuals who have been pointing all this out. They are not harm-
ing their people; they are fighting a battle for the welfare of the
United States people, whose interests have no reason to be divorced
from the interests of the rest of humanity.
It is a question of the system. It is the product of a historical evo-
lution, of a social type. Don’t forget that all evolutions have acted to
the detriment of human beings, of their prerogatives, of their rights, of
their freedoms. Today, of their survival. Five thousand years ago, there
didn’t exist nuclear weapons, there didn’t exist the threats or the dan-
gers that Chomsky spoke about; less than sixty years ago, the first
nuclear weapon exploded, and since that time this great danger of
extermination has existed. But 35 years ago this other deadly danger
was unknown: the environment wasn’t talked about. It seemed the
only danger of extermination could come from a nuclear war. The
population of the world has more than doubled since the victory of the
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revolution. A researcher complained that there was no African repre-
sentative at the table. And his complaint was correct. The thing is that
for this developed world Africa does not exist. There, 40% of people in
fertile age have the AIDS infection. We have doctors there. All of sub-
Saharan Africa has 50,000 doctors, mainly white. For the 500 million
inhabitants. Not long ago I was at a meeting on racism and was able
to find out the facts. Now the United States government, after the war
and surely conscious of the terrible impact, remembered there is AIDS
in Africa; the proposal was made and 15 billion dollars allocated to
fight AIDS. I am exceedingly pleased: if we had made an offer to the
United Nations, we would have offered it a number of doctors to fight
AIDS. I am going to say something. I must say it. There are mission-
aries and saints; I won’t deny it. But I know what happens in the field
of medicine: neither Europe nor the United States together, those
countries that are so democratic and developed but so lacking in the
values of solidarity, put together a sufficient number of doctors to
replace the Cuban doctors who are there, or in Guatemala. They don’t
put together five hundred doctors. No human capital was created, no
values were shaped, no programs were designed to shape people with
solidarity, capable of going anywhere, however tough it might be.
When the Nicaraguans asked us for a thousand doctors we asked for
volunteers. Already in 1979 the conscience of our country had been
developing. Thirty thousand came forward; they knew they would
have to walk, to ride on horseback. The doctor takes a lot of liking to
the families. When a doctor of ours is two years on one of those stints
and says goodbye, there are tears on the part of the family and of the
doctor. Two thousand were sent. They didn’t need more. Months later
two or three were murdered, as the did with the alphabetizers. And
what happened? A document was received with the signature of
100,000 who offered to go there. Well, that is already the fruit of a con-
sciousness, the fruit of a political culture, of a knowledge of the things
that happen in the world, of a given value that has been rooted and of
a consciousness that has been shaped. And that happened massively in
this country; I don’t know if in others it’s like that. It is the people who
are ready to defend their fatherland. Here the character of the intel-
lectual worker is massified.
Well, I say that the country can recruit hundreds of thousands
of technicians and professional people. I am not exaggerating. The
West and its democratic industrial societies enjoy abundant financial
capital but are ruined as regards human capital. Their mass media
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d o n ’t work to create a consciousness, they don’t work to spread cul-
ture and knowledge. One of the most terrible things about this system
that I criticize is that in those societies one finds the increasing phe-
nomenon that the human being is superfluous. Germany is the most
industrialized country in Europe. There constantly appear new
machines that save jobs all over. Cuba isn’t Germany. We are con-
scious of the fact that we campaign against tobacco. We cannot attain
such a pure conception as to say we won’t sell any more tobacco
because it is harmful. It is one of the country’s sources of income. But
we try to campaign against the temptation to consume any drug, alco-
hol, even cigars. Nobody bothers to talk about self-esteem, that
tremendous force, that need of the human being. Because I said, what
can be the self-esteem of an illiterate person, what can be the self-
esteem of someone who is jobless? Today whoever loses employment
at 45 loses his health, loses his self-esteem. There are people who
commit suicide simply because they have the impression they are not
longer good for anything. We have managed to reach less than 3%
unemployment in Cuba. Technically “full employment.” Meanwhile,
the U.S. people have high unemployment and no reaction is generat-
ed in the face of certain economic advances. What has risen in the
United States is the productivity of labor: many fewer people are pro-
ducing more. But the unemployment rate is not diminishing. The last
news I saw was that the request for subsidies had been of 350,000.
Between June and September it had grown 7%. No society in which
the human being is superfluous can be a fair society, can be a demo-
cratic society. They are incompatible things.
I would recommend a study to look into the value of the dollar
forty years ago, in purchasing power, and to compare it with the cur-
rent purchasing power. Then the oligarchy about which President
Chávez has spoken takes away a trillion dollars –legitimately obtained
and illegitimately obtained, because one must add a judgement factor.
There is talk of hot money, there is talk of financial corporations
whose business is to make short-term deposits; their business is to
multiply money via the interest paid to them for the loan of the
deposit; this is called hot money. It must be pointed out that in the face
of the imposed economic order, of the IMF’s laws, of the increasing
chasm between rich and poor despite what has been promised for fifty
years to those same poor whose population increases, there is an
increase in the power of a million in patents, capital, technology, sci-
entific research centers, and it is reinforced by the institutions. What
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money from a Latin American country, be it Mexican or Brazilian or
Bolivian or Argentina, can stop devaluing? If it is considered that all
accumulated citizen money of any Latin American country, legiti-
mately or illegitimately acquired, is hot money! What they have isn’t
gold. What they have is paper, with supposed values that change every
day. It is devalued, but not on account of the causes by which the dol-
lar or pound sterling are devalued, because of crisis, because of war,
although this does not hinder the pillaging. The value of the currency
of the rich countries is devalued systematically and, despite this, the
accumulation of wealth increases constantly. This occurs this way
with billions of inhabitants who live in the world, for other reasons. I
have mentioned one: unequal terms of exchange. That is how millions
of dollars have left the Third World. Not only do they pay more cheap-
ly for its product; not only do they charge more expensively for their
patents: it’s that the money, because of a natural law, must depart.
Humanity has always had some little problems with currencies. But
the alchemists’ prodigy of turning paper into gold is one of the most
important technological advances attained by the United States.
When the Second World War ended, the United States, which
had entered the war because of the Japanese attack, hadn’t lost one
screw in that war. Europe destroyed, France destroyed, Germany
destroyed, the USSR destroyed. Japan destroyed and with the gift of
two nuclear bombs dropped unnecessarily. It was an evident act of ter-
r o r. They could have organized a battlefield in a place where they had
a military base and it would have been more than sufficient. It was an
act of terror that preceded the Cold Wa r. After seeing a few tanks here
and there one understands that it is a great lie to say that what defined
the Soviet victory (after committing I don’t know how many military
mistakes) was the aid it received from the West. When the war began,
in fact, Soviet tanks were superior and had a better caliber. The mis-
trust and the errors of the person leading the Soviet Union are one of
those subjective factors of which I am thinking when I say that men’s
conduct causes the march of events to be held back. When the Soviets,
having complied with their commitments, launched the attack through
Manchuria, a few days later history heard the news of the launching of
those nuclear weapons. The unnecessary launching of those weapons.
How many nuclear weapons are there? Even the international organi-
zations pulled weapons from their pockets –it’s isn’t known where they
have them. That non-proliferation program only serves for a few who
have the monopoly to have ever more sophisticated weapons and the
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others, if they so much as manufacture one, are invaded, unless they
are an ally of the United States, as happened in the Middle East in the
case of Israel. The data are known. Once I posed a question in Rio de
Janeiro criticizing the arguments they offered when they proclaimed
N AT O ’s new military doctrine and its right to act outside the borders of
Europe in the Euro-Atlantic area. And I asked them if the Latin
American countries gathered there were or nor in the Euro-Atlantic
area. It was agreed that the question would be answered at a private
meeting. The meeting ended and they didn’t answer anything.
Afterwards there was a dinner; they were already dining. The Italian
was there. I was laughing to myself because they hadn’t answered and
he said to me, “Fidel: the answer is ‘no’.” As if saying that they are not
included. I posed another question in the case of Israel: the solution in
their judgement was a military intervention by NATO. They are going
to unleash a nuclear war complying with the Euro-Atlantic doctrine
against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and they are going to kill
Palestinians, Jews and whoever is there. When Korea spoke of a
nuclear weapon the world shuddered, and threats were issued against
Korea and whoever speaks up.
International unfairness
There is nothing fair about this world. It is unfair, unequal, arbitrary;
ours is a subjected and exploited world. On proclaiming on
September 20th 2001, that whoever did not back his project for a war
against terrorism would be considered a terrorist and be exposed to
U.S. attacks, President Bush openly ignored the United Nations’ pre-
rogative and, by virtue of the US’s military power, took on the role of
master and policeman of the world. In a recent speech he gave on the
200th anniversary of the West Point military academy –well known
for its major role in United States military history– Mr. George W.
Bush spoke fiery words to the nine hundred and ninety-eight gradu-
ating cadets. He also spoke there to the United States and to the rest
of the world. He said that “if the U.S. waits for threats to fully mate-
rialize, it will have waited too long. In the world which has been
entered into, he said, the only path to security is the path of action,
and his nation would act. US security, he told the cadets, would
require the military strength that they would lead. It was a strength,
he said, that had to be ready to attack immediately in any dark cor-
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ner of the world”. Please, let nobody try to turn off the light in this
room. “And U.S. security”, he added, “would require being ready for
preventive attacks when necessary to defend U.S. freedom and U.S.
lives”. He stated that “terrorist cells had to be discovered in sixty or
more countries; ...along with our friends and allies, the U.S. must
oppose proliferation and face the regimes that sponsor terrorism as
each case dictated. The U.S. would send diplomats wherever neces-
s a r y, and would send our soldiers wherever necessary; the security of
the United States and the peace of the planet would not be left at the
mercy of a handful of terrorists, tyrants and madmen”. I believe we
fall into both categories.
Bush added that “the U.S. would eliminate the dark threat to
that country and to the world. Some, were upset by his not being very
diplomatic, or being discourteous”. Quite some discourtesy! Speaking
in terms of good and evil! I am not in agreement! It is, Bush said, “a
conflict between good and evil, and the U.S. would call evil by its
name; when facing off against evil and anarchic regimes, the U.S. was
not creating a problem but solving one, and the U.S. would lead the
world in the struggle against the problem”. In his speech, there isn’t a
single mention of the United Nations, nor one phrase referring to peo-
ples’ right to security and peace, or to the need for a world ruled by
norms and principles. There is only talk of alliances between powers
and of war, and war in the name of peace and freedom, words which
in his mouth sound mendacious and empty like soap bubbles. What
would Roosevelt have said if he had heard a speech like that one?
Hitler never made such categorical, such precise threats as these. Sixty
or more: the question was, what might “or more” mean? Soon after-
wards, the answer came from Washington. One of the Chambers of
Congress proposed an agreement that if the International Criminal
Tribunal punished some United States serviceman... the United States
would attack Holland! I found the answer to the query. “Or more coun-
tries” means “all countries other than the United States.”
Latin America’s hour
I would like to recall what I said on May 1st and then what I said when
the high-school year began. And not because it was I who said it, but
because it is all I have. And lastly the speech I gave on September 1st
on desertification. This subject which I say is a very serious problem.
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I also pose the way to teach to read and write with some methods
which are already being employed. Not for Cuban children because
100% of Cuban children reach the sixth grade; 99.5% reach the ninth
grade. We have located all youths between 17 and 30 years of age who
haven’t studied or worked for diverse reasons, and who unfortunately
are the quarry for crime. And we have them studying, we invite them
to study, we give them some economic assistance and this has had a
tremendous reception. This began in 2001 and this year (2003) 30,000
entered university. The country has 15,000 social workers, four train-
ing schools. The amount of things that can be done with few
resources! I am not proposing, look, Evo, organize a revolution there,
set up a socialist system, call it that if you like, or you can use the old
terminology that spoke of a stage of national liberation. You recall that
things were divided into stages. That’s because we were very back-
ward, we were very schematic. Don’t tell me you are going to solve the
stage of absolute ignorance in matters of state and practical econom-
ics with academic knowledge. We know extremely brilliant academi-
cians but there are few academicians who can organize a government.
Because they become distracted, and are steeped in theory. It’s not that
they are unable. The only intellectual I know about who was capable
of organizing something was Martí. He was an intellectual, a writer,
essayist, poet, a genius. He also organized a party and organized a war.
An intellectual generally isn’t an organizer. Well, theory is important
and decisive. I know about the repercussions of what has happened
here. It’s not that I am simply flattering you. It isn’t your merit or ours:
it’s that consciousness has been maturing, it’s that the masses have
gradually acquired it, it’s that new forms of organization have
appeared. There will be a task ahead in the field of defining things. I
have said no two revolutions are alike. It would mean diminishing the
imagination and intelligence of man to think that two political
processes will be the same. Each one will always contribute some-
thing, but it is man who must achieve the synthesis. I say that it is not
an option. You have no other alternative than to solve the problems,
since this situation is unsustainable. We all know history. I know that
French revolutionaries, in the name of democracy, imitated Roman
institutions. It wasn’t known at that time that there was a great strug-
gle between patricians and plebeians and that Julius Caesar was assas-
sinated by the oligarchy.
I was talking about some books I have read. Well, some further
remarks, and then it would be better to start wrapping up. I have
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abused your patience and apologize deeply. I mean it sincerely. You
are knowledgeable people. This is the most interesting meeting of all
those in which I have participated in all these years of revolution. We
have had the luck to have the knowledge: eminent people came, we all
know; eminent U.S. professors have come. I have said some things
during my speech. I beg some of those people not to think that I am
answering anyone in particular. On the contrary; one must speak
expressing what one believes but hasn’t the slightest interest in being
discourteous or in leaving an impression of discourtesy. I respect each
person’s thinking. I thank you for the different points of view. We don’t
gain anything if all those who have the same criterion were to meet
here. Here we have many opinions, criteria, nuances. There is a whole
current of concern which I have never seen before, of progress, which
corresponds to the real fact that the world has reached this point and
that the situation demands changes. There are indeed powerful peo-
ple. Argentina and Brazil are holding discussions with the IMF.
Argentina is discussing more than anyone. Two of the most powerful
countries at this time are called Argentina and Brazil. They have in
their hands the power of the debt of approximately half a trillion dol-
lars. In this they can be more powerful than the IMF, more powerful
than the Eight all together. And nobody can raise a dagger to make
them pay, to keep the schools without funds, hospitals without funds,
unemployment at 18-20%; nobody can raise a dagger.
I don’t believe that leaders make history: the subjective factor is
influential as a plus or as a minus; they accelerate or delay. Besides, I
don’t believe in geniuses or in specially gifted people. I have the crite-
rion that society –and our species– are full of geniuses. while here we
have extremely brilliant ones, more brilliant than Martí impossible. If
all personalities in history are analyzed we shall discover that they
have arisen each time a crisis came. Then the leaders appear.
Napoleon –who would have heard about him without the French
Revolution? In all periods of history these leaders have emerged when
a crisis has come. If Evo had been born at the time when the MNR
staged that coup, in 1952, nobody would know who Evo is. So every-
thing is relative. Each person interprets things in one way or another.
I say that this is the hour of Latin America. It will depend on the peo-
ple. If Brazil and Argentina wish it –I am not advising it, I am giving
an opinion– they could give the IMF orders, because they have the
nuclear weapon of half a trillion dollars, the capacity for self-suffi-
ciency in food and in energy, I am saying in all senses, and a level of
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trade and cultural development. They can give the IMF orders. The
debts have already become so large they are reaching the critical
point. The critical point was mentioned when talking about nuclear
weapons. And it was said that when “x” amount of enriched uranium
of such a quality is put together with another, equal mass of enriched
uranium of the same quality, critical mass is achieved. The little point
at which chain reaction occurs. The IMF is over if two nations do the
same thing. Because the rest will do the same. Yes, that’s how things
are. The point is being reached in which this situation is unsustain-
able. Will the United States economy manage to rouse itself under the
current conditions of the world economy, and of the problems of the
U.S. itself? I doubt it. It may be able to do so for a short time. But each
time, the timespans are shorter. Having solved one little part doesn’t
solve anything. There will be ever more hungry people, ever more
poverty, ever more discontent, ever more rebellion. And this does not
involve weapons. In Argentina nobody fired a shot, and when they
froze the money the government fell. They blew a little, that’s all. If one
can blow a lot, so much the better. When these circumstances occur,
in Bolivia they can no longer employ the methods that were used by
the military dictatorships. They tried to do the same to us. How much
did that adventure cost them? That kind of Bay of Pigs in Guatemala.
I am going to speak of human beings: 200,000 dead. It could have hap-
pened to us if they had managed to land and send OAS troops to estab-
lish democracy. That would have happened, two and a half years after
the revolution. Many revolutionary measures had already been adopt-
ed: all ill-gotten gains had already been confiscated, we had adopted a
series of laws that had had an enormous impact on the people. In
Cuba the immense majority of the people sides with the revolution; it
isn’t known how much it would have cost. In Guatemala 200,000 dead,
and of these 100,000 have disappeared. How little is spoken of those
who monitored that revolutionary movement. The lives, the blood it
cost, the suffering of that people. In Guatemala the category of pris-
oner did not exist. They were dead or had disappeared. They cannot
solve it as in Argentina, nor as they did with Pinochet. They no longer
can. They can no longer smash civil resistance with tanks and
machineguns, massacring thousands of people, murdering, causing
disappearances. I won’t discuss whether they were 10,000 or 30,000.
Ten thousand is already an inconceivable number –and the way they
did it. And what happened in Chile. And what happened in El
Salvador. It is known; it has been studied. It seems as if none of this
had happened in the last thirty years. And the pillaging. How can the
system that I mentioned, and that produces capital flight in colossal
amounts, maintain itself? It is indefensible. Isn’t this imperialism? The
latter has exhausted all the atrocities it could commit, but that doesn’t
mean it will disappear tomorrow. What will happen with globalization
tomorrow? Will this democracy –which has just received a tremen-
dous moral blow when they forced it to approve the proposal of con-
verting the occupation of Iraq as a function of the United Nations,
without any guarantees, nor any promises, and under the leadership
of the United States government– be the only thing we can achieve? It
was said here by one of the panelists and one who has given one of the
speeches with very harsh words for what has happened with the
United Nations10. We shall see what happens. It is no longer the veto
right exercised by the great power. It inclines reverently. As regards
world public opinion, people in the United States, Spaniards and, I am
sure, the majority of Europeans, of Russians –it was the happiest
moment of their life when the resolution was approved, that the
Russians, copying the doctrine of the government of the United States,
had decided to abandon the agreement on the use of space for military
purposes. That is the situation. Nobody can sustain this. I start off
with that conviction. For a long time now, at many of the meetings we
have had here there has been talk of all these things. Stock exchanges
rose so high –a phenomenon that hadn’t happened even in 1929– that
there were stocks of high-technology industries that, in an extremely
brief period, rose from one million to 800 million dollars. They rose
800 times. We asked ourselves and searched in books for the various
theories on where that money comes from. Many things have been
mentioned here, casino economy... I think one must go deeper into all
these phenomena. We have the duty to find out what will happen. And
we have the duty to defend ourselves against two enormous dangers:
one of them of an economic, social and political order, and another of
a macro-natural order. I say goodbye to you in the hope that your
great-great-grandchildren will be able to arrive at a year 2100 in which
intelligence, education and culture prevail over instincts. Up to now,
society has done nothing else than cultivate instinct. The better world
that everyone talks about must be the fruit of the battle of education,
culture, intelligence and the values it has created against the instincts
that we inherit from nature. Optimist is the name I give to someone
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10 See the article by Perry Anderson in this same book.
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who believes that what the evolution of our species gave us in gray
matter will prevail over the biological laws that nature gave us. This,
without putting the blame on anyone save us. We thank everybody,
principally those who, to participate in this gathering, to which they
have given a lot of life with their points of view, had to overcome great
obstacles. I won’t say, Fatherland or Death. I will say: may humanity
be saved.
